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At its core, this research project is a revision of how we conceptualise the role 
of international organisations. The concept of role is often invoked International 
Relations when discussing the function of institutions like the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA), but its full meaning in this context has never been 
problematised, leading to varying perceptions of its meaning and a lack of 
common understanding in the discourse. In the case of the APSA, this lack of 
common understanding has led to a wide variance in how the role of the APSA 
is categorised, and a corresponding discrepancy in assessments of the 
institution’s success and utility, which has had a knock-on effect on policy 
recommendations, which also differ wildly from author to author.  
This thesis devises technical definitions for the various ways in which the word 
role is utilised in International Relations and related fields, and in so doing, aims 
to standardise our understanding of the role of institutions, using the APSA as a 
case study.  
After developing a new technical definition of role based on Role Theory, the 
thesis develops a research programme which sets out to investigate the true 
role of the APSA, based on an examination of how the APSA’s role has been 
shaped by key limiting and enabling factors, and how this role is shaped and 
influenced, and directed; all the while highlighting how it differs from the 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction and Literature Review 
The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
The African Union (AU) was established on 9 July 2002, superseding the old 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The African Union Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) began to develop alongside the operationalisation of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union. The Constitutive Act set out many of the 
key institutions, powers and responsibilities of the nascent framework, and was 
soon supplemented by the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council (2002), the Common African Defence and Security Policy 
(2004g) and many other legal documents that collectively constitute the APSA. 
Ten years since its operationalisation in 2002, the APSA has already been 
involved in three major military peace missions, referred to by the APSA as 
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) as they often deploy early in the peace 
process. These were, chronologically, the African Union Mission in Burundi 
(AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—which has since evolved 
into the United Nations/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)—and 
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It has also sponsored an 
intervention in Comoros, Operation Democracy in the Comoros, designed to 
overthrow an unconstitutional secessionist government on the island of 
Anjouan. AMISOM and AMIS alone have cost hundreds of millions of dollars 
per annum to maintain, and severe capacity gaps within the AU and its member 
states have led the AU to rely extensively upon its external partners–countries 
and organisations who value the APSA’s contribution to peace and security 
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enough to continue paying its bills and providing other support such as training, 
mentoring and the provision of expertise and equipment. 
The APSA has had a polarising effect on the discourse, attracting equal 
measures of cynicism and optimism. One reason for this discord, which will be 
investigated in detail below, has been the failure of APSA scholars to agree 
upon what the APSA is supposed to do; scholars with high expectations of the 
role of the APSA and its PSOs have a correspondingly low assessment of its 
success. This project will address the inconsistency of these expectations by 
reconceptualising what we mean by the role played by the APSA. It will do this 
by problematising the definition of an organisation’s role and replacing the 
mundane definition with more precise technical definitions. A more accurate 
understanding of what the APSA’s role is will allow for a more accurate 
assessment of its success or failure at performing that role. 
Importantly, this thesis is not written with the primary aim of telling the APSA 
what to do, or what it should be doing, or what its weaknesses are. The real aim 
of this study is to facilitate a more objective basis for assessments of the 
APSA’s utility as a peace and security actor, as well as the corresponding 
decisions about the allocation and extent of support by explaining what the role 
of the APSA really is, what it can be expected to achieve and what it should not 
be expected to achieve. As the following literature review will show, every 
APSA scholar has a slightly different list of recommendations as a result of their 
pre-existing and disparate perceptions of the role of the APSA. This thesis 




In order to facilitate a tight and pragmatic focus to the thesis, a number of 
qualifications and limits have been imposed upon this project. First, the thesis 
will not describe the APSA’s institutions, other than how they directly affect the 
APSA’s role; after ten years, there is now a healthy body of scholarly work 
analysing the initial treaty framework and describing the various components of 
the APSA. This previous work has allowed the current project to assume a 
basic level of prior knowledge about the APSA, enabling it to take a more 
analytical tone from the outset, putting this well established scholarship in the 
context of the role of the its effect upon the role of the APSA. Second, the 
thesis will concentrate only on the APSA’s first ten years of operation, from 
2002-2012, and it will focus only on the APSA itself.  
The acronym APSA is not consistently used; it is defined by academics, 
practitioners and journalists alike as either the “African Union Peace and 
Security Architecture” or, the broader term, the “African Peace and Security 
Architecture”. The former term is less common, and may or may not include the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs). 
The latter term is usually used as a reference to the former, although it 
sometimes also includes non-AU security institutions on the continent. 
For the sake of clarity and focus, when this thesis refers to the ‘APSA’, it is in 
reference to the former definition—the “African Union Peace and Security 
Architecture”—and will not include the security architecture of the RECs and 
RMs. Although they are officially part of the African Union architecture, their 
integration into the continental system is ongoing. The Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States 
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(ECCAS) and the East African Community (EAC) have all fielded peace support 
operations of various sizes, and have done so with the authorisation of, and in 
consultation with the continental level; however, they all have their own 
independent treaty frameworks, revenue streams, decision-making bodies and 
force generation systems that are separate from each other and from the AU. 
The relationship between the RECs/RMs and the AU Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) often resembles the relationship between the APSA and the UN 
Security Council. As a result of this separateness, and in order to focus study 
on the AU architecture in particular detail, as a single institutional framework, 
the RECs, RMs and other security frameworks operating in Africa—including, 
for example, the UN, the Arab League and the United States’ Trans-Sahara 
Counter-Terrorism Partnership—have been largely left out of this study, except 
for where they affect the role played by the APSA. The APSA itself will be 
treated as an ‘institution’; institutionally separate from the wider web of African 
security actors, and even largely separate from the wider AU, which is not 
focused on peace and security issues. The APSA as an ‘institution’ is based 
around the AU’s core peace security organs; the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), the PSC Secretariat, the AU Commission’s Peace and Security 
Department (PSD), the Peace Support Operations division (PSOD) and the 
Military Staff Committee (MSC). The PSC forms the focal point of the APSA, 
and its decisions and declarations are only rubber-stamped by the African 
Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, which nonetheless sets 
the agenda for the PSC.  
The institutional nature of the APSA is discussed in considerable detail in the 
following chapters, particularly in chapter six. Treating the APSA as a single 
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institution lends the current study greater focus and clarity, and, importantly, 
makes the methodology and the conclusions of the work more easily 
transferable to other institutions. 
The remainder of this chapter will introduce the research topic in more detail. It 
will first examine a selection of key texts from the relevant literature, focusing 
only on those that have addressed the APSA directly. This review will give an 
overview of the fractured perceptions of the role of the APSA in the discourse, 
and highlight how this has led to equally fractured perceptions of the success 
and the utility of the APSA as a peace and security actor. The chapter will 
conclude with a discussion of the key themes in the literature, placing the 
current research in context and explaining why it is needed, and will then briefly 
introduce the structure of the thesis and the research methodology.  
APSA scholarship and the Academic Debate 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union came into effect ten years ago, and 
since then the APSA has accrued a small, but relatively vibrant discourse of 
increasingly focused and analytical scholarship. In order to understand why the 
current research is so important, and how it will enhance the existing discourse, 
it is necessary to examine the key themes of APSA scholarship over the past 
ten years. This brief review will demonstrate that there are several crucial flaws 
in the existing discourse, and that a true understanding of the role of the APSA 
requires a different approach. 
First, however, it is necessary to define what counts as APSA scholarship. 
There has been a lively discourse on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
(e.g. Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the 
Politics of Africa 1963 to 1993 (Walraven 1999), The Organization of African 
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Unity: an Analysis of its Role (Naldi 1999)1) and other African organisations 
involved in peacekeeping, including key RECs ECOWAS and SADC (e.g. 
Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa 
(Adebajo 2002b), West Africa: From a Security Complex to a Security 
Community (Bah 2005), SADC: Towards a Security Community (Ngoma 
2003)).  There are also many relevant debates within IR theory, especially 
those focused around security cooperation, English School theory, neo-
Institutionalism, peacekeeping theory and other related fields, which overlap 
with many of the core themes addressed in this thesis (e.g. Security Regimes 
(Jervis 1982), Security Communities (Adler & Barnett 1998), Regions and 
Powers: The Structure of International Security (Buzan & Wæver 2003), 
Beyond Anarchy: the Importance of Security Institutions (Lake 2006); 
nonetheless, they remain only contextually relevant to the current study. The 
following section will instead concentrate on the African Union Peace and 
Security Architecture’s own growing body of discourse, as this is the immediate 
conversation in which the current research takes place.  
This conversation did not really exist until about 2005, before which most of the 
literature was still focused on the OAU, often only acknowledging AU in 
passing; early APSA scholarship has considerable crossover with the OAU 
scholarship, especially before the operationalisation of the Protocol Establishing 
the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in 2004. The scholarship of 
this period, although often informative, could provide little more than a 
breakdown of the security provisions in the AU Constitutive Act and its 
protocols and some speculative analysis thereof (e.g. The Peace and Security 
                                                 
1
 Like the APSA discourse, ‘role’ is not explicitly defined in these examples. 
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Council of the African Union: The Known Unknowns (Levitt 2003), The Right of 
Intervention Under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference 
to Non-Intervention (Kioko 2003), Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The 
African Union Treaty and Human Rights (Udombana 2002)).  
2005 was a turning point in the scholarly debate, and coincided with the 
deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which, after the 
relatively effective African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), began to evince 
the key limitations on the role played by the APSA, a shift that will be explored 
further in Chapter 7.  
The APSA scholarship surveyed for the following review is all drawn from 2005 
onwards, and focuses on three areas; describing the APSA’s treaty framework, 
describing the extent of the operationalisation of the APSA and/or assessing 
how successful the APSA has been as a peace and security actor in Africa, and 
prescribing what should be done to increase its success. Despite the fact that 
these APSA scholars have been using similar methodologies, and looking at 
much of the same evidence, the discourse is fractured when it comes to 
answering this final question. In practice, every different author has come up 
with a slightly different answer, ranging on a scale from APSA optimists like Tim 
Murithi, to APSA pessimists like Paul Williams. Further, there has been a wide 
range of different recommendations posited by the authors in order to enable 
the APSA to be more successful in performing its role, some of whom seem to 
be encouraging the organisation to move in contradictory directions. The 
following section will examine this wide range of interpretations of the APSA’s 





For Murithi, a leading APSA expert who was interviewed for this thesis, the role 
of the APSA is all about African ownership of African security issues. One of his 
earliest books dealing with the APSA, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, 
Peacebuilding and Development (2005), provides a general overview of the 
AU’s early years in the context of Pan-Africanism, giving it a strong ideological 
component. The book is focused on the AU and its role in continental political 
and economic integration; the AU’s institutions are put in the context of a 
decades-long struggle towards African unification. “The African Union”, he 
asserts, “provides a new opportunity for revitalizing the Pan-Africanist agenda 
of united Africans and the Diaspora and encouraging them to work in solidarity 
with each other” (2005: 36). Most of the book is concerned with economic and 
structural development and is, therefore, out of the scope of this review; 
however, the fourth chapter is devoted to the APSA. Here, Murithi discusses 
the main differences between the OAU’s security architecture and that of the 
AU, and he highlights the AU’s engagement with civil society, human security 
and enhancing popular ownership of the organisation as core elements of the 
APSA’s role. The book also puts the creation of the ASF within the same 
context: the pan-Africanist drive to unify Africa’s armed forces (2005: 83). 
Writing in 2005, he also tries to assess the effectiveness of the APSA, claiming 
that, although the extent of the role played by the APSA in the field by that time 
may have been modest, it was nonetheless a significant success for the AU to 
have a field presence in some of the most unstable parts of the continent. The 
book views the APSA as a success because, despite numerous setbacks in the 
planning stages, it has shown strong political will to engage with African 
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problems. Murithi argues that the AU will continue to face significant 
challenges, which must be overcome if the AU is to achieve its goal of building 
sustainable peace and promoting development, but on the whole, The African 
Union presents a positive view of early developments in the AU’s peace and 
security structure. 
This positive view of the APSA is developed in a more focused and analytical 
manner in an article penned by Murithi in collaboration with Richard Gueli a few 
years later: ‘The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: the African 
Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African 
Union Mission in Somalia’ (Murithi and Gueli 2008). This article describes the 
evolution of the security architecture in Africa from the OAU, through the 
foundation of the AU, and to more contemporary developments. The article also 
discusses the evolution of the AU’s nascent relationship with its external 
partners, especially its relationship with the EU and the UN. 
The APSA’s role in Africa’s peace and security environment had expanded by 
2008; with AU troops deployed simultaneously in Sudan and Somalia, Murithi 
and Gueli’s article describes the now almost fully operationalised APSA as a 
fundamental paradigm shift in the African peace and security environment. The 
authors again reinforce the importance of African ownership to the role played 
by the APSA and urge the APSA to strengthen this role. Although they do not 
necessarily expect the APSA to be able to deploy North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO)-style PKOs, they do advocate for the AU to increase its 
efforts to assume a leadership role in peace and security that will focus the will 
of Africa’s political leadership as well as the AU’s external partners: “The AU 
will need to seriously orient the political leadership of the continent and take 
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decisive and necessary action, without which the challenges of ensuring 
successful peace operations will not be met” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 82).  
The authors further promoted the APSA’s role as a pan-Africanist organisation 
by heavily recommending that the APSA develop common collective security 
norms and practices as well as clearly delineating the division of labour 
between the continental level and the subregional level.  
In their assessment of existing structures, mobilising resources is considered to 
be the biggest problem that the AU has, particularly acquiring financial 
contributions from the member states. The authors also suggest that the AU 
should develop its logistical capacity. Yet, despite this recognition of insufficient 
resourcing, the authors express some concern at the evolution of the AU-UN 
partnership, warning of a new form of paternalism through the UN’s “‘fatherly’ 
coterie of advisors” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). They warn that, although the 
APSA may be best suited to the local peace and security environment, they 
should avoid a situation where APSA troops do the fighting while the UN gives 
the orders.  
The article’s discussion of the APSA field missions finds many positive aspects 
to report, especially in AMIB. Nonetheless, the authors do acknowledge the 
APSA’s serious problems in terms of planning and point to military and financial 
capacity gaps as severe handicaps that have limited its success in the field.  
Despite the more cautious tone, the article still sees the APSA as a success, 
though beset on all sides with challenges. The article underscores the fact that 
the APSA still has serious work ahead of it to improve its ability to deliver peace 
and security to Africa’s citizens, but the authors were keen to point out that, 
even though the APSA was still in its early years, it had already gained 
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considerable field experience in missions of varying types throughout the 
continent. These experiences, even the negative ones, were part of the learning 
process. 
Departing somewhat from Murithi and Gueli’s pan-Africanist ideology, but 
remaining similarly enthusiastic about the APSA, Stephan Klingebiel’s chapter 
in Africa and Fortress Europe, entitled Peace and Security Policy of the African 
Union and the Regional Security Mechanisms (2007), seeks to evaluate the 
AU’s approach to peace and security. He judges the success of the APSA by 
assessing the level of operationalisation of the AU’s security institutions. The 
chapter begins in the familiar format of summarising the AU peace and security 
framework in reference to the AU Treaty and the PSC protocol. Here, Klingebiel 
explains how the establishment of the African Union heralded a fundamental 
shift from the OAU’s peace and security architecture through an examination of 
the institutional makeup of the AU peace and security architecture as well as 
the AU’s relationship with the EU. 
The author then describes how the APSA serves as a focal point for the peace 
and security agenda at the continental level, discussing its advantages over the 
OAU model. In particular, Klingebiel highlights the importance of the normative 
shift with the establishment of the AU, explaining that the role of the APSA is to 
assume responsibility for peacekeeping in the continent in line with the African 
solutions to African problems doctrine, rather than leaving conflict management 
to the whim of western states and the UN. Indeed, he applauds the AU’s efforts 
to make it clear “that the involvement of other countries in this area is welcome 
only on condition that they are prepared to cooperate within the framework of 
AU approaches and that they are invited to do so” (Klingebiel 2007: 74). 
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Klingebiel also highlights the importance of the APSA’s African ownership by 
claiming that the AU has been well served by many recognisable personalities 
including South Africa’s President Mbeki, Mali’s President Konaré and 
President Obasanjo of Nigeria, as well as the many civil society organisations 
that work closely with the AU. 
However, like Murithi and Gueli, Klingebiel also highlights the APSA’s lack of 
capacity; materiel, financial backing and military capacity—including the African 
Standby Force (ASF), which was yet to make any real progress towards 
operationalisation. Klingebiel also suggests that the AU ought to direct more 
attention to non-violent conflict management, such as post-conflict 
reconstruction, which had been neglected during the APSA’s operationalisation. 
For Klingebiel, these problems serve to highlight the importance of the APSA’s 
relationship with the EU, especially the EU’s Africa Peace Facility (APF), a fund 
of an initial EUR 250 million that had been diverted for use by the APSA itself 
and has been used to fund the AU’s field missions. The author highlights that 
the APF and the EU’s renewed commitment to it makes the EU one of the most 
important supporters of the APSA; a reflection of the growing AU-EU 
partnership. The article itself was published within a collection on wider African-
European relations (Gebrewold 2007).  
On the whole, the article takes a very positive view of the AU’s progress up to 
the time of writing in 2007. This judgement is based on a comparison with the 
OAU, rather than comparing the AU’s actions with the expectations of Western 
academics. He claims that the AU has shown the will to act, as well as an effort 
to increase indigenous capacity through the African Standby Force. Although 
the AU’s impact in Darfur has been limited, Klingebiel asserts that the simple 
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act of successfully launching a rapid response to Darfur is a success all on its 
own.  
Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture (Klingebiel 2005) deals with the 
AU’s relationship with the EU and a number of other external partners, making 
it more generalist in nature. The article is an attempt to synthesise the extent 
and the objectives of the external community’s tangled support network for the 
AU. He discusses this within the context of the contemporary security 
environment as well as possible future developments. In general, despite 
highlighting the usual problems with the AU’s financial and materiel capacity, 
the article takes a positive tone, but echoes Murithi and Gueli’s concerns about 
the AU’s external supporters’ military focus in their capacity building efforts. 
Klingebiel argues that the APSA was finding it difficult to fulfil its role because 
its peaceful conflict prevention and resolution elements were suffering due to a 
lack of funds and neglected by external partners. Klingebiel further argues that 
military humanitarian intervention should not be considered to be a major part 
of the APSA’s role, as it is largely outside the APSA’s capacity. 
The article sees the APSA’s success as dependent upon external support, but 
characterises the AU’s external partners’ interests as instrumentalist in nature. 
It suggests that the EU and the US are primarily interested in strengthening the 
military aspect of the APSA, which, Klingebiel warns, could erode African 
ownership, turning the APSA into a proxy for dealing with security issues that 
are not securitised by most African governments, such as stabilising oil 
exporting regions or controlling illegal immigration (or, rather, emigration).  
Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture reinforces the role of the APSA 
as an African solution for African problems, and recommends that, while 
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Africans must own this architecture, the West must pay for it before it can 
succeed. The discussion concludes with some recommendations for the 
international community, suggesting that they focus more support on peaceful 
conflict management and socio-economic development, in line with the original 
intention of the AU’s founding documents. He states that the current financial 
support for the APSA is well below requirements; pointing out that the 
European Union’s initial Africa Peace Facility (APF) fund was barely enough to 
pay for the AU’s small mission in Burundi for two years. 
The EU and the African Peace and Security Architecture (Middleton 2009), like 
much of Klingebiel’s work, also discusses the role and responsibility the EU 
plays in relation to the African Peace and Security Architecture. The article is 
particularly insightful as it is largely based on a study produced by Middleton for 
the EU Parliament Security and Defence Sub-Committee. It is both descriptive 
and prescriptive, with a positive and optimistic tone. 
The main focus of the article is on the need for capacity building in Africa. 
However, the report warns of the external community expecting too much from 
the AU in terms of peace and security, which, the author claims, may help to 
explain the many negative reviews that the AU’s recent missions have received. 
The author points out that even a fully operationalised APSA will not solve all 
the continent’s problems, but it will help stabilise the security landscape. This 
correlation between expectations and perceptions of success is one of the main 
justifications for the current thesis, but is rarely mentioned in the scholarship; 
even Middleton only mentions it in passing. He notes that “Superficially, the AU 
looks like an African version of the EU, but it is built on different foundations 
and operates in a radically different, and more difficult, environment. 
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Understanding the realities of the AU should enable EU money to be better 
targeted at those areas where it can be deployed most usefully” (Middleton 
2009: 7). 
The article goes through different areas where the EU can help bridge some of 
the AU’s capacity gaps. The article examines how the APF affects the role of 
the APSA, making the interesting point that the APF is funded through the 
European Development Fund, which means that the money cannot be used for 
anything with ‘lethal implications’. This means that the APF cannot be used to 
provide military hardware to help bridge the AU’s pressing capacity gaps in this 
area. This has resulted in delays in paying soldiers, as AMIS is largely funded 
through the APF and the EU has been slow to release funds while it ensures 
they are being used for conflict prevention and not peacekeeping (Middleton 
2009: 7). The article echoes the dismay of the AU’s leadership at this oversight 
and recommends funding the APF though different channels so in order to 
increase its flexibility and allow the AU leadership the freedom to prioritise.   
The article likewise highlights the constraining effects of a lack of heavy airlift, 
APCs and other heavy equipment in the individual member states themselves, 
going on to point out the fact that ECOMOG’s successes in the field were due, 
in part, to the large level of support from the United States. The article suggests 
that the EU member states take a similar approach and bilaterally provide 
helicopters, APCs and other hardware that the AU needs to get to and 
effectively operate in the field—actions that the author sees as the primary role 
of the APSA. The article ends with a long shopping-list of military-focused 
recommendations to improve efforts at enhancing the capacity of the APSA, 
including recommendations echoed variously throughout the discourse (e.g. 
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Crupi (2005) and Williams (2006)), such as logistical support, direct support to 
the RECs, and a new source of funding (Middleton 2009: 11-13). 
US Army Colonel J.P. Kobbie’s unpublished dissertation on The Role of the 
African Union in African Peacekeeping Operations (2009) is focussed on 
assessing the AU’s state of readiness to participate in PKOs. In the 
dissertation, he examines the AU missions in Burundi and Sudan and uses 
these case studies to highlight what he refers to as political, institutional and 
conceptual restraints that limit the APSA’s readiness and effectiveness  (Kobbie 
2009: 18). The dissertation is written in an enthusiastic tone, and the author is 
keen to highlight the achievements of the AU up to the time of writing. It 
includes large descriptive sections detailing the development of the African 
peace and security architecture in a historical context, discussing the evolution 
from OAU to AU and illustrating how progressive the AU treaty is in 
comparison. He specifically mentions the APSA’s shift from traditional 
peacekeeping to multi-dimensional operations as a major success (Kobbie 
2009: 25). He sees the AU’s Article 4(h) —the right to intervene in conflicts 
involving war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity—as the 
embodiment of the R2P doctrine making the APSA one of the first international 
organisations in the world that explicitly claims the right to intervene even when 
there is no peace to keep. 
However; throughout the thesis, Kobbie asserts that peacekeeping is a global 
responsibility and suggests that the international community should endorse 
globally supported African solutions to African problems.  
He also echoes Murithi’s argument that the APSA should take on a leadership 
role – assuming responsibility not just for rallying African governments, but for 
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consolidating strong donor support for its peace missions. Kobbie describes the 
role of the AU as a natural response to the UN’s institutional overstretch, and to 
the indifference and lack of political will of the external community to intervene 
in Africa. He is careful to point out that, although the AU is taking on more of the 
burden of peacekeeping on the continent, that should not be an excuse for the 
UN to shirk its responsibilities; reinforcing other authors’ calls for the APSA to 
be treated as part of the global peace and security architecture. 
He sees APSA’s role as a rapid response force to respond to emerging crises 
and the UN gradually replacing them with a longer-term peace operation. 
Kobbie recommends that the AU should explore and institutionalise this division 
of labour and involve the EU, NATO and other powers in the process. The work 
also contains many of the recommendations mooted by the Middleton report 
above, as well as several of the works below (e.g. (O’Neil and Cassis 2005), 
(Powell 2009)) such as integration of humanitarian, political, police and military 
efforts at the planning and operational level and the adoption of a common AU 
military doctrine. 
David Francis’ book, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security 
Systems (2006), is not exclusively concerned with the African Union, but 
assesses the role and successes of regional peace and security systems in 
Africa more generally. There is a strong theoretical component to the book and 
aspects of Constructivist and English School theory are incorporated through 
concepts such as security regimes, security interdependence, securitisation 
and security communities.  
Like Murithi and Gueli, Francis’s book also sees the efforts of the APSA as 
largely successful; the crowning achievement of a renewed wave of afro-
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optimism, improved economic development, and renewed commitments from 
the external community. As an example of positive developments, Francis 
highlights the AU’s major departures from the OAU, such as the development of 
a much closer bond between the continental framework (AU) and the sub-
regional framework (RECs), and the establishment of a much more robust 
collective security framework. Francis likewise marks Article 4(h) as a paradigm 
shift in IR from regime security to human security (2006: 129). However, 
Francis sees the role of the APSA less as an exercise in African ownership and 
more as a keystone of regional peace and security systems in Africa—a 
developing security community. For Francis, the APSA’s biggest success has 
been promoting regionalism, which he sees as an important force for stability 
on the continent. To support this, Francis reiterates the concept of the security 
pyramid in Africa and discusses the multi-level, overlapping nature of Africa’s 
peace and security architecture (2006: 127). 
Emmanuel Kwesi Aning’s The UN and the African Union's Security 
Architecture: Defining an Emerging Partnership? (2008) continues Francis’ 
focus on the APSA’s role as part of the overarching global security architecture, 
but adopts a less theoretical methodology. The article examines the role of the 
APSA in relation to the UN, describing and assessing the main processes of the 
relationship as they had evolved at the time. The article contains some 
interesting insights into the APSA’s position in the global peace and security 
architecture, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. This 
article differentiates itself by portraying the role of the APSA as a core element 
of the global peace and security architecture headed by the UN, and highlights 
the UN’s responsibility for peace and security in the continent, in contrast with 
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Murithi’s Africa-led model (Aning 2008: 18-20). Like Francis, Aning is a 
proponent of the pyramidal structure of the security environment in Africa, with 
nation states at the bottom, then RECs, followed by the AU and finally the UN 
as the ultimate authority on peace and security. 
Aning begins in the conventional way, exploring the AU’s treaty framework, 
particularly in relation to Article 4(h) and its relation to the R2P doctrine. Writing 
in 2008, in the run-up to the deployment of the United Nations African Union 
Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Aning suggests that there is a deepening 
recognition of the importance of the APSA’s role in the African security 
landscape, and that the UN is becoming increasingly aware of the need to 
adopt a closer working relationship with it. He highlights the APSA’s role as a 
core part of the global peace and security architecture, and the APSA’s specific 
strengths, being based closer to the conflict zones and having a wealth of local 
specialist knowledge and pre-existing relationships. The author suggests that 
the APSA’s field missions will be most effective when operating within the 
framework of the UN as the AU suffers from many capacity gaps which could 
be bridged with support from the UN (Aning 2008: 21). 
The article also explains some of the major problems the AU has encountered 
when trying to institutionalise its relationship with the UN. Aning claims that the 
APSA’s role is undermined by the fact that the UN is not structured to embrace 
regional organisations, despite certain provisions for it in Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. He therefore suggests that the UN needs to significantly increase its 
institutionalised support for the APSA. Aning sees the APSA as successful, and 
the African Union is described as being much more dynamic than the UN when 
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it comes to recognising the importance of multilateralism and synergy between 
the different layers of peacekeeping organisation.  
O’Neil and Cassis’s report for the North-South Institute, Protecting Two Million 
Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in 
Darfur (2005), is an enthusiastic account of AMIS based on fieldwork in Darfur, 
including interviews with AU soldiers and police as well as IDPs and military 
experts and humanitarian workers. The report contains large descriptive 
sections giving background information for the Darfur conflict as well as and 
listing developments up to the time of writing. The authors build a long list of 
AMIS’s strengths and weaknesses near the end of the report, based on their 
research in the field. Many of the familiar (e.g. Appiah-Mensah (2005), Powell 
(2005), Murithi and Gueli (2007) and Middleton (2009)) complaints arise such 
as the limited deployment, limited financial capacity etc. In particular, the report 
discusses the weak mandate and the authors take issue with the PSC’s 
decision to keep Khartoum on-board (O’Neill and Cassis 2005: 13-14).  
Despite the many negative aspects of AMIS, the authors also collate an equally 
long list of successes in the field. For example; the APSA is lauded for its active 
cooperation with NGOs and civil society organisations, which, according to the 
authors, generally claim that the AU is always open to cooperation and 
suggestions from them. The authors’ perception of APSA’s successes on the 
ground in Darfur were a result of individual commanders in the AMIS forces 
who bent the mandate to allow their troops to be in the right place at the right 
time, often at great risk to themselves, to protect civilians, even though civilian 
protection is technically outside the mandate (O’Neill and Cassis 2005: 28-29). 
Civilians close to AMIS positions also told the authors that they felt safer with 
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the APSA troops nearby (O’Neill and Cassis 2005: 44). The authors point out, 
however, that there were nowhere near enough troops to cover a large 
proportion of Darfur’s civilian population. The authors underscore their 
perception that the will to protect exists in the APSA; the APSA’s failures in 
Darfur were largely a result of the external community’s irresponsible decision 
to let the APSA take the lead on Darfur when the situation was clearly outside 
its capacity. Overall, this interpretation represents a departure from the previous 
works through its more forceful condemnation of the APSA’s external partners 
for failing to support its critical efforts in the field. 
Kristiana Powell’s NSI working paper, The African Union's Emerging Peace and 
Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the 
Responsibility to Protect (2005), begins by discussing the background to the 
responsibility to protect doctrine and its incorporation in the APSA. It then 
describes the APSA’s capacity for conflict management and how it fits into the 
wider global peace and security environment. Powell uses the APSA’s field 
missions in Burundi and Sudan as case studies to evaluate the challenges of 
implementing the responsibility to protect in Africa. These case studies are 
detailed and highlight the author’s perceptions of the successes and the failures 
of the AU in AMIS and AMIB. 
The paper is written in the light of the APSA’s policy of ‘non-indifference’ in 
conflict management enshrined in Article 4(h) of the AU Treaty and investigates 
the extent to which R2P has really been operationalised within the APSA, 
concentrating on examining the APSA’s operations in Burundi and Darfur. Like 
the authors discussed above, Powell highlights the APSA’s considerable 
capacity gaps, which limit its potential as a peace and security actor; she 
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suggests that the APSA’s planning capacity, command and control structure 
and its logistics were not advanced enough to support a task like AMIS.  She 
also talks of chronic financial problems including troops not being paid on time, 
as well as a severe lack of military capacity. Despite these difficulties, Powell 
also has a positive view of the APSA’s efforts thus far, as they demonstrate a 
clear political will to get involved in organising the continent’s conflict 
management concerns. In particular, the author mentions AMIB’s protection of 
vulnerable populations and AMIS’s ability to reduce violence in the areas in 
which it had been stationed (Powell 2005: 27). 
Because the APSA has the will, but not the capacity, and the West has the 
capacity, but seems to lack the will, Powell suggests that the external 
community needs to do much more to support the activities of the APSA, 
explaining that there is a need for these donors “to provide assistance for 
developing a range of operational and structural conflict prevention capacities” 
(Powell 2005: 23). Financial and logistical support in particular is required for 
the APSA to be able to effectively support its field missions, although financial 
support has gradually increased in line with the public concern over the conflict.  
At the end of the paper, the author submits several issues for policy dialogue, 
including how to further assist AMIS to improve on the specific capacity gaps 
mentioned earlier in the paper, how to improve the APSA’s initial response to 
crises, how to improve vertical integration of the African peace and security 
institutions and several others. 
In a related but much more theoretical piece, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: 
Does the African Stand-By Force Need a Doctrine for Protection of Civilians?’ 
(2007), Chiziko discusses the role that the APSA should play in the context of 
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the APSA’s stated human security and ethical concerns, again paying particular 
attention to the R2P doctrine. However, the article is focused on the ASF, rather 
than the APSA as a whole, and explores the different possibilities, identities and 
roles that the APSA could embrace. This piece is interesting for the current 
study because it sees the role of the APSA not as something static or absolute, 
but something that is chosen—a concept that will discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter. Chiziko determines that the APSA should embrace the role of 
the ‘guardian soldier’, echoing some other authors’ recommendations for the 
ASF to embrace a multi-disciplinary military doctrine (2007: 78; Däniker 1995: 
93). Chiziko recommends that as well as providing local stability and order, AU 
forces should also be capable of performing rescue and aid operations. He is a 
strong proponent of a much closer working relationship between the APSA and 
human rights organisations and humanitarian agencies. He also calls for the 
involvement of lawyers and theologians as experts on international and 
humanitarian law and ethics respectively. He believes that the military rules of 
engagement need to be standardised and replaced with what he calls the ‘rules 
of engagement for human protection operations’ (Chiziko 2007: 78). This will 
help broaden the ASF’s battlefield tasks to include many more humanitarian 
and ethical considerations.  
Although there is considerable support in the academic discourse to strengthen 
the AU’s humanitarian and ethical component, Chiziko’s article is an extreme 
example. Chiziko’s recommendations are progressive and he is trying to 
encourage the redefinition of the role of peacekeeping on the continent by 
supporting an increased militarisation of the AU’s mission. Chiziko himself 
discusses many of the military capacity gaps and command and control 
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problems apparent in the APSA, highlighting excessive interference by 
member-state governments, language problems, lack of standardisation in 
SOPs, doctrines, staff procedures and equipment. He also mentions the more 
commonly mentioned (e.g. Powell (2005), O’Neil and Cassis (2005), Murithi 
and Gueli (2008), Middleton (2009)) shortfalls in terms of airlift and other heavy 
materiel, air-to-surface capacity and logistic support (Chiziko 2007: 84). 
Echoing Francis, the article concludes that to bridge some of these gaps, the 
AU should institutionalise its working relationship with the UN, NATO and the 
EU. He recommends that the external community should specifically focus on 
supporting the ASF as the nucleus of Africa’s peace and security architecture, 
at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and suggests the EU 
Battlegroup structure as a possible model for the ASF (Chiziko 2007: 86). 
Touray’s article ‘The Common African Defence and Security Policy’ moves 
beyond earlier discourse, which concentrated on the AU Treaty and the PSC 
Protocol, to discuss the Common African Defence and Security Policy 
(CADSP), and uses that to examine the role of the APSA. 
The article begins with the familiar discussion of the evolution of security 
cooperation in Africa put into historical context. It then goes on to discuss the 
principles, objectives and the institutions of the CADSP. According to Touray, 
the main role of the APSA, as elucidated in the CADSP, is having the capacity 
to respond to internal and external threats effectively; however, the author also 
talks about strengthening security cooperation between African states, building 
trust and enhancing the military preparedness of member states to ease the 
deployment of peace missions (Touray 2005: 643).  
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Interestingly, Touray talks about the CADSP in the context of the principle of 
the indivisibility of the security of African states, comparing its role to NATO’s 
Article V to demonstrate a possible move towards continent-wide collective 
security. However, like Klingebiel, Touray criticises the APSA for what he sees 
as an overbearing focus on military conflict management mechanisms and its 
apparent belief that most of Africa’s security problems can be solved by military 
power. He also criticises the APSA’s institutions as unprepared for their role, 
and largely unoperationalised (at the time of writing). In particular he criticises 
the weak Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which he claims “is a 
collection and dissemination point for various news items that are readily 
available on radio, TV and in the written press” (Touray 2005: 649). A weak 
CEWS, he claims, undermines the AU’s entire conflict prevention strategy, 
forcing it to deal with conflicts after they have happened. 
The article presents a number of suggestions for improving the APSA, including 
improving the capacity at the sub-regional level, and harmonising conflict 
management doctrines and traditions, or adopting the UN doctrine (Touray 
2005: 651) – a suggestion that is also common in much of the military academic 
discourse (e.g. Appiah-Mensah (2005), Crupi (2005), Chiziko (2007) and 
Kobbie (2009)). The author also suggests seeking assistance from NATO and 
the EU to plug its capacity gaps. 
Makinda and Okumu share Touray’s conceptualisation of the role of the APSA 
as a primarily military endeavour. Moreover, in putting a slightly greater 
emphasis on this element as the main role of the APSA, they consequently 
have a lower perception of the APSA’s success. Their book, The African Union: 
Challenges of Globalisation, Security, and Governance (2007) discusses the 
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APSA within a broad context of history, law, economic development, 
globalisation and other aspects of the AU and its environment. Chapter four of 
the book is aimed directly at assessing the APSA’s contributions to peace and 
security in Africa. The optimism present in many other books and articles, 
including Makinda’s earlier works on the subject, is conspicuously absent; this 
may be evidence of the new millennium’s afro-optimism grinding to a halt along 
with the peace processes in Somalia and Darfur. The difficulties the APSA 
faced in these states leads the authors to directly contradict Murithi and Gueli, 
concluding that perhaps ‘African solutions’ are not adequate for all African 
problems (Makinda and Okumu 2007: 93). Makinda and Okumu back up their 
low opinion of the success of the APSA with a long list of perceived failures 
during the AMIS and AMIS II periods (2004-2007), and the planning thereof. 
They suggest that one of the biggest problems that the APSA has is in 
gathering expertise. They see the organisation as knowledge-dependent and 
therefore recruiting the best staff and gathering the most appropriate 
information is the key to allowing the APSA to live up to its role as a real force 
for stability on the continent. The authors explain that, despite having a 
sophisticated legal structure that allows for robust conflict management 
mandates, the APSA is still chronically short of capital, materiel, personnel and 
expertise, and these shortages put their own limitations on the AU mandates. 
Makinda and Okumu have a much more militaristic view of the role of the 
APSA, characterising its primary role as a military peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement agency. This high expectation of the role of the organisation may 
be the cause of the book’s correspondingly lower perceptions of the APSA’s 
success. The book reiterates the call of several earlier authors for the APSA to 
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strengthen and formalise its relationship with the UN (e.g. Powell (2005) and 
O’Neil and Cassis (2005)) and even its own RECs in order to consolidate the 
continental security architecture and increase its collective capacity. However, 
the authors do acknowledge that the APSA has made some positive steps, and 
that it is a work in progress with several of its major organs still partially 
unoperationalised at the time of writing in 2007.  
AU's Critical Assignment in Darfur: Challenges and Constraints (2005) is an 
article written by Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, the military advisor to the 
Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission 
(SRCC) and head of the AMIS headquarters in Khartoum. The article is 
ambivalent towards the APSA’s track record in Sudan, emphasising the need 
for the AU to strengthen its capacity and expertise at all levels, through 
technical cooperation and appropriate assistance from the UN and partners.  
The difficulties highlighted in the article are familiar to the academic discourse 
on the APSA; the restrictive mandate, the lack of troops, operational, logistical 
and planning shortfalls. Appiah-Mensah claims that there had been a continuing 
lack of resources since the mission began, and the mission’s earlier weak 
mandate and subsequent political, operational and administrative mishaps by 
the AU leadership not only threatened the effectiveness of AMIS, but its very 
existence (Appiah-Mensah 2005: 19). Importantly, the article argues that 
assertions by some APSA scholars, as well as much of the popular press, that 
AMIS had failed, undermined support to the mission, putting lives at risk in 
Darfur. 
Like Middleton’s article, the author points out the important fact that the 
negative image of AMIS is largely based on the fact that it has not measured up 
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to Western expectations of the mission. He mentions that some have argued for 
the AU mission in Sudan to be judged in relation to its own mandate, rather 
than in relation to Western perceptions of what its mandate should be. He 
points out that, although the mission was heavily criticised, it was still the only 
form of external intervention in the country.  All the same, Appiah-Mensah 
highlights the fact that the situation on the ground is still bad and that the AU 
must continue to adapt to that situation. He argues that mandates are not 
carved in stone, and the PSC and its external partners can expand and alter 
them at any time. The author argues that the AU must have known from the 
start that it was taking on a huge burden and he claims it should have 
attempted to harness the required resources from the member states before it 
started. He explains that the best way for the AU to achieve some level of 
success in Darfur is to actively engage its external partners including the UN, 
the EU and the United States in all aspects of the mission (Appiah-Mensah 
2005: 20).  
Another perspective emanating from the US Army War College is Why the 
United States Should Robustly Support Pan-African Organisations (Crupi 2005) 
written from a US foreign policy perspective by US Army planning expert, 
Francis Crupi. Unlike Kobbie’s thesis, it also takes a low opinion of the success 
of the APSA. Contrary to the title of the article, Crupi recommends that US 
interests in the region would be better served by ending its support to the 
APSA, and re-routing that support to the Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs).  
The article measures the success of the APSA through a comparison with the 
RECs, using ECOWAS as a case study, and finds that the APSA is less 
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effective, and therefore should not be supported. Crupi feels that ECOWAS 
“has a greater state in the development of the sub-region and a more extensive 
track record in peace enforcement operations” as well as being in a “well-
leveraged position to influence the peace and progress in West Africa 
necessary for industry and commerce to thrive” (2005: 121-2). The article is 
more hawkish in nature than the others and concentrates on US foreign policy 
interests, rather than lofty humanitarian ideals. In a validation of Klingebiel’s 
description of external partners as essentially instrumentalist, Crupi pays 
particular attention to West African oil production; the US interest here is in 
maintaining stability in West Africa to stabilise and diversify the global oil 
supply. The article further argues that RECs like ECOWAS, if strengthened, 
could be used by the US against their transnational foes, such as Al-Qaeda, 
while the APSA itself is seen as weak and fractured. The author highlights 
some of the more hawkish elements of US development policy — embodying 
many of Murithi’s concerns in his assertion that “employing these groups as 
surrogates mitigates the risk of political and military entanglements” (Crupi 
2005: 121) — and makes an interesting and unique contribution to the scholarly 
debate. 
Finally, Paul William’s (2006) article, Military Responses to Mass Killing: The 
African Union Mission in Sudan, is one of the most negative works on the 
African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture, and particularly focuses on 
the many pitfalls, flaws and outright failures during AMIS and the expanded 
mandate of AMIS II in Darfur.  
The article begins by enumerating the possibilities open to the international 
community for peacekeeping – the UN, regional organisations, coalitions and 
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nation states. He condemns the UN for failing to authorise military action in 
Darfur, and the long delay before it even started discussing intervention. While 
the UN did finally agree to a regime of sanctions and a no-fly zone, he claims 
that, at the time of writing, “it was evident that neither the sanctions nor the no-
fly zone had been effectively enforced” (Williams 2006: 170). Although he 
acknowledges that NATO had offered logistical support to the AU mission at the 
time of writing, Williams criticises them for not considering deploying forces on 
the ground.  
Williams’ article is especially critical of the APSA. Even though he concedes 
that the AU was the only organisation willing to put troops on the ground, he 
does not see this as a good thing. He suggests that the international 
community’s enthusiasm for AMIS was simply to cover up their own desire not 
to get involved (Williams 2006: 178). He claims that the APSA is too weak to 
make a meaningful impact in Darfur, reinforcing the common concerns about 
the APSA’s military, logistic and doctrinal capacity gaps. He also claims that the 
APSA’s budget problems are self-inflicted as member states lack political will 
and refuse to pay their budget dues. It is Williams’ assessment that, as the 
weakest potential actor, it should never have been the first choice to make first 
contact in the Darfur conflict. 
The article judges the APSA’s success in Darfur by comparing its progress 
against his own perception of the role of the APSA. Despite the fact that AMIS 
was a monitoring mission with a mandate solely for the protection of the military 
observers, Williams regards it as a failure because it failed to ‘neutralise’ the 
janjaweed (2006: 176), an unusually high expectation of the role of the APSA. 
The author holds particular disdain for what he sees as the AU’s collaboration 
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with Khartoum, claiming that they ‘coached’ the government of Sudan on how 
to “handle the whites” (2006: 172).  
The following year, Williams published Thinking About Security in Africa (2007), 
which gives a more measured, but still highly pessimistic, view of the APSA. 
Coming from a strong human security perspective, Williams is sceptical of what 
he perceives to be the AU’s militaristic focus – a point echoed in some of the 
more positive literature as well. Thinking about Security in Africa is a re-
evaluation of the unique African security landscape. It is largely conceptual and 
theoretical in nature, drawing heavily from the constructivist/critical theory 
offshoot of critical security studies.  
The mantra of this article is people, justice and change, a phrase used 
repeatedly throughout the article, which sums up Williams’ view on what the 
APSA ought to be focusing on. The argument used by Williams throughout the 
paper is that the “the true path to security depends less on devising interstate 
confidence building measures than on building stable, democratic societies that 
can resolve their conflicts without resorting to violence” (2007: 1029).  
Williams’ article calls for a fundamental shift on the continent, claiming that real, 
fundamental change is required because the “status quo is not working for the 
vast majority of Africans” (2007: 1029). This is contrary to the majority of the 
discourse above, which is almost unanimous in its assertion that a fundamental 
normative shift has taken place on the continent with the establishment of the 
APSA and that a new paradigm of proactive conflict management had begun. 
However, Williams criticises the creation of the AU as a shift in the wrong 
direction, with such a large focus placed on the military aspects of conflict 
management. The author acknowledges the importance of having strong 
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independent institutions on the continent, but he does not see them as 
contributing to peace and security unless they develop policies based on 
people, justice and change.  
In the end, Williams sees the APSA as having largely failed; in particular, he 
laments a severe lack of human and financial resources and what he sees as 
the lack of political will of its members. He sees the whole peace and security 
architecture as state focused and claims the Assembly is engaging in 
“sovereignty first” politics (Williams 2007, p 1038). In general, the article is an 
interesting and sophisticated look at some of the contentious issues involved in 
the strengthening of the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture through the lens 
of critical security studies, providing an important counterpoint to the more 
positive appraisals discussed above. 
Defining the Role of the APSA 
There are many agreements in the works sampled above, and the same 
capacity problems are highlighted frequently. What is not consistent, however, 
is how the authors assess the importance of these capacity gaps, how seriously 
they have affected the role of the APSA and how or if they should be resolved. 
Despite the fact that these works have all relied upon an interpretation of the 
role of the APSA against which to measure its success or failure, they have not 
provided much of an intellectual basis to justify their assertions of what those 
roles are. Williams, for example, takes the role of ‘civilian protection’ as said 
without explaining why he thinks that it is part of the APSA’s role (although he 
explains why it shouldn’t be). Therefore they have not based their assessments 
of the APSA’s success on what the role of the APSA is, they have based them 
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upon their beliefs about the role of the APSA, and these beliefs are based upon 
the authors own naturally biased views on the subject, and informed by their 
ideology.  
Throughout this review of key APSA scholarship, the authors have displayed 
wide-ranging intellectual backgrounds; from Pan-Africanism, through 
Neoliberalism and Constructivism to Critical Theory. These varying 
backgrounds have led the authors to make different assumptions about what 
the APSA’s role should be, often finding support for their assumptions in the 
language of the treaty framework, but not systematically engaging with the 
concept of the role of the APSA. This has resulted in different authors justifying 
their different interpretations of the role of the APSA with different evidence; or 
in some cases simply asserting what they believe the role of the APSA is 
without any supporting evidence. As a result, the authors all have different 
views of what the role of the APSA is, or should be: The APSA is a forum for 
African political ownership; it is a framework for security cooperation; it is a 
framework for external support; it is a nascent security regime; it is an 
interventionist humanitarian military alliance; it is a misguided attempt to push 
military solutions on systemic problems. 
This has a knock-on effect on the validity of the conclusions of their 
assessments of the APSA. A defining element of the perceived success of an 
organisation is living up to the role assigned to it; for Murithi, success is the 
African Union taking ownership of the struggle for peace and security on the 
continent holistically, promoting African solutions for African problems. For 
Makinda and Okumu, success would rely upon the APSA’s capacity to 
successfully deploy peacekeeping missions. For Williams, success would 
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require the APSA to leave military deployments to NATO and the UN and 
refocus its energies on dealing with the underlying structural problems.  
This unsystematic approach to the concept of the role of the APSA is a very 
unstable foundation on which to conduct the debate; the variance in the 
expectations of what the APSA should be achieving, which have in turn been 
built on shaky ground, has resulted in a corresponding variation in the authors’ 
recommendations for the improvement of the APSA. At this point, we can see 
clear, real-world repercussions stemming from this conceptual problem, as 
many of these authors have also been advisors to governments and 
international organisations, lobbying for capacity enhancement for specific 
areas of the APSA, or lobbying for a reduction of support to certain areas. This 
has three serious, real-life consequences: first, the authors, and the reports and 
recommendations based upon their work, are not presenting a consistent 
strategy for improving the APSA; many of the authors’ recommendations are 
contradictory, resulting in confusion for policy makers. Second, the APSA is not 
recognised for what it is. The organisation is presented variously, in all the 
aforementioned guises, which has a knock-on effect for strategic level planning, 
particularly in terms of division of labour and interoperability; how can the UN 
design a clear strategy for institutionalising its relationship with the APSA, if its 
advisors do not agree on what the APSA is, what it does, what it should do or 
even if it is worth supporting at all? Third, perceptions of the success or failure 
of an organisation directly affect the support that it receives from its members 
and its partners. If the APSA is as ineffectual as Williams believes, then 
supporting it would be a waste of resources. However, if it is as integral to the 
African regional security architecture as Francis claims, then reducing support 
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could have serious negative consequences. It is therefore important that APSA 
scholars agree on the role of the APSA in order to have a stable basis to 
debate its success and its utility.  
Thesis Aims and Objectives 
In order to address the aforementioned vagaries associated with the use of the 
concept of role, and to understand the real role of the APSA, the thesis has 
adopted a clear set of aims and objectives: 
 Core Aims 
o Challenge the value of the definition of the role of the APSA 
promulgated by the APSA itself as a poor basis for policy and 
scholarship. 
o Challenge definitions of the role of the APSA based upon 
preconceived notions of what the role of the APSA should be. 
o Provide an objective definition of the role of the APSA based upon 
the role that it actually plays in the context of its operating 
environment. 
 Objectives to Achieve Aims 
o Provide a new theoretical framework to systematically define and 
quantify the role of an organisation like the APSA which explains 
that the practical role played by the APSA is limited, enabled and 
directed by multifarious influences. 




o Define the extent to which these limiting factors are compensated 
for by enabling factors. 
o Define areas where enabling factors have created a role for the 
APSA where no role had previously been defined. 
o Determine how the APSA’s capacity is pushed in specific 
directions, and how its role is reprioritised through the influence of 
various sources of governance of the organisation. 
o Develop a theoretical framework to systematically analyse the 
effects of governance on an organisation like the APSA. 
o Determine the net effect of these limiting, enabling and directing 
factors and use this to outline a more realistic definition of the 
practical role of the APSA. 
It is the aim of this thesis to provide a stable and objective definition of the role 
of the APSA. This will create a stable basis for the assessment of the APSA’s 
utility as a peace and security actor, and enable a clear understanding of what 
the APSA can and cannot do, thereby providing a stable basis for policy and 
scholarship. The thesis will achieve this goal by first reconceptualising the 
concept of the role of an organisation; circumventing the vagaries of the 
dictionary definition by establishing technical definitions of role through the 
development of a Role Theory-based theoretical framework, which the thesis 
has dubbed Institutional Role Theory.  
Institutional Role Theory forms the main framework around which the thesis is 
structured. Institutional Role Theory allows for a more accurate definition of the 
role of the APSA based on what it actually does, rather than what it says it 
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does, or what observers variously say that it should do. According to 
Institutional Role Theory, the real role of the APSA is formed through interaction 
with relevant international law, its institutional framework, its member states, its 
partners, its governance and its operating environment. Interactions in all these 
areas involve influences from various sources that either limit or enable the role 
of the APSA. Assessing the net effect of these limiting and enabling factors will 
provide an outline of the space in which the APSA can act, giving a clear, 
systematic and subjective indication of the real role of the APSA, which, in 
Institutional Role Theory, is termed the interactionist role. 
Thus, the bulk of this thesis is devoted to examining the effects of five 
categories of limiting and enabling factors. These are as follows: the treaty 
framework of the APSA; the internal capacity of the APSA; external capacity 
enhancement of the APSA; governance of the APSA, and the APSA’s 
operational environment. The conclusion will present an overview of the net 
effect of each of these five categories of limiting and enabling factors, followed 
by a clear definition of the interactionist role of the APSA, and the 
repercussions of the thesis for the discourse, finishing with some suggestions 
for further research. 
The following chapter will explain the chapter structure in more detail, including 
how the thesis came to settle on these particular five categories. It will also 
explain the research methodology by which the thesis will accrue the necessary 
information to assess the effects of the aforementioned categories of limiting 
and enabling factors; however, it will begin by problematising the concept of 
role, explaining the need to develop a new theoretical framework for using the 
concept in International Relations, and will focus on what Institutional Role 
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Theory is, and how it will be used to answer the question at the heart of this 
thesis: what is the real role of the APSA? 
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Chapter Two:  
Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology 
Introduction 
In order to better facilitate a comprehensive definition of the role of the African 
Union’s Peace and Security Architecture, this chapter will problematise the 
definition of the word role itself, developing a form of Role Theory for use with 
international organisations. This will provide the theoretical framework for the 
remainder of the work. 
The chapter will begin by examining what is meant by the word role, surveying 
a variety of fields to demonstrate the lack of an appropriate technical/theoretical 
definition in the existing literature. The chapter then turns its attention to Role 
Theory in the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology, which has developed 
technical definitions for role, though only in the context of individuals, not 
institutions like the APSA. These definitions are then adapted for application to 
international organisations, providing an appropriate framework for the thesis 
through the development of a new type of Role Theory for International 
Relations based on Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory and Functionalist Role 
Theory, which will be called Institutional Role Theory. The chapter will then 
examine how this theoretical framework applies to the APSA, developing a 
research programme that will provide an objective outline of the real role of the 
APSA through an examination of the effects of five categories of limiting and 
enabling factors which will form the basis of the chapter structure for the rest of 
the thesis. After the theoretical structure has been clearly explained, and all the 
key technical terms defined, and the research programme and chapter structure 
have been discussed in detail, the methodology chapter will conclude with an 
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explanation of the research methods used to furnish the information required to 
fully analyse the effects of each of the categories of limiting and enabling 
factors; a process which constitutes the main effort of the thesis. 
Why Role? 
Before the main work of this chapter commences, it is worth taking some time 
to explain why this thesis has been built around the imprecisely defined word 
role; why go to the effort of problematising the concept of role, and developing 
technical definitions for it, when comparable, and more specific terms are 
available, such as function, responsibilities or capacity?  
It is, ironically, the broad and inclusive connotations of the word role which 
make the term so useful, and explain why it is so heavily used in the literature; 
Google nGram Viewer (which searches all Google books) highlighted over 5 
million instances of the phrase “role of an/the organisation/institution” since 
1950. The phrases, function of the APSA or responsibilities of the APSA, do not 
carry the full meaning of role; function implies only one part of the role—its 
intended role—which is described in detail in the next chapter. The 
responsibilities of the APSA would explain more about what the APSA should 
be doing but, as the previous chapter showed, there is considerable disparity 
between authors when it comes to the role that the APSA should play, and 
challenging the use of these subjective assessments as a basis for judging the 
institution’s efficacy is one of the main objectives of this thesis. Both of these 
concepts are indeed central to understanding the role of the APSA; however, 
on their own they explain little, and, used interchangeably, as they frequently 
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are in the discourse, they can lead to further confusion about the role of the 
APSA.  
Capacity is a much more easily defined term; to understand the role played by 
an organisation, it is necessary to understand that organisation’s capacity to act 
in furtherance of that role—and a discussion of the APSA’s capacity will 
constitute a large portion of this thesis. However, an understanding of an 
organisation’s capacity alone only tells us what that organisation can do, not 
what it does do, or why. For example, NATO’s capacity is many times more 
extensive and comprehensive than that of the APSA, but knowing this does not 
tell us that the APSA has conducted the same number of full-scale missions 
since 2002 that NATO has deployed since 1992, in more challenging or equally 
challenging theatres. Capacity misses much of the complexity and subtlety of 
the real role played by either NATO or the APSA in the international security 
environment.  
The word role implies much more than just capacity; the role played by an 
organisation is not just what it can or should do, or what it was intended to do, 
but what it does do, and crucially, why and how it does whatever it does, two 
concepts that are only really addressed by the term role. Role offers a more 
holistic understanding of the organisation, providing a better basis for policy 
decisions. However, without a technical definition of the word for the use of the 
concept within a clearly defined framework, and a more systematic, evidence-




Problematising Institutional Roles 
Although the word role is used in every piece of APSA scholarship, and the 
concept is at the very heart of most of these works, it is not used in a consistent 
manner. The previous chapter has shown the consequences of this lack of 
common understanding; every author conceptualises the role differently. In 
particular, three separate definitions of role can be identified in the literature; for 
some, the role of the APSA is whatever its treaty framework says it is; for 
others, it is an ideal to which the APSA must aspire. In the latter case, the 
definition of that role comes from outside the APSA, raising a further question: 
who gets to decide which role the APSA should be playing? And if, as the 
previous chapter showed, multiple commentators decide upon different roles to 
which the APSA should aspire, how should we, or indeed the APSA and its 
partners, decide which is the most valid? The third way in which the word role 
has been used is as a description of the role that the APSA is currently playing; 
but even in this more sophisticated usage we still have problems: how do we 
consistently decide what the current/real role of the APSA is, without a 
standardised system for so doing, and, as a result, how do we define its 
success and failure without an accepted role against which to measure? The 
word role, therefore, means different things to different scholars in different 
contexts; more confusingly, one scholar might use all the above definitions of 
the word role without making a clear distinction between usages. 
In light of these vagaries, and the aforementioned problems they have caused 
for the discourse on the APSA, it would be extremely useful to have a clear, 
technical, standardised definition of the word role to use in relation to 
international organisations. It is the objective of this chapter to develop such a 
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technical definition, to develop the standardised vocabulary necessary to 
facilitate a clear debate on this topic and to develop a research programme that 
would provide a more objective definition of the role of an organisation as its 
main output. 
Problematising the Role of the APSA 
It is surprising that no technical definition of the concept of the role of an 
international organisation has yet appeared in the IR discourse; even Liberal 
Institutionalists and Constructivists persevere with the vagaries of the dictionary 
definitions, despite the high frequency with which the word is used.  
There is one pre-existing effort to problematise the concept of role in 
International Relations, in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis; however, it was 
not focused on the role played by international organisations, but rather focuses 
on the role of individuals in key leadership positions within state governments. 
National Role Conceptions (NRC), developed in the 1970s, builds on 
developments in the field of Sociology and Social Psychology, and focuses on 
“the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions, suitable to their state, and of the functions, if 
any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system 
or in subordinate regional systems” (Holsti 1970: 246). Unfortunately, while on 
the right lines, this framework does not have the scope necessary to provide a 
holistic understanding of the role of the APSA. Applied to the APSA, it would 
simply reinforce the role that the AU leadership believes that the APSA should 
be playing, whatever that might be at any one time, which is not necessarily any 
more valid than the opinions of any of the APSA scholars discussed in the 
previous chapter. NRC provides little justification of the weight that it places on 
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the opinions of these key individuals, which are themselves subject to myriad 
pressures and influences, and, more importantly, it confuses the role of the 
state with the intentions or objectives of the state (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012: 7). 
These problems make NRC’s conclusions highly subjective and therefore a 
weak candidate for application to this study. 
It has, therefore, been necessary to move outside the boundaries of 
International Relations in search of a technical definition of role, one that 
embraces a more corporate or institutional focus. An extensive survey failed to 
find work on this subject. Organisational Role Theory (ORT), for example, a 
theory developed in the discipline of Business Studies, was developed in The 
Social Psychology of Organisations (Katz and Kahn 1966) and several 
subsequent works. Unfortunately, it only conceptualises the manner in which 
individuals accept and enact an array of roles within task-oriented and 
hierarchical systems, making it slightly more individual-focussed than NRC. As 
the theory focuses on the role of individuals, rather than the role of the 
organisations, it does not provide a usable framework for the current 
endeavour.  
With NCR and OST failing to provide the required framework, it became 
necessary to go to the source and develop a new model for conceptualising the 
role of the APSA. Both NRC and OST were developed out of conceptual work 
in the field of Sociology and Social Psychology, particularly Role Theory, a 
theoretical conceptualisation of the roles played by individuals within society. 
NRC and OST both shied away from applying Sociological definitions of role, 
which had been designed for individuals, directly to either states or businesses 
respectively. However, this is precisely the route that this thesis has taken.   
53 
 
It is not unprecedented to apply concepts from Sociology and Social 
Psychology to International Relations. Alexander Wendt argues that the 
analogy between states and individuals “is an accepted practice in mainstream 
international relations discourse”, going on to assert that “substantively, states 
... through their practices, constitute each other as "persons" having interests, 
fears, and so on” (Wendt 1992: 397). Wendt’s seminal article, Anarchy is What 
States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics (1992), establishes 
the anthropomorphisation of states as a core element of Constructivist 
International Relations theory. Building upon the works of authors like Robert 
Jervis (1988), Robert Keohane (1990), and Joseph Nye (1987), the article is 
focused around how states’ experiences, through the construction of and 
participation in international institutions, shape their identity (Wendt 1992: 393-
394). The article moves away from traditional economic theorising, and 
incorporates a “sociological social psychological form of systemic theory in 
which identities and interests are the dependent variable” (Wendt 1992: 394). 
Goldgeiger and Tetlock’s article, Psychology and International Relations Theory 
(2001), takes this a step further and directly applies Social Psychological 
models to various International Relations theories in order to supplement 
understanding of various situations by understanding the ‘psychology’ of states. 
Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s article, Hegel's House, or ‘People are States Too’, 
agrees that “states are people” in his discussion of states as ‘social actors’ (P. 
T. Jackson 2004: 281). He goes on to say that “states and individual human 
beings do not exhaust the variety of actors being ‘personated’ in contemporary 
world politics. In particular, one sees references to ‘humanity’, ‘the market’, ‘the 
globe’, and ‘civilisation’, which can also be meaningfully studied as social 
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actors” (P. T. Jackson 2004: 287). By highlighting this point, Jackson is 
providing support for the current proposition to apply Sociology and Social 
Psychology techniques to an institutional framework like the APSA, rather than 
its individual member states. This approach is confirmed in neo-structuralist 
approaches such as Steele’s book, Ontological Security in International 
Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State (2008), which adopts Social 
Psychology techniques to show that NATO launched its operation in Kosovo 
out of ‘shame’ relating to its decline in relevance following the end of the Cold 
War (Steele 2008: 126-128). 
Role Theory 
The preceding section has established the need for a new conceptualisation of 
the role of corporate actors in International Relations, and also established the 
precedent for utilising theoretical frameworks from Sociology and Social 
Psychology in International Relations theory. However, it is not the goal of this 
paper to anthropomorphise the APSA any more than to simply allow it to have a 
role as a corporate entity—a far from revolutionary concept; APSA scholars all 
agree that the APSA has a role, they just do not agree on what the role is and 
have no established methodologies that can work it out objectively. This section 
will therefore examine Role Theory in Sociology and Social Psychology, before 
moving on to borrow from their technical definitions of role, and adapt them for 
use in the context of the thesis.  
The reconceptualisation of the role of international organisations will be based 
upon Social Psychology’s Role Theory. According to Biddel, a key figure in the 
discourse, “Role theory concerns one of the most important characteristics of 
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social behavior—the fact that human beings behave in ways that are different 
and predictable depending on their respective social identities and the situation” 
(1986: 68). Role Theory is largely focused on three concepts which correlate 
with the three conceptualisations of role identified in the APSA scholarship 
earlier: 1) patterns of behaviour, 2) identities and 3) expectations of behaviour 
that are understood by all (Biddle 1986: 68). However, there are several 
different streams of thought in Role Theory, and the following section will 
examine these individually, starting with Functionalist Role Theory, moving on 
to discuss Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory, and finishing with a brief look at 
Cognitive Role Theory and Structural Role Theory, neither of which have 
proven fully applicable to the current study. 
Functionalist Role Theory is a traditional approach, dating back to 1936, and is 
the most foundational way to conceptualise roles. The functionalists view social 
structures as collections of designated social positions, the shared norms of 
which govern differentiated behaviours (Bates and Harvey 1975: 12). For 
functionalists, roles represent the accomplishment of specific functions in 
society. The functionalist perspective describes roles which are predefined and 
unchanging (Biddle 1986: 70-71). For example, the function of the role of a 
police officer remains static, regardless of the individual inhabiting the role. 
People who inhabit this role either live up to the function of being a police 
officer, or they fail to do so; the conceptual role of a police officer itself never 
changes. Biddle, however, sees functionalism as flawed, pointing out that many 
roles are not associated with specific, identified social positions, and that roles 
do not necessarily have corresponding functions. He also claims that social 
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systems are far from stable and norms may or may not be shared within the 
system (Biddle 1986: 71). 
Symbolic Interactionist Role Theory is much more fluid, stressing the roles of 
individual actors, rather than their functions. Roles change over time and are 
formed through social interaction. The Symbolic Interactionist conceptualisation 
of roles, according to Biddle, “reflect[s] norms, attitudes, contextual demands, 
negotiation, and the evolving definition of the situation as understood by the 
actors” (Biddle 1986: 71). Symbolic Interactionism also has its weaknesses, and 
Biddle raises some key problems that have plagued interactionist efforts, 
including a tendency to produce vague and inapplicable definitions laced with 
ideology, and a failure to embrace empirical research. He claims that they fail to 
pay attention to actors' expectations of others, or to structural constraints upon 
expectations and roles. He also claims that it is unclear whether Symbolic 
Interactionists believe that expectations generate, follow on from or evolve 
conjointly with the Symbolic Interactionist roles (Biddle 1986: 72). 
In addition to these two ‘mainstream’ conceptualisations of role, Biddle 
mentions two others. Cognitive Role Theory is focused on the link between 
expectations of the role and behaviour. Cognitive Role theorists examine social 
conditions that give rise to expectations of roles. The theory develops 
techniques for measuring expectations and the impact of expectations on social 
conduct. It also covers perceptions of the expectations of others and the effects 
of those perceptions on behaviour (Biddle 1986: 74). Conceptually, this would 
be difficult to implement for an international organisation but not impossible; a 
cognitive role could be established by quantifying how the APSA’s perceptions 
of how it is perceived affect its role.  
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Structural Role Theory, developed during the 1950s, focuses on hierarchical 
structures within social structures, defined as static sets of organisations 
comprised of sets of people with the same role, whose patterned behaviour is 
directed by other sets of people within the organisation. The Structuralist 
conceptualisation of the role is geared towards understanding social networks, 
kinships, role sets, exchange relationships, comparison of forms of social 
systems, and the analysis of economic behaviours. Structural Role Theory is 
very similar to Organisational Role Theory, which has already been rejected as 
a suitable model for this thesis (Biddle 1986: 72-73). 
Reconceptualising the Role of the APSA: Institutional Role 
Theory 
So far, this chapter has established that there are no pre-existing theoretical 
frameworks for conceptualising the role played by international organisations; 
the only institution-focused role theories are Organisational Role Theory, 
National Role Conception Theory and Structural Role Theory, and all of these 
are focused on the interaction between individual members of institutions, 
rather than the role of the institution itself. However, a review of key IR theory 
texts has shown that it is not uncommon to apply concepts to states and other 
international actors that were derived from the Sociology and Social Psychology 
discourse and originally intended to be applied to individuals. The chapter will 
therefore now focus on the development of a new theoretical framework for a 
research programme aimed at defining the role of the APSA, which, in the 
absence of any similar work in International Relations, will build on concepts 
developed for Role Theory, borrowing some of its terminology. For ease of 
reference, the theoretical framework will be called Institutional Role Theory. 
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First, it is important to set out exactly what it is that Institutional Role Theory 
needs to deliver. It needs to provide a clear and evidence-based estimation of 
the role of the APSA. This will allow for more accurate assessments of the 
success of the role, instead of the whole smorgasbord of different opinions 
outlined in the previous chapter. This in turn will result in less contradictory 
recommendations and policy suggestions and facilitate a more consistent 
approach among the APSA’s external partners, who will better understand what 
the organisation can do, and what it should not be expected to do. The role of 
any organisation changes over time, but the framework described in this 
chapter is designed to allow a researcher to discern the role played by any 
international organisation at any single moment in time, or even to chart the 
evolution of its role over a period of time, and enables that assessment to be 
repeatable, consistent and objective. Institutional Role Theory will facilitate a 
common understanding of what we mean when we use the term role in the 
context of international organisations, even though the output of the theory (a 
description of the role itself) will probably change over time. 
As explained above, Role Theory is largely focused on three concepts: 1) 
patterns of behaviour; 2) identities and; 3) expectations of behaviour that are 
understood by all (Biddle 1986: 68). This can be roughly applied to the APSA 
as: 1) what it does; 2) what it intends to do and; 3) what others think that it is 
supposed to do. These three points all describe interpretations of the same 
actor’s role, but are all very different. It was very clear from the literature review 
that scholars’ expectations of the role of the APSA were usually quite different 
from what the APSA was actually able to do. It is also clear, as Chapter 3 will 
show, that the role that the APSA was designed to play in Africa is in many 
59 
 
ways more ambitious than either the role that it actually plays, or the role that it 
is expected to play by commentators. It is therefore important to understand 
and rationalise the differences between these three approaches to the role of 
the APSA. 
The Functionalist Roles of the APSA 
In the vocabulary of Role Theory, the role that the APSA is designed to play, 
which is outlined in the treaty framework and discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, is clearly a functionalist role. As discussed earlier, the functionalist 
role is a static role that is placed upon the actor, and is defined by a 
predetermined function; in the case of the APSA, this predefined function is 
described in the treaty framework, including the mandates of individual PSOs. 
However, the role that the APSA is expected to play shall also be considered to 
be a functionalist role in Institutional Role Theory, as it is a generally static role 
built around a predetermined function.  
Therefore, within the context of Institutional Role Theory, the functionalist role is 
the appointed role that an organisation is supposed to perform, and can be split 
into two categories; the functionalist role can be either self-determined (which 
shall be termed the endemic functionalist role), or pre-defined by the subjective 
expectations and perceptions of the observer (which shall be termed the 
projected functionalist role). For example, Paul Williams’ (2006) projected 
functionalist role of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was the 
protection of all civilians in Darfur; a role that AMIS clearly failed to live up to, 
but was never actually a part of its endemic functionalist role, as defined in the 
original mandate. While the endemic functionalist role could perhaps provide a 
benchmark against which to measure success or failure, a projected 
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functionalist role provides very shaky ground for an assessment of an 
organisation’s success, a prediction of the organisation’s future, or any number 
of other important analyses. The exact nature of the projected functionalist role 
changes with each observer, each of whom has slightly different expectations 
of the role that an organisation should be playing. This was the source of the 
problems in the discourse highlighted in the previous chapter. By contrast, the 
endemic functionalist role of an organisation is relatively consistent. It is 
focused on what the organisation itself intendeds to do, and, in the case of the 
APSA, is established in writing in its founding charter and subsequent official 
documents; the perception of the endemic functionalist role will, therefore, 
remain relatively unchanging regardless of the individual observer, although the 
role itself may evolve over time along with the development of new protocols to 
the treaty. 
However, the functionalist role, whether projected or endemic, is still only a 
description of what an organisation is supposed to do, and therefore policy 
decisions based upon either interpretation of the functionalist role could be 
seriously flawed. Understanding the functionalist roles of the APSA does not 
systematically explain the practical, de facto role played by the organisation 
within its operating environment, which could be quite different. It therefore 
provides a skewed perception of the organisation, contributing to 
misconceptions and misunderstandings that could have serious repercussions 
for policy, potentially leading to wasted resources, or worse, increasing 
instances of blowback.  
There are no shortages of examples of support being provided to organisations, 
largely on the basis of functionalist interpretations of role, that has failed to yield 
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results, or actually ended up being used against whomever supplied the 
support in the first place. In particular, US support for organisations that it had 
defined as anti-communist frequently backfired; the US’s projected functionalist 
role of these organisations failed to take into account the scale and importance 
of other elements of their roles. Gerard Prunier and Barbara Wilson (2006) cite 
a recent, African example of this problem related to the United States’ policy in 
Somalia. In early 2006, the United States, searching for viable partners in the 
country, announced that it was willing to support any group which was prepared 
to fight against terrorism in Somalia. Clan-based alliances of warlords and their 
militias immediately redefined their endemic functionalist roles in order to attract 
US support, establishing the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism (ARPCT) on 18 February 2006 (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). The 
US began heavily funding the group, providing $100,000-$150,000 per month 
to the organisation through the CIA (Kagwanja 2006: 83), a policy that was 
based almost entirely on the ARPCT’s endemic functionalist role, rather than a 
systematic assessment of the real role that it actually played. Far from playing 
the role of an effective counter-terrorism force that could root-out al Qaeda 
elements in the country, or, for that matter, a force for the restoration of peace, 
the ARPCT played the role of an alliance of self-interested, power-hungry 
warlords, “hungry for funds, and keen to weaken the authority of the TFG” 
(Transitional Federal Government of Somalia) (Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). 
The TFG argued that if the leaders of ARPCT were serious about fighting 
terrorism, they would have been prepared to come to Baidoa and work with the 
Government on the issue (United Nations 2006d: 2). A 2006 UN report stated 
that the ARPCT was recruiting child soldiers in Mogadishu (United Nations 
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2006d: 10). Michael Zorick, a senior US diplomat in Kenya at the time, 
protested against payments to the ARPCT, calling them counter-productive 
(Prunier and Wilson 2006: 750). If the United States had based their 
understanding of the organisation on an assessment of the role that the 
organisation was actually playing in Somalia, rather than the role it was 
supposed to play, or claimed to play, then it may have reconsidered providing 
the organisation with small arms, training and capital. 
Similar examples abound: the endemic functionalist role (or indeed, many 
elements of the projected functionalist roles) of the Sudanese Border Guards, 
or the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) Mai-Mai self-defence militias, or 
any number of other organisations, would be very different from an impartial 
assessment of the real role that these actors perform.  
An evolving example is the perception of the Arab Spring’s revolutionary 
movements in the West, which has adopted a projected functionalist role of 
revolutionary groups in North Africa and the Middle East as pro-Western and 
pro-democracy; however, as the situation evolves, and particularly after the 
election of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, there are fears that these 
revolutionary movements were not playing the role of pro-democracy freedom-
fighters struggling against oppressive governments, but were more like pro-
Islamic freedom-fighters, struggling against oppressive secular governments 
(Totten 2012). Michael Totten questions whether the Arab Spring is really an 
Islamist Winter (Totten 2012), while Hoda Badran highlights how the Arab 
Spring has translated into a reduction of freedom for women in the affected 
countries (Badran 2012). In light of these developments, a less subjective 
definition of role might have resulted in different policies from Western actors 
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such as NATO, the EU and the United States; all of whom (after initial 
misgivings) became heavily involved in promoting the Arab Spring. 
Interactionist Role 
Developing a systematic approach to defining a non-subjective understanding 
of the term role is the driving force behind this thesis. It would allow for a 
repeatable, objective, systematic and evidence-based interpretation of the 
APSA’s evolving role, instead of the subjective and contradictory ascriptions of 
the APSA’s role described in the literature review. To achieve this, Institutional 
Role Theory will draw from Symbolic Interactionist Theory, and establish the 
third interpretation of the role: the role that the organisation is actually 
performing, which will, henceforth, be referred to as the interactionist role. 
As explained in the discussion of role theory, Symbolic Interactionism does not 
define peoples’ roles based on preconceived functions that they are expected 
to perform. Instead, the Interactionists argue that roles are established 
organically through interactions within society. Thus, interactionist roles are not 
static; they evolve in response to various push-pull factors in the individual’s 
environment. In Institutional Role Theory, this will be interpreted to mean that 
the interactionist role is shaped and formed by myriad influences acting upon 
the APSA, which shall be termed limiting and enabling factors.  
Limiting and Enabling Factors 
Each enabling factor creates space for the APSA to act in a specific area; for 
example, the provision of troop contingents from APSA member states enables 
its role as an agency for the deployment of Peace Support Operations. Without 
troop contributions, the APSA could not perform this role. Likewise, the size and 
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quality of these troop contributions will have a corresponding effect on the role 
that the APSA can play in this area (i.e. its capacity to play this role). 
Conversely, limiting factors have the opposite effect, limiting the extent to which 
the APSA can perform a role in a particular area, regardless of how much the 
APSA wants to, or is expected to perform that role; for example, the poverty of 
African states is a factor that limits the AU’s general budget, and has a knock-
on effect on the APSA’s Peace Fund, limiting its ability to pay troops serving in 
its Peace Support Operations. This means that troop-contributing countries 
often have to pay out of pocket to support their contributions in the field, making 
the contribution of troops for APSA PSOs impossible for many of Africa’s 
poorest states, and undesirable for most others. This severely limits the role 
that the APSA can play as an agency for the deployment of Peace Support 
Operations. However, the APSA’s role in this area is expanded by external 
capacity enhancement; financial support from the United States, the European 
Union, the UN and other partners gives the APSA the financial capacity to play 
a much larger role in this area than would otherwise be possible, allowing the 
APSA to (eventually) start reimbursing the troop-contributing countries, 
restoring their faith in the whole process and enabling the APSA’s role. 
Governance of the institution can also be considered to be an enabling or 
limiting factor, and occupies a special place in Institutional Role Theory, as it 
enables or limits the use of the institution’s capacity in certain areas for certain 
roles, and can also include decisions about which parts of the institution’s 
capacity to enhance, and which to neglect. 
The number of roles in which the APSA acts, and the extent to which the APSA 
is able to perform in them, is completely dependent upon limiting and enabling 
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factors. As a result, it is possible to come to an objective view of the role of the 
APSA through a detailed examination of these limiting and enabling factors, 
and to ascertain their net impact on the organisation. The interactionist role can 
be discovered in the space between these limiting and enabling factors. We can 
therefore develop an interactionist equation to help define the interactionist role: 
enabling factors minus limiting factors equals the interactionist role. 
Technical Definitions of Role 
This chapter has thus established three technical definitions of role:  
1. Endemic Functionalist Role: This is the role that the actor was originally 
intended to achieve. This provides little information about the real role 
performed by the actor, especially in the case of the APSA, which has a 
highly ambitious endemic functionalist role, as the following chapter will 
explain. This thesis aims to challenge and replace the use of endemic 
functionalist roles as an effective basis for policy. The endemic 
functionalist role of an institution will change only as its treaty framework 
is expanded and amended. 
2. Projected Functionalist Role: This is the role that observers believe that 
the actor should be performing. This is the most common way in which 
the word role has been used in the discourse, and its subjective nature is 
also the biggest problem with the literature, as the previous chapter 
explained. This thesis aims to challenge and replace the use of projected 
functionalist roles as an effective tool for the assessment of the 
effectiveness or utility of an actor, especially where these assessments 
are used to inform policy. The projected functionalist role of an institution 
changes in relation to the observer’s opinions about the role; it shifts 
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from person to person, and can change as the observer’s opinions 
change. 
3. Interactionist Role: This is the ‘real’ role that the actor performs in 
practical terms. The interactionist role is formed and shaped by various 
limiting and enabling factors which act upon the institution in its operating 
environment. The interactionist role can be defined through the 
application of the interactionist equation. Thus, the interactionist role of 
an actor can be discovered through an investigation of the effects, extent 
and direction of the various limiting and enabling factors. This will be the 
main task of this thesis, and will provide a much more realistic and less 
subjective idea of the role of the APSA. The interactionist role of an 
institution can change over time with the ebb and flow of limiting and 
enabling factors, but it does not change relative to the observer, or the 
observer’s opinions, notwithstanding debate over the effect, extent or 
direction of various limiting or enabling factors. 
The Institutional Role Theory Research Programme 
In order to define the interactionist role of the APSA, it is necessary to develop 
a research programme based on understanding the impact of limiting and 
enabling factors upon the role played by the APSA. The research programme 
developed in this section will form the basis for the rest of the thesis.  
First, it is necessary to identify all the major limiting and enabling factors acting 
upon the APSA, and organise them into categories, to which we can then apply 
the interactionist equation. It is likely that the five categories devised by the 
present thesis for use in the context of the APSA would also be transferable to 
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studies of the interactionist role of other international organisations of a similar 
type, and possibly even other types of international actors such as states or 
NGOs. 
The five categories of limiting and enabling factors used in this thesis are as 
follows:  
1. Structural and Legal Factors 
2. Internal Capacity Factors 
3. External Capacity Enhancement Factors 
4. Governance Factors 
5. Environmental Factors 
These five factors were developed through an extensive investigation of the 
mission environments of the APSA’s three Peace Support Operations, as well 
as the AU-sanctioned Operation Democracy in the Comoros. This investigation 
highlighted all the major influences on these missions that impacted on the 
APSA’s capacity to act, or affected its use of that capacity. The conclusions of 
this investigation of the PSO mission environments are included as Chapter 7 
of this thesis, as the mission environments themselves are limiting and enabling 
factors, placing constraints upon the APSA PSOs. The APSA tends to deploy 
early during the peace process and, as a result, the mission environments are 
usually still violent and extremely dangerous, acting as a major limiting factor on 
the role of the APSA as a peacekeeper/peacemaker. 
The investigation also uncovered legal and structural factors that have, for 
example, enabled the APSA to deploy without the requirement of a ceasefire. 
The United Nations, however, is limited by its treaty framework to only deploy 
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where there is ‘peace to keep’ (although creative interpretation of the Charter is 
reducing that limitation when convenient).  This has acted as a limiting factor, 
restricting UN support to the APSA and preventing its missions from 
transferring to UN control in violent mission environments where the UN is not 
supposed to have a role. Such transferral of mission ownership is not just the 
APSA’s only working exit strategy, but also a core part of its endemic 
functionalist role as a bridging force for the UN.  
Internal capacity gaps have become extremely prominent problems, limiting the 
APSA’s capacity to act during the APSA PSOs. Examples include the lack of 
heavy airlift capacity, the lack of logistical capacity and the lack of planning 
expertise. These factors have severely restrained the role that the APSA has 
been able to play in the field. However, many of these capacity gaps have been 
bridged with extensive external support for the APSA and its missions. External 
support constitutes a major enabling factor, but external partners also have a 
significant influence on how the capacity they provide is used, often placing 
conditions on aid, or earmarking it to enable only specific elements of the 
APSA’s role, limiting the APSA’s endemic functionalist role as an African-owned 
and African-led project, and shaping it into something of a more global nature. 
Various limiting and enabling factors like this have moulded the governance of 
the APSA, which in turn affects the role played by the APSA.  
Chapter Outline 
This section will provide an overview of the techniques and sources used in 
each chapter to collate and analyse the information required to discover the 




Chapter 3: The Treaty Framework and Endemic Functionalist Role of the APSA 
is the starting point for the investigation, largely devoted to understanding the 
endemic functionalist role of the APSA, as well as how the structural and legal 
factors which define that endemic functionalist role also limit and enable the 
role of the APSA. The information examined in chapter 3 is largely drawn from 
an analysis of the APSA’s treaty framework. Access to the treaty framework 
was achieved through the AU’s new electronic archives, but as there were gaps 
in the electronic archives (which have now mostly been closed with the 
launching of a new Situation Room website in 2011), supplementary work was 
done in the African Union Commission Building in Addis Ababa, allowing 
access to copies of communiqués, reports and protocols which were not 
available online at the time. This chapter establishes a clear view of the APSA’s 
endemic functionalist role in the course of examining the limiting and enabling 
factors of the treaty framework. The APSA’s endemic functionalist role, as 
defined in key documents such as the Constitutive Act of the African Union and 
the Peace and Security Protocol, provides an interesting starting point from 
which to chart the evolving interactionist role over the ensuing chapters. 
However, the main purpose of the chapter is to highlight how the relevant legal 
framework limits and enables the interactionist role of the APSA. 
Chapter 4: Internal Capacity examines how the APSA’s internal capacity limits 
and enables its role. The chapter is enhanced by interviews conducted in Addis 
Ababa with key APSA personnel and external partners, who all had a lot to say 
about the APSA’s capacity problems, and were able to put them in the context 
of how they have limited its role. The chapter also utilises the Reports of the 
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Chairperson of the Commission, which are released several times a year and 
are available in electronic archives and at the AUC in Addis Ababa. 
Chapter 5: External Capacity Enhancement is focused on explaining how 
external partners have been able to enable the role of the APSA, but also looks 
at the effects of the limitations that have been placed upon the role of the APSA 
as a result. The chapter is largely drawn from United Nations archives, 
especially the various memoranda of understanding, framework agreements 
and declarations on the subject of the UN/AU relationship. Various Reports of 
the Chairperson of the Commission, drawn from the African Union archives, 
have also proved invaluable to charting the progress and actual implementation 
of pledged external support, or locating delays and unfulfilled pledges; 
unfulfilled pledges, or impounded armoured vehicles, do not have a 
corresponding enabling effect on the APSA’s role. 
In the absence of a theoretical framework that could be used to systematically 
track how the role of the APSA is limited and enabled by internal and external 
governance, Chapter 6: Governance of the APSA establishes a new theory of 
governance based on Policy Governance from the field of Business Studies, 
and uses that as a theoretical framework for the rest of the chapter. An 
examination of the major agreements between the APSA and its external 
partners furnishes the chapter with limiting factors stemming from the 
restrictions of these agreements. The chapter also assesses which areas of the 
APSA have received the most external funding, and which have been 
neglected, thereby demonstrating how external partners shape the role played 
by the APSA through targeted and conditional support. It also benefits from 
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interviews conducted in Addis Ababa, where representatives of both the APSA 
and its partners had strong views on the matter. 
Chapter 7: The African Security Environment investigates the limitations placed 
on the APSA by the mission environments in which it operates. To achieve this, 
the chapter examines each of the APSA’s four missions in chronological order, 
showing how the missions were shaped by the limiting and enabling factors 
placed upon them by developments in the security environment. The chapter 
also seeks to outline how these developments and experiences have shaped 
the role played by the APSA’s PSOs over the long term. The information used 
in the chapter is largely drawn from the Reports of the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, and the Reports of the Chairperson of the Commission of the 
African Union. Various Peace and Security Council Communiqués are also 
utilised, and the information is systematically cross-referenced with press 
reporting. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion seeks to provide an overview of the limiting and enabling 
factors acting upon the APSA, and will apply the interactionist equation to these 
factors, subtracting limiting factors from enabling factors. This will allow for an 
outline of the interactionist role of the APSA, which can be compared and 
contrasted with the endemic functionalist role outlined in chapter three, and the 
projected functionalist roles outlined in chapter one. In this way, we will be able 
to measure the success of the APSA against its own high ambitions, and 
against the expectations of the discourse. The chapter will conclude with a 





In order to gather information on the APSA’s various limiting and enabling 
factors, their origins and the extent of their effects, the author adopted two main 
research methods both categorically qualitative: archival research, based upon 
the APSA’s increasingly well-stocked electronic archives; and interviews with 
key individuals working within the APSA framework and key representatives of 
the APSA’s main partners, based in Addis Ababa in 2010. 
The methodology adopted by the thesis is common to the existing APSA 
scholarship; similar works, such as Benedikt Franke’s (2009) Security 
Cooperation in Africa, which provided a snap-shot of the APSA’s state of 
operationalisation in 2008 and its effect upon enhancing security cooperation in 
Africa, or Kristiana Powel’s (2005) working paper on the APSA’s 
implementation of R2P, were similarly based upon official documents and 
reports, supplemented with unstructured interviews with representatives of the 
APSA and its partners in key cities in Africa, in particular Addis Ababa, 
Khartoum, Bujumbura and Johannesburg.  
Field work in the PSOs’ operating theatres themselves, potentially based in 
Mogadishu or El Fashir, was considered for the thesis, but the time and capital 
required to work in these volatile environs were not proportionate to the insight 
they would have provided. A further complicating factor was that the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Coventry University advice was not to 




Linnea Bergholm’s 2009 thesis—which focused on UN/AU cooperation in 
Darfur—did incorporate fieldwork as a cornerstone of her research method, 
including anonymous interviews in Darfur and other key locals. These were an 
extremely valuable part of her thesis because they provided qualitative insights 
into the participant’s “feelings, values, attitudes and perceptions” (Bergholm 
2009: 12). Bergholm emphasised this method because her project was 
designed to “describe and understand social phenomena, rather than seeking 
to explain or theorise from such phenomena” (Bergholm 2009: 9). By contrast, 
the present thesis does seek to explain and theorise. Further, while Bergholm, 
like Powell and others, was focused on the operational and tactical level, the 
present thesis is only concerned with it insofar as it affects the continental level 
and the overarching institutional framework. While understanding the 
operational level is the key to understanding the role of the APSA, the broad 
scope of the thesis would not have been sustainable with so much effort going 
into such detailed work on either AMISOM or UNAMID. As a result, a different 
balance of research methods has been adopted for the present thesis, with a 
heavier focus on archival research, but with a correspondingly lighter focus on 
fieldwork. As a result, it is important to acknowledge that the thesis is limited by 
a reliance upon official and unofficial reports of developments in the APSA’s 
operations, rather than first-hand observation. 
Archival Research 
Much of the work in this thesis is informed by analysing primary sources, 
including reports by organisations such as the North-South Institute (NSI), the 
Swedish Defence Research Institute (FOI), the Institute for Strategic Studies 
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(ISS), and others, which are themselves based upon official documents, 
secondary research, interviews and/or fieldwork related to APSA PSOs. 
However, the most important primary sources for the present study were the 
African Union’s own electronic archives which were available in English, French 
or both (the author generally favoured the language that the document was 
originally written in), as well as those of the United Nations and, to a much 
lesser extent, those of the European Union. The African Union’s official 
documents have been imperative to the study, providing the majority of the 
information about the APSA’s limiting and enabling factors. They include the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, its Protocols, the Decisions and 
Declarations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the 
Communiques [sic] of the Peace and Security Council, Reports of the Military 
Staff Committee, Press Releases of the Peace and Security Council, Press 
Releases of the Assembly, and the Reports of the Chairperson of the 
Commission.  
In the early stages of the research for the thesis, only the core of these 
documents was available electronically, and gaps in the electronic archive, 
including many reports by the Military Staff Committee and some 
Communiques and other reports, were supplemented with a visit to the African 
Union Commission (AUC) building in Addis Ababa in May 2010. Since then, 
however, the APSA’s online presence has improved drastically, and a near-
complete electronic archive is now available at the official AU Situation Room 
website. Reports of several working groups and committees are still difficult to 
find however, as a result of the African Union’s continuing personnel capacity 
problems which have a knock-on effect on its online presence. 
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In light of the analytical methodology outlined above, a strong understanding of 
the treaty framework and the inner-workings of the APSA treaty framework has 
been imperative, in particular to understanding the endemic functionalist role of 
the APSA, as well as understanding limiting and enabling factors affecting the 
organisations, including those stemming from the organisation itself. 
Elite Interviews 
Careful consideration was given to the ethical implications of the interviews 
prior to arranging the research trip to Addis Ababa. Full ethical approval for the 
research was sought from the faculty, and was granted in accordance with the 
procedures of Coventry University Committee on Ethics.  
Interviews were not conducted anonymously; the interviews were not seen to 
put the interviewees at risk because of their largely procedural and technical 
nature, which focused on topics such as logistics, interoperability, CONOPS, 
C3, cash-flow and the interpretation of various protocols, communiqués, 
charters and treaties. Further; helping to spread knowledge of the activities of 
the APSA and its partners was often an element of the job description of the 
interviewees, making the interview process a natural and frequent occurrence 
for them which, as highly-educated specialists, they were well prepared to deal 
with. 
Even still, before the interviews took place, the offices of interviewees were 
provided with a leaflet that explained who the author was and the nature of the 
research project. The leaflet ensured that the interviewees understood the 
nature and purpose of the interviews, and what would happen with the 
information they provided. It also ensured that they were made explicitly aware 
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that they could withdraw permission for the use of the material they provided 
me at any time, either during the interview or by contacting me subsequently via 
the contact details provided on the leaflet or on the author’s business card, 
which was provided to each interviewee and some of their staff.  
Explicit oral permission was sought at the beginning of each interview to record 
the conversations on a digital recording device, which was later used for 
transcription and analysis. 
The interviews were conducted primarily in English (with some facilitation and 
clarification in French), which was not the first language of all of the 
interviewees, but is the working language of the African Union and its partners 
in Addis Ababa. They served two core purposes within the research 
methodology; first, they were used to cross-reference, confirm, expand on and 
prioritise information about the nature and extent of various limiting and 
enabling factors that had already been gleaned from the archival research, 
reports from think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Swedish 
Defence Research Agency and the North-South Institute,  and a survey of 
secondary scholarship, which itself contained the conclusions of various 
interviews. 
Second, it was hoped that the interviewees would be able to propose additional 
limiting and enabling factors that the author had not yet considered, allowing for 
new avenues of research on return to the UK; this is a process which Jeffry 
Berry refers to as ‘branching’ and requires the interviewer to decide if the 
interviewees proposed topic for conversation is a distraction, or a potentially 
valuable avenue for study (Berry 2005: 801). In particular, the interviews shed 
light upon the massive personnel problems in the APSA, which have limited the 
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APSA’s capacity to act, and capacity to absorb external financial support, as 
will be explained in more detail in chapter four. 
In light of these two objectives, and in light of the preceding research, which 
had shown that the APSA was highly dependent upon external support as a 
major source of enabling (and a few limiting) factors, a conscious decision was 
made to embrace as many of the APSA’s key partners as possible, sending 
requests for interviews to the United States’ Mission to the African Union, the 
European Union Delegation to African Union, the United Nations’ Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), the Chinese Delegation to the African Union and 
the French and British embassies in Addis Ababa, in addition to requests for 
interviews at the AUC, especially the Peace Support Operations Division 
(PSOD) and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretariat.  
Interview method 
Berry highlights the importance of giving interviewees ‘licence to roam’ but also 
places high importance upon the interviewer’s ability to keep the interview on 
track (Berry 2005: 680). In light of these insights, the interviews were conducted 
in a semi-structured and open-ended manner to encourage the free exchange 
and interpretation of ideas and concepts surrounding the subject matter. They 
were, however, focused around the two objectives mentioned above. 
Interviewees were asked to explain their view of the nature, the extent and the 
importance of several limiting and enabling factors. Some key questions, 
prepared in advance, were used to stimulate discussion in some of the 
interviews: 
1. How would you define the role of the AU’s peacekeeping component? 
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2. What are the security functions of the AU military capacity? 
3. Does the practical role of the AU’s military peacekeeping component 
differ from the role defined in its mission statement? 
4. Why not leave peacekeeping to the UN? 
5. Should the AU strengthen and formalise it relationship with the UN? 
6. What is/should be the role of the international community in supporting 
AUPKOs? 
7. Does the AU’s dependence on external actors compromise its African 
ownership? 
8. Do you think the AU should diversify its income (look for support from 
China etc.)? 
9. How important is diplomatic support to the AU’s military activities? 
10. Is the current ad-hoc system of troop generation sustainable? 
11. Will the ASF be a viable tool for the PSC? 
Problems encountered 
The APSA’s limited administrative capacity, and the over-loaded schedules of 
the people targeted for interviews, meant that setting up meetings from the 
United Kingdom was extremely difficult. Interviews with Koen Vervaeke, head of 
the EU Mission to the African Union, and Timothy Murithi, the Programme Head 
of the PSC Report Programme at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), as well 
as interviews with Sandy Moss and Sam Jeremy at the UK Embassy, were 
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confirmed before heading to Ethiopia, and tentative arrangements were made 
to interview Ambassador Battle, head of the United States Mission to the 
African Union.  
However, a major concern was the lack of confirmed interviews at the African 
Union itself; officials would not respond to emails, and all the phone numbers 
available for these individuals were routed through the main administrative desk 
of the AUC, where secretaries were wary of forwarding unsolicited calls to 
APSA officials. Some tentative interviews were set up with PSC Secretariat 
officials. 
Unfortunately, the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in April 2010 prevented air travel in 
northern Europe for two weeks, resulting in the postponement of interviews and 
making it impossible to interview Koen Vervaeke, Ambassador Battle and some 
other potential interviewees in Addis Ababa who had since left the city. On 
arrival in Addis Ababa, the author was unable to secure access to either the 
ECA or the AUC without a prior agreement. 
Dr. Murithi, provided the author with invaluable support in the form of mobile 
phone numbers for some of the key individuals interviewed at the AUC, 
including Dr. Admore Kambudzi, head of the PSC Secretariat. So armed, 
establishing interviews at the APSA became much easier.  
Potential Limitations on the Research Methodology 
Archival Research 
It is arguable that the thesis’ heavy reliance upon official AU documentation 
could give an institutional bias in favour of the APSA. The author has noticed 
some (though not many) areas where major setbacks in the APSA PSO’s were 
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not covered in the Chairperson of the Commission’s Reports, or were covered 
in passing with very little detail. 
In order to compensate for this problem, the thesis has, where possible, cross-
referenced much of the information presented in the official AU documentation 
with other primary sources, such as official UN documents, government and 
institutional reports and interviews, as well as the context provided by the 
secondary literature. However, owing to the obscurity of much of the subject 
matter, some sections of the thesis rely exclusively on information gleaned from 
the AU archives and, as a result, it should be acknowledged that the risk of a 
certain level of bias in the APSA’s favour may remain. 
Interviews 
The author also made a conscious decision to target elites within these 
organisations to ensure that interviewees had the freedom and knowledge to 
talk about the relevant issues. Targeting elites for the interviews was also 
partially a result of time constraints and difficulty in gaining access, which could 
have facilitated more ad hoc interviews. This resulted in a smaller pool of 
interviewees, and perhaps resulted in missing out on valuable information that 
could have been gleaned from lower ranking staff. 
Moreover, it is important to recognise bias in the interviews (Dexter 2006: 119-
121). Each organisation’s representatives had their own biases, which became 
clear during the interviews especially in light of the number of organisations 
covered. All the interviewees became slightly defensive when responding to 
claims made by the other interviewees. Where such bias has been suspected, it 
has been clearly stated in the thesis that the information was the interviewee’s 
opinion. Additionally, some interviewees had a tendency to stick to the ‘party 
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line’, sometimes providing information that was readily available in mission-
statements and other non-critical sources. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how the thesis intends to address the problems with 
the APSA scholarship that were raised in chapter one. It explained the need for 
a reconceptualisation of what is meant when scholars talk about the role of an 
organisation. Borrowing from the fields of Sociology and Social Psychology, the 
chapter developed a new version of Role Theory, called Institutional Role 
Theory, which is designed specifically to analyse the roles of actors in 
International Relations. In the course of developing Institutional Role Theory, 
the chapter developed three different technical definitions of the word role, the 
endemic functionalist role, the projected functionalist role and the interactionist 
role. These technical definitions allow for a much clearer understanding of what 
is meant by academics when invoking the role of an actor. The chapter also 
developed a research programme that enables researchers to provide an 
outline of the interactionist role of an actor by investigating the limiting and 
enabling factors that act upon it and applying the Interactionist Equation. 
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to examining the limiting and enabling 
factors that act upon the APSA so that the Interactionist Equation can be 
applied, revealing a systematic and objective interpretation of the role played by 
the APSA. The following chapter will begin this process with an examination of 
the endemic functionalist role of the APSA, and the limiting and enabling factors 




Chapter Three:  
The Endemic Functionalist Role and Treaty Framework 
of the APSA 
Introduction 
Since the AU’s inception in 2002, it has evolved a considerable treaty 
framework; in addition to the AU Founding Treaty, it is made up of numerous 
Protocols, Decisions, Declarations, Common Positions and Communiques 
which, considered as a whole, can outline the endemic functionalist role of 
African Union Peace and Security Architecture; the role envisioned for the 
institution by those who developed the texts from which it is constructed. It 
delineates the legal boundaries within which the APSA is required to operate, 
but it has also allowed for the creation of a comprehensive set of tools and 
institutions to enable the APSA to promote peace and security across the 
continent, and gives the APSA the freedom to use them in a number of ways in 
a number of situations.  
This chapter will analyse the APSA’s treaty framework in order to meet two key 
outcomes: first, the chapter will present a clear outline of the endemic 
functionalist role of the APSA—the role that the APSA was intended to perform. 
It will use statements of intent and key objectives, mandates and areas of 
operation outlined in the treaty framework to do this, rather than relying on 
external assumptions of what the role of the APSA ought to be. Second, this 
chapter intends to begin the long process of outlining the interactionist role of 
the APSA; treating the treaty framework itself as a limiting and enabling factor, 
showing the impact it has had on the role played by the APSA by limiting or 
enabling its capacity to act in certain areas.  
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To achieve these objectives, the chapter will first focus on the treaty 
framework’s progressive conceptualisation of security, which will form a solid 
platform from which to conduct the rest of the study. It will then go on to 
examine the nature of the role of the APSA envisaged in the treaty framework. 
It will discuss the limitations that the AU treaty framework places on the role 
played by the APSA, and will then focus on the capacity that the AU treaty 
framework has authorised for the APSA to carry out its endemic functionalist 
role. 
Conceptualising Security 
To understand how the AU perceives its role in peace and security, we must 
first understand how it conceptualises security issues. The most important 
document in this respect is the Solemn Declaration on the Common African 
Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), which sought to provide a “common 
understanding of defence and security as terms embracing both civilian and 
military aspects” (African Union 2004g, Preamble 10). As this statement 
suggests, the APSA has embraced a very wide definition of security that heavily 
incorporates human security concepts. Article 6 of the CADSP reaffirms the 
AU’s commitment to traditional state-centric security, but it also puts forth a 
broad range of civilian issues that have been securitised by the AU: human 
rights, structural security including good governance, economic development, 
access to resources, poverty, education, health, gender equality and 
environmental issues (African Union 2004g, Article 6).  At the launch of the 
Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004, the African Heads of State and 
Government explicitly labelled HIV as a security problem for Africa (African 
Union 2004h, Article 11). 
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This progressive concept of security laid the foundations for the securitisation of 
threats to human security in the African Union Non-Aggression and Common 
Defence Pact. In the pact, aggression is defined as “...the use, intentionally and 
knowingly, of armed force or any other hostile act by a State, a group of States, 
an organisation of States or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign or external 
entity, against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and 
human security of the population of a State Party to this Pact...” (African Union 
2005a, Article 1c).  
The most important consequence of this concept of security is that it allowed 
the APSA to embrace the growing consensus, since the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide, that sovereignty is a responsibility, not a right, and that states have a 
responsibility to uphold human security, not just state security. If a government 
fails in its responsibility to protect, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act gives 
the AU the authority to intervene, without any requirement for the consent of the 
government of the state in question, but only “in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” 
(Organisation of African Unity 2000). Article 4(h) marks a sharp break from the 
OAU’s infamous and intransigent reification of state sovereignty. The APSA’s 
right to intervene under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act was expanded further 
in the proposed Amendments to the Constitutive Act; however they have not yet 
been ratified (African Union 2010f).  
The AU views socio-economic development as interdependent with state 
security (African Union 2002b, Article 4d), therefore it is in the interests of 
human security that the APSA has also renewed Africa’s efforts to address 
state-centric security issues. Important OAU documents such as the Lomé 
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Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government, The OAU Convention on the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa, and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism are still at the core of the AU’s security policy (African 
Union 2005a). 
Importantly, the APSA treaty framework also constructs a belief in Africa’s 
security interdependence: “the indivisibility of security in Africa, and particularly 
the fact that the defence and security of one African country is directly linked to 
that of other African countries” (African Union 2004g, Preamble). Again, the 
AU’s interpretation of what constitutes security interdependence is extremely 
loose. Bearing in mind the broad definition of security outlined above, the 
CADSP defines common security threats as any security threats which 
“confront all, some, or one of the countries or regions of the continent” (African 
Union 2004g, Article 7); i.e. all security threats are defined as common security 
threats – essentially a statement of solidarity, which is encapsulated in the 
NATO-inspired Article 2c of the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence 
Pact: “...any aggression or threat of aggression against any of the Member 
States shall be deemed to constitute a threat or aggression against all Member 
States of the Union” (African Union 2005a). 
Thus the APSA treaty framework casts a wide net over security, allowing a vast 
number of processes to be securitised, and providing the AU with the freedom 
and legitimacy to bring to bear the full resources of the APSA and the member 
states to deal with even the slightest security threat. 
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The Endemic Functionalist Role of the APSA 
The APSA treaty framework provides us with a large number of goals, 
objectives, standards of behaviour, statements of intent and justifications for its 
existence. Collectively, these statements represent the endemic functionalist 
role of the APSA. This represents the APSA’s raison d’être, as imagined by its 
creators, the guiding principles that govern how and why the APSA employs 
whatever means are at its disposal. Every document in the treaty framework 
contributes something to this constructed role, and reinforces what came 
before; however, there are several important themes that arise frequently that 
represent an outline of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role. 
At its most basic level, the APSA, and indeed the whole African Union, is a 
collective bargaining tool. Its goal is to “promote and defend African common 
positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples” (Organisation of 
African Unity 2000: Article 3d). A relevant example of this is the AU’s common 
positions delivered at the United Nations General Assembly, such as the 
Ezulwini Consensus, which calls for two permanent seats and five non-
permanent seats for Africa on the UN Security Council (2005c). The AU’s 
highest common objective is African socio-economic development, and it was 
to that end that the APSA was created. The preamble to the AU Constitutive 
Act states “that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment 
to the socio-economic development of the continent” and emphasises “the need 
to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation 
of our development and integration agenda” (Organisation of African Unity 
2000); a sentiment repeated in subsequent documents (African Union 2002b: 
Article 4d), (African Union 2005a: Preamble). The APSA is likewise committed 
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to the “peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace 
and security” (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4i). The PSC Protocol 
was penned to enhance the APSA’s capacity to play “a central role in bringing 
about peace, security and stability on the Continent” (African Union 2002b: 
Preamble). Thus, the promotion of peace is a core element of the constructed 
role of the APSA.  
In this respect, the APSA views itself as an extension of the United Nations 
peace and security architecture, describing itself as a regional organisation in 
keeping with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (African Union 2002b: Article 17.2), 
(African Union 2002b: Preamble). As such, the APSA undertakes to cooperate 
with the UN in the promotion of peace and security (African Union 2002b: 
Article 4). It achieves its objectives in peace and security through a number of 
strategies. 
The APSA’s constructed role in conflict management is extensive and 
ambitious. The APSA assumes primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace and security on the continent, undertaking to address each and every 
conflict that emerges on the continent in a timely manner, and to do so 
effectively (African Union 2004h: Article 3). The Statement of Commitment to 
Peace and Security in Africa boldly states that the APSA “shall not shrink from 
decisive actions to overcome the challenges confronting the continent. 
Henceforth, there will be no conflict on our continent that will be considered to 
be out of bounds for the African Union” (African Union 2004h: Article 7). These 
articles could be the source of much of the criticism of the APSA, as they seem 
to make the resolution of all conflict in Africa part of the APSA’s role; compared 
to such a lofty objective, it is certain to fall short. However, they could equally 
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be seen as a statement of political will and an assertion of African ownership of 
Africa’s underlying security problems. 
From this examination of the treaty framework, it is possible to synthesise the 
APSA’s endemic functionalist role, which is fostering peace by engaging with 
small arms and light weapons proliferation, peace building, peacekeeping, post 
conflict reconstruction, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration, child 
soldiers land mines, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) proliferation and 
terrorism (African Union 2004g: Article 10).  It is the APSA’s endemic 
functionalist role to prevent inter-state or intra-state conflicts (African Union 
2005a: Article 2a(iii)). Where conflict already exists, the APSA, through the PSC 
has the responsibility (not simply the right) to deploy peace-making and peace 
building missions to resolve the conflict (African Union 2002b: Articles 3b and 
4b).   
A further aspect of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role is defence 
cooperation. The APSA is supposed to “defend the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence of Member States” (Organisation of African Unity 
2000 Article 3b). The CADSP was designed to provide a framework for defence 
cooperation, including military training, intelligence pooling, and the 
development of common military doctrine, capacity and threat deterrence 
(African Union 2004g: Articles 13c, 13f and 13r). Moreover, despite the low rate 
of occurrences of inter-state conflict in Africa, the CADSP even includes a 
NATO-style mutual defence clause—Article 2c (African Union 2005a). 
The most powerful tool afforded to the APSA by the treaty framework is the 
African Standby Force. It enables the APSA to carry out its endemic 
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functionalist role in peace operations under six different mission scenarios 
(African Union 2003d: 3): 
 Scenario 1: AU/Regional Military advice to a political mission. 
 Scenario 2: AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN 
mission. 
 Scenario 3: Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission. 
 Scenario 4: AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and 
preventive deployment missions. 
 Scenario 5: AU PKF for complex multidimensional PK mission with low-
level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts). 
 Scenario 6: AU intervention – e.g. genocide situations where 
international community does not act promptly. 
According to the ASF Policy Framework, scenarios one to four should be able 
to deploy with thirty days notice. Scenario five should be able to fully deploy 
within ninety days; however, the military component should be on the ground 
within thirty days. Under scenario six, the APSA should be able to deploy a 
robust military force in 14 days (African Union 2003d: 6-7). Further, forces 
deployed for scenarios one, two and three are expected to be self-sustaining for 
30 days, whereas scenarios four, five and six should (ideally) be deployed with 
self-sustainability for 90 days (African Union 2003d: 15). Such a standing force, 
if fully operationalised, would exceed the capacity of even the United Nations 
and the European Union’s stand-by arrangements, an indication of the 
extremely high ambitions of the APSA. 
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The treaty framework also states that humanitarian assistance is an important 
component of the role of the APSA. According to the PSC Protocol, the ASF is 
supposed to perform humanitarian assistance missions to “alleviate the 
suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address 
major natural disasters” (African Union 2002b: Article 13.3). The ASF is also 
expected to be able to perform Quick Impact Projects (QIP), small, cheap 
targeted missions making use of specialist staff  to perform small-scale 
humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction missions (African Union 2003d: 
Article 3.24.e). 
It is clear, therefore, that the APSA is supposed to have a very considerable 
military aspect to aid it in its endemic functionalist role as Africa’s primary 
guarantor of peace and security. However, despite this, a powerful, recurring 
normative feature of the treaty framework is the APSA’s commitment to the 
pacific resolution of conflicts (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4e). 
The military elements of the APSA are supposed to be methods of last resort 
and its endemic functionalist role in conflict management is primarily peaceful. 
The treaty framework underlines political dialogue as the “essential mechanism 
for preventing recourse to insurrection and armed struggle”, supplemented with 
the wider AU’s commitment to addressing the underlying causes of conflict 
(African Union 2004h: Article 11). For example, promoting structural security is 
a cornerstone of the endemic functionalist role of the APSA; the promotion of 
human rights, democracy and democratic culture, good governance and the 




Indeed, an important part of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role is its 
commitment to conflict prevention. Early warning, preventive diplomacy and 
peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation and conciliation, are 
integral to the APSA’s role in conflict management (African Union 2002b: 
Articles 4b, 6b and 6c). This sentiment is reinforced in the CADSP, which 
emphasised the APSA’s desire to promote a ‘culture of peace and peaceful co-
existence’ in Africa and to promote the pacific resolution of conflicts and the 
non-use of force (African Union 2004g: Article 13k). One of the objectives of the 
AU Non Aggression and Common Defence pact is “to ensure that disputes are 
resolved by peaceful means” (African Union 2005a: Article 2.a(iv)).  
From the above, it seems that there may be a certain level of role conflict 
between the pacific and interventionist elements of the APSA’s role. It is 
perhaps telling that the APSA has not fully embraced the new interventionist 
ideals for which it has been lauded. Article 4(h) provides for a right to intervene 
in a state without the consent of the government under specific conditions, not a 
responsibility, as would later be recommended by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its now famous R2P report 
(ICISS 2001). Likewise, the treaty framework reconfirmed its commitment to 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity from the start (Organisation of African 
Unity 2000: Article 3b). Importantly, the controversial Amendments to the 
Constitutive Act, which considerably expanded the APSA’s right to intervene 
without the permission of the state in question, was never ratified by the 
requisite two thirds of the member states. Further, the Ezulwini Consensus 
explicitly states that the obligation of a state to protect its citizens should not be 
used as a pretext to undermine state sovereignty or territorial integrity (African 
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Union 2005c: Paragraph B(i))—perhaps indicating that Africa’s leadership is still 
not fully comfortable with the R2P concept, despite being on the cutting edge of 
its operationalisation. 
Treaty Framework 
The endemic functionalist role of the APSA is therefore broad and complex. In 
order to enable the APSA to fulfil its role, the AU has developed a robust treaty 
framework to establish powerful mechanisms and institutions. However, this 
treaty framework both limits and enables the APSA’s capacity to act. The most 
significant limiting factors of the APSA treaty framework come from the APSA’s 
position within the wider framework of international law, especially the AU’s 
relationship with the United Nations. 
From the beginning, the APSA has respected the role of the UN Charter 
(Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 3e). In the Preamble of the PSC 
Protocol, the AU acknowledges the primary responsibility of the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) for the maintenance of international peace and 
security (African Union 2002b), a sentiment repeated in the AU Non Aggression 
and Common Defence Pact (African Union 2005a: Article 17a). The AU also 
acknowledges the UN as the supreme mandating authority and stated explicitly 
in the Ezulwini Consensus “that the intervention of Regional Organisations 
should be with the approval of the Security Council” (African Union 2005c: 6) 
and that it “will seek UN Security Council authorisation of its enforcements 
actions” (African Union 2003d: 4). 
The APSA treaty framework also accepts the primacy of international human 
rights law (African Union 2002b: Article 4c). The Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights is acknowledged in the Founding Treaty itself (Organisation of 
African Unity 2000: Article 3e), along with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, which is reaffirmed in article 3(h) (Organisation of African Unity 
2000). Further, the treaty framework has recommended (although not enforced) 
the accession of AU member states to various international treaties bilaterally, 
such as the Convention on Banning the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
with a Traumatic Effect or Which Strike Indiscriminately (African Union 2010e: 
Decision 321). The APSA must work within the boundaries of these 
international agreements during its operations. 
The African Union also continues the OAU’s traditional respect for the borders 
on independence (African Union 2002b: Article 4i) and this dogmatic adherence 
to the independence borders removes the APSA’s freedom to recognise the 
sovereignty of autonomous sub-state regions such as Somaliland or Cabinda. 
The promotion of self-determination has been a useful tool in resolving conflicts 
in other parts of the world such as East Timor and Kosovo. 
Finally, as explained above, another important theme of the APSA treaty 
framework is the strong commitment to the pacific resolution of conflicts 
(African Union 2004g: Article 15) (African Union 2009e: Article 13). Even this 
may well be considered a limiting factor if it delays military deployment in a 
crisis.  
While acknowledging these limiting factors, the treaty framework is also the 
source of the APSA’s legitimacy and its mandate to act. The treaty framework’s 
important enabling factors collectively outline the potentiality of the APSA. It has 
facilitated the APSA’s capacity to act in many areas, most famously the right to 
intervene in support of peace. 
94 
 
The AU treaty framework confers the right to intervene in a member state in 
one of two ways. The simplest path is through Article 4(j) of the Constitutive 
Act, whereby a member state can request that the APSA intervene within its 
borders in order to “restore peace and security” (Organisation of African Unity 
2000: Article 4j). However, under ‘grave circumstances’ – war crimes, genocide 
or crimes against humanity, the Assembly may authorise intervention, and does 
not require a request from the government of the member state concerned to 
do so (Organisation of African Unity 2000: Article 4h). If the Protocol on the 
Amendments to the Constitutive Act is ratified, which now seems unlikely, these 
grounds for intervention would be expanded to include unconstitutional changes 
of government (as defined in the Lomé Convention) (African Union 2003e: 
Article 4). 
The APSA’s endemic functionalist role as a peacekeeping organisation rests 
heavily on its capacity to deploy peace missions, which is facilitated by the 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union, which established the PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 2.1). 
The PSC has the power to act on the behalf of AU member states on matters of 
Peace and Security (African Union 2002b: Article 7.2); although the Constitutive 
Act references the Assembly, the power to authorise peace support operations 
and intervention under the above articles also lies with the PSC (African Union 
2002b: Articles 3b, 6d, 7.1c). In order to further enable the APSA’s capacity to 
fulfil its endemic functionalist role in this area, a number of institutions have 
been created to supplement the PSC. Theoretically, the most important of these 
institutions is the African Standby Force (ASF); a standby arrangement under 
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the control of the Peace and Security Council consisting of five multinational 
brigades, one from each of the Regions. 
The PSC Protocol helps to enable the APSA’s endemic functionalist role in 
peacemaking by permitting the preventive deployment of the ASF under certain 
circumstances: “in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) 
an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or States, and 
(iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an 
agreement” and also allows the  ASF to deploy observation and monitoring 
missions (African Union 2002b: Article 13.3). The Policy Framework for the 
Operationalisation of the ASF develops this aspect of the APSA’s role further by 
explicitly outlining the types of conflict scenarios in which the ASF would be 
expected to deploy, including military advice to a political mission,  observer 
missions, which may be co-deployed with a UN mission, Chapter VI and 
preventive deployment missions, complex peacekeeping missions and finally 
full-scale interventions under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act (African Union 
2003d, :3). The Ezulwini Consensus limits the APSA’s role by underlining the 
need for the APSA to obtain approval from the Security Council for intervention; 
however, it goes on to state that such approval may be sought post-facto 
(African Union 2005c: Paragraph B(i)) – effectively allowing the APSA to deploy 
on its own initiative and seek legitimacy in its leisure, enhancing its role as a 
first responder and as an African-owned organisation 
The AU Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact further strengthens the 
interventionist elements of the APSA’s role. Article 3(d) (African Union 2005a) 
requires that the APSA prevent genocide, mass murder and other crimes 
against humanity. Likewise, Articles 4(a) and (b) (African Union 2005a) commit 
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member states to provide mutual assistance against any aggression or threat of 
aggression and to respond “by any means necessary.” Bearing in mind the 
wide definition of security used by the APSA, these articles could be invoked to 
justify intervention in a very wide range of situations, establishing the APSA’s 
freedom to act in pursuit of its endemic functionalist role as a military 
peacekeeper/peacemaker. Member states are further required to arrest and 
prosecute armed groups, mercenaries or terrorists that pose a threat to any 
member state (African Union 2005a: Article 6b), a process which would likely 
require the use of force. 
The treaty framework also outlines a limited endemic functionalist role in 
counter terrorism for the APSA. The AU Charter reconfirmed its commitment to 
the implementation of the OAU Convention on Combating Terrorism (African 
Union 2002b: Article 17.1.i). Meanwhile the 2002 Algiers Plan of Action 
established the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism 
(African Union 2002a). The AU Non Aggression and Common Defence Pact 
extends the APSA’s capacity to act by allowing member states to extend all 
assistance necessary in the event of a terrorist threat, and allows the arrest and 
prosecution of any irregular armed group (African Union 2005a: Article 6). 
On the other hand, the role of the APSA envisaged in the treaty framework is 
heavily focused on the pacific resolution of conflict and as such has more than 
hard-power tools at its disposal. The PSC Protocol creates a number of soft-
power options for use in conflict management. The most important of these is 
the Panel of the Wise (PotW), a panel of highly-respected African personalities 
“who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace and 
security and development” (African Union 2007g: Article 3), one from each sub-
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region. The PotW was created to support the PSC in the area of conflict 
prevention to take whatever action it deems necessary to promote peace and 
security in Africa (African Union 2002b: Article 11). The panel was 
operationalised at the 100th meeting of the PSC with the adoption of the 
Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise. The treaty framework 
enables the PotW, utilising their good offices, to provide advice to the PSC and 
the Commission based on fact-finding missions: they can conduct informal 
shuttle diplomacy, assist mediation teams, encourage political dialogue, 
confidence building and reconciliation and other preventive diplomacy 
techniques, making the PotW a potentially invaluable asset in fulfilling the 
APSA’s role in the pacific resolution of disputes (African Union 2007g: Chapter 
III). 
The treaty framework also allows for the development of the APSA’s role as a 
humanitarian actor. The PSC protocol instructs the PSC to facilitate 
humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict or natural disasters. 
Coordinating and conducting humanitarian action is the responsibility of the 
PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 7.1p, 13.3f and 15), and the ASF is 
mandated to facilitate the activities of humanitarian agencies in mission areas 
(African Union 2002b: Article15.4). 
Bearing in mind the APSA’s emphasis on prevention, and the requirements of 
the above capacities, the treaty framework enables the development of an early 
warning capacity. Established in the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002b: Article 
12.1), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is designed to enable 
preventive diplomacy and anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts that 
may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity (African Union 2002b: 
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Articles 6b, 7.1a). The CEWS operates on ‘clearly defined and accepted 
political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be 
used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best 
course of action” (African Union 2002b: Article 12.4). Information gathered from 
the CEWS was envisaged to be used by the chairman of the commission to 
advise the PSC (African Union 2002b: Article 12.5). The CEWS is located in the 
Conflict Management and Analysis Division in the Peace and Security 
Directorate, and it consists of a Situation Room, responsible for data collection 
and analysis (African Union 2002b: Article 12.2a). It is linked to observation and 
monitoring units in the Regional Mechanisms (African Union 2002b: Article 
12.2b). The modalities of the CEWS are further refined in the Draft Roadmap 
for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System (African 
Union 2008c). 
Although the treaty framework described above has allowed the APSA to have 
a role in these specific areas, and has outlined a structure for the APSA, it is 
still just a stack of paper. To enable the APSA’s member states and partners to 
turn this treaty framework into real action, the APSA established the Peace 
Fund in Article 2.1 of the PSC Protocol. The peace fund is made up of only 6% 
of the AU general budget; however, from 2011, the general budget contribution 
to the Peace Fund began to increase, and will rise to 12% in 2014 (African 
Union 2010d: Decision 287). Other sources of income for the Peace Fund 
outlined in the PSC Protocol are voluntary contributions from member states 
and African civil society and fundraising, as well as from external donations 
(African Union 2002b: Article 21.2, 21.3). It was envisaged that these funding 
sources would enable the APSA to spring to life, enabled and legitimised by the 
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documents described above, and it would be able to fulfil its endemic 
functionalist role. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the APSA’s endemic functionalist role and the legal 
framework which authorises it. It may appear that this dissertation could happily 
end at this point as we now have a clear idea of the role that the APSA was 
established to play in the African peace and security environment. The role 
played by the APSA is an African-owned peacekeeping, peacemaking, rapid 
response, humanitarian organisation with early warning capabilities. It has 
responsibility for ending current conflicts and preventing future ones on the 
continent, as well as supporting post-conflict reconstruction and development, 
promoting human security and providing humanitarian assistance. The APSA 
also plays an important role as a key partner of the United Nations. The APSA 
is a framework for a standing multinational military force, capable of deploying a 
full brigade of 20,000 to a peace enforcement mission operational theatre within 
90 days. At the same time, the APSA is a multilateral diplomatic effort aimed at 
the peaceful resolution of conflict through high-level negotiation and shuttle 
diplomacy. On top of all that, the APSA is a mutual defence and security 
cooperation pact.  
However, this is not the role the APSA is playing; it is the role that it was 
intended to play, or the role that it one day aims to play: the endemic 
functionalist role. It does not tell us much about the reality of the role performed 
by the APSA, which may not resemble the endemic functionalist role at all. But 
this fact does not necessarily mean that it should not be considered 
strategically important as an organisation, and it does not mean that the role 
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that it is playing, although clearly not as extensive as the one outlined above, is 
unimportant either. In fact, the role played by the APSA in Africa’s regional 
security environment is of pivotal importance for APSA member states and 
external partners. 
Seeing all the elements of the endemic functionalist role of the APSA outlined in 
one place highlights the absurdity of using the endemic functionalist role as a 
benchmark to measure success. The endemic functionalist role is very far from 
the real role played by the APSA, and this is a result of various limiting and 
enabling factors acting upon it. Some of these factors have already been 
discussed; the treaty framework itself, in addition to setting out the endemic 
functionalist role of the APSA, also enables the operationalisation of the APSA 
by making it legal and by setting out a plan for its operationalisation. It helps to 
organise resources and provides legitimacy in the eyes of international law. It 
further acts as a limiting factor: by stating where the APSA is allowed to 
develop, it establishes the organisation’s legal boundaries. In some areas the 
APSA’s role has been explicitly limited by the treaty framework—such as 
requirements placed on intervention—and in other areas limitations have been 
indirectly applied—for example, the requirements set out in the UN charter 
which the APSA must operate within. 
However, there are many more limiting and enabling factors which explain why 
the real, or interactionist, role of the APSA is so different from the extremely 
ambitious endemic functionalist role. The following chapters will go on to 
examine the most important of these limiting and enabling factors in detail, 
beginning with the APSA’s internal capacity problems, which have prevented 
the full operationalisation of the endemic functionalist role of the APSA; 
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whereas the institutional framework gives the APSA the permission to assume 
its role, the process of operationalisation requires expansive sources of 
capacity which, in the poorest continent in the world, are not easy to come by. 
102 
 
Chapter Four: The Internal Capacity of the APSA 
Introduction 
The treaty framework itself creates a meta-level of limiting and enabling factors, 
and also sets the agenda for the APSA, outlining its organs and plans for their 
operationalisation. However, the organs themselves contain a whole new set of 
limiting and enabling factors that have had a huge, if not entirely unexpected, 
impact on the role played by the APSA. Ten years after the founding of the AU, 
very few of the APSA’s institutions are fully operationalised; most are short-
staffed overworked and under-resourced. Further, a lack of either capacity or 
political will on the part of AU member states has had a knock-on effect on the 
capacity of the APSA; the operationalisation of the ASF has taken much longer 
than expected, force generation for missions is extremely difficult, and the 
Peace Fund has been consistently empty. 
Certainly, the APSA has operationalised to a great extent, and it clearly does 
have the capacity to play a role in the African security environment, as we will 
see in the subsequent chapters. However, that role is very different from the 
endemic functionalist role described in the previous chapter, and one of the 
main reasons for this is the problem of severe and chronic capacity gaps within 
the APSA institutions. In order to outline the effect this has had on the role 
played by the APSA, this chapter will focus on the APSA’s current weaknesses 
in three key areas of capacity that were frequently highlighted in interviews with 
AU staff and external advisors conducted by the author in Addis Ababa. First, it 
will examine the APSA’s chronic lack of expertise, technical knowledge, and 
qualified staff. It will then go on to discuss the APSA’s lack of indigenous 
enforcement capacity in the form of military capabilities. It will finish with a 
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discussion of arguably the most fundamental capacity gap: the APSA’s limited 
financial capacity. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the effect of 
the APSA’s internal limiting and enabling factors upon the role of the APSA. 
Human Resources 
In interviews and in the literature, one of the APSA’s most reported capacity 
gaps is its failure to recruit enough people with the requisite skills to fully 
operationalise its institutions. The APSA has had worryingly low staff levels 
relative to the extraordinary responsibilities required of it by its endemic 
functionalist role, with only a fraction of the number of staff members working 
on peace and security issues that the European Union  and NATO have at their 
disposal (Moss 2010: interview). Despite the fact that Peace and Security is the 
largest department within the AU Commission, staff levels are much lower than 
required for the endemic functionalist role because of a litany of problems, 
including a limited HR budget, loss of skilled Africans through the brain-drain, 
mission creep, poor recruitment procedures, limited salaries compared with 
comparable rates in local international organisations and high work-loads; all of 
which has resulted in high turnover rates (Murithi 2010: interview). The 
bureaucracy has been so under-staffed that staff members have had to take on 
more responsibilities, with many performing multiple roles (Murithi 2010: 
interview). Even senior staff members are known to work extremely long hours, 
often losing weekends, evenings and lunch breaks trying to manage their 
workloads (Suifon 2010: interview). Some AU advisors explained in interviews 
with the authors that to try to make up for these shortfalls, the AU has had to 
make extensive use of external consultants in many of its departments, such as 
the Continental Early Warning System (Gomes 2010; Murithi 2010: interview). 
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However, this solution does not address the long term problems of the APSA, 
while raising obvious questions over African ownership of the APSA.  
The programme head of the PSC Report Programme at the Institute of Security 
Studies, Dr. Tim Murithi, helped to elucidate some of the underlying causes of 
this chronic staff-shortage in an interview with the author in 2010: the AU does 
not have the resources to hire as many people as it needs to effectively execute 
its endemic functionalist role (Murithi 2010: interview). Further, staff retention is 
a continuing problem for the APSA; high workloads, low remuneration and a 
poor working environment have resulted in many capable staff members 
leaving the organisation (Murithi 2010: interview). The lack of space 
compounds these problems; the bureaucracy has overflowed from the AU HQ 
complex and is spread over Addis Ababa in a web of office space spanning 
disjointed commercial buildings. In 2007 the Chinese government provided 100 
million USD towards the construction of a new building In Addis Ababa (Franke 
2009:242); however, the building work is considerably behind schedule and, at 
the time of writing, the new complex is still not completed.  
One of the most serious causes of the staff deficiency, however, is the AU’s 
recruitment processes. The slow recruitment process is highlighted by 
Klingebiel et al. (2008: 68) as a major problem for the APSA, resulting in a 
smaller number of overburdened staff. In an interview with the author, Solomon 
Gomes (2010: interview), a senior political advisor at the AU Commission, 
echoed this sentiment, and explained that the AU’s cumbersome and 
unresponsive procedures for recruitment create a bottleneck within the 
administration. He claimed that as a result of these problems, recruitment often 
lags three or four months behind official requirements. These inefficient 
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processes are reminiscent of the staid bureaucratic practices of the OAU, which 
according to Murithi, are still very much a part of the African Union’s corporate 
culture (Murithi 2010: interview). Murithi pointed out the fact that the APSA’s 
bureaucracy has not been fully computerised; staff are still regularly walking 
hard-copies of documents across different buildings to collect signatures—a 
significant amount of red-tape for such a large organisation. To remedy these 
difficulties, a new AU Deputy Chairperson was brought in specifically to 
transform the AU’s administration and make it more efficient; however, there 
has been some resistance to change in the organisation (Murithi 2010: 
interview). On top of this, during various interviews at the PSC Secretariat in 
Addis Ababa in 2010, the author came across an increasing lack of confidence 
in the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, who was seen by some to 
spend too much time travelling, rather than focussing on enabling the day-to-
day administration of the organisation. Significant efforts are being made to 
enhance the administrative capacity of the APSA; however, institutional reform 
is a long-term project which will take years, and in that time, these capacity 
gaps will continue to have a limiting effect on the role played by the APSA 
(Gomes 2010: interview).  
Given the low staff numbers, it is not surprising that the bureaucracy is falling 
short (Murithi 2010: interview). However, even with all the positions filled, the 
AU would still not be in a position to deliver on the high expectations placed 
upon it by its endemic or projected functionalist roles. The severe capacity 
shortages at the PSC secretariat and the Peace Support Operations Division 
were highlighted by Dr Admore Kambudzi, head of the PSC Secretariat. In an 
interview with the author, Kambudzi explained that the PSC Secretariat “doesn’t 
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have enough staff, it doesn’t have enough equipment, and it doesn’t have 
enough operations staff” (Kambudzi 2010: interview). He underlined the 
importance of the PSC secretariat to the effectiveness of the APSA, as without 
an effective PSC Secretariat, the APSA cannot function (Kambudzi 2010: 
interview).  The PSC Secretariat is currently designed for two officers; however, 
Kambudzi explained that in order to serve the PSC effectively it must grow to 
about ten (Kambudzi 2010: interview). 
It is important to note that the PSC Secretariat is not the only department facing 
these problems; departments across the APSA are increasingly failing to 
handle the proliferation of their workloads. According to a 2010 re-evaluation of 
the APSA’s staffing requirements, the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development unit (PCRD) requires about fifteen staff members, from level P2 
right up to level P4 and P5-- a considerable increase from the three staff 
members that the PCRD unit had at its disposal during the author’s visit to the 
African Union Commission (AUC) (Suifon 2010: interview). In an interview with 
the author, Takwa Suifon from the APSA’s department of Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development pointed out that there is also a lack of support 
staff for the African Union ‘Special Representatives’; put on the ground in AU 
member states without a network of specialist support staff, the Special 
Representatives find that they are unable to perform their complex tasks. By 
contrast, the UN Special Representatives usually have a staff of about fifteen to 
twenty specialists (Suifon 2010: interview). Therefore, the APSA not only needs 
to fill all the existing vacancies, but in order for it to perform its role properly, a 




Another major problem undermining the APSA’s human resource capacity is a 
lack of Africans with the required skills, qualifications and experience required 
to fill positions in the APSA. Thus, not only the quantity, but the quality of the 
AU’s staff is brought into question. A 2005 report of the Chairperson of the 
Commission concerning the early stages of AMIS complained about the slow 
progress in the staffing of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), which was 
responsible for the coordination of AMIS. The report recounts a slow and 
delayed response by member states requested to second officers to the DITF, 
and goes on to state that some of the officers posted to the DITF had no prior 
experience with planning and management in peace support operations at the 
strategic level (African Union 2005b: 12). 
The extent of this kind of capacity gap in the APSA was highlighted by Kevin 
Warthon, Peace and Security Advisor at the United States Mission to the 
African Union. During an interview with the author, he explained that the United 
States “can give the AU all of the assets and the things that it needs and we’re 
doing that. But ... if the institutional intellectual management capacity does not 
exist, then all this stuff that we give is for nought” (Warthon 2010: interview). 
Providing the APSA with equipment or systems that they do not have the 
expertise or technical know-how to manage does not increase the APSA’s 
capacity to act (Warthon 2010: interview). Gomes reinforced this position when 
discussing delays in accepting external support, explaining that “you have a 
situation where an offer is made and it takes you time to take the offer because 
you don’t have people who can manage it” (Gomes 2010: interview).  To 
illustrate the seriousness of this problem, Warthon recounted a high-level 
meeting of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) joint taskforce 
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where the deficiencies of AMISOM’s Mission HQ staff (the political leadership of 
AMISOM) became painfully clear: Mission HQ staff had failed to produce a 
Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) for AMISOM. The Plans and Operations 
Unit (a strategic level organisation that analyses information, conducts 
research, and provides support to the APSA) offered to send a team to help 
with writing the plan; however, a staff member from the AMIS Mission HQ staff 
told the joint task-force meeting that “you can send as many teams as you like, 
and they can be there for as much time as you want them to be, and we still will 
not be able to do it, because we simply just don’t have the capacity or capability 
on our staff to do this.” The Special Representative for the Chairperson’s 
Commission concurred with this assessment (Warthon 2010: interview). The 
same problem has been highlighted by the 2006 G8 report on peacekeeping, 
which called the APSA’s lack of capacity in planning and the definition of 
mandates “a hindrance to mission success” (G8 2009: 6). 
Further deficiencies are visible around the APSA, such as at the CEWS, the 
focal point of the APSA’s role in conflict prevention. According to Gomes, “it is 
not an early warning unit. It is an office with computers where people are 
photocopying all kinds of latest news and passing it to officials” (Gomes 2010: 
interview). 
These personnel capacity problems do not seem to be teething problems, but 
long-term limiting factors on the role of the APSA. According to Warthon, the 
only real solution is a long-term commitment to education and training on the 
continent to identify bright young minds and place them in fast track 
programmes to prepare them for positions in the APSA; they need people who 
“know how to do the research, know how to do the analysis, and know how to 
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manage these governmental pillars that have been designed” (Warthon 2010: 
interview). Another cause of this lack of expertise is that limited funds available 
for personnel results in losing prospective applicants to comparatively higher 
salaries paid by other institutions, such as the UN (Stephan Klingebiel et al. 
2008: 68). 
The issue has been raised at the AU Assembly, showing an awareness of this 
serious problem. The Assembly addressed the issue in the 2009 Tripoli 
Declaration: “Making and sustaining peace and security is an intellectual 
challenge. We therefore undertake to build the capacity of our universities and 
research institutes to explore the nature of African conflicts, to investigate what 
succeeds and what fails in conflict resolution efforts, and to arrive at African-
centred solutions, drawing from our own distinctive and unique experience” 
(African Union 2009e:4). Unfortunately this rhetoric has not yet translated into 
any concrete action, and so this lack of capacity will continue to be a limiting 
factor for the foreseeable future. However, it should be noted that despite these 
endemic capacity gaps, the APSA’s personnel have been able to conduct 
complex administrative tasks that have kept the APSA operational over the 
years, such as the rotation of Rwandan troops in the early stages of AMIS, 
even though the Darfur Integrated Taskforce was at half-strength at that time 
and lacked the relevant experience (African Union 2005b: 12). 
Military Capacity 
Although the APSA’s personnel problems are a serious concern, the 
subsequent chapters will show that the APSA is able to limp by with support 
from external advisors. However, this section will now discuss an even more 
serious capacity problem that is even harder to compensate for. One of the 
110 
 
cornerstones of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role described in the previous 
chapter was its capacity for the deployment of what the APSA calls Peace 
Support Operations (PSOs), which include peacekeeping operations, 
peacemaking, prevention and other military-based operations in support of 
peace. This element of the endemic functionalist role of the APSA has become 
renowned for its pioneering interventionist undertones; embracing the R2P 
doctrine years before the UN did.  
As outlined in the previous chapter, the APSA’s treaty framework gives it the 
right to intervene in a state without the permission of its government in order to 
prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity. It also has a clearly 
stated desire to intervene quickly, either with the aid of the CEWS to field 
preventive missions, or by deploying during conflicts before the signing of a 
ceasefire agreement in order to field protection missions. With this in mind, it is 
clear that the APSA’s endemic functionalist role is in many ways more 
demanding than that of the United Nations. It would follow, therefore, that a 
very large, well equipped and well trained military component to the APSA is an 
absolute necessity. However, the APSA’s military resources are far from 
correspondingly capable.  
The African Standby Force (ASF) 
The APSA is designed to have a standing military capacity of five brigades 
(roughly 100,000 elements), which it can call upon to field complex PSOs at 
only a few weeks notice. The African Standby Force (ASF), which was originally 
supposed to be operational by 2010, is still a long way from the force envisaged 
in the treaty framework. Some significant progress has been made on the 
project, such as its successful completion of the AMANI AFRICA command 
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post exercise held in late October 2010 to test the ASF’s operational readiness 
(Ashine 2010). AMANI AFRICA was conducted with support from the United 
Nations Office for the African Union (UNOAU), in close coordination with the 
European Union and NATO, to assess the operational readiness of the ASF. 
The successful completion of the exercise marked the end of the ASF Road 
Map II. The UNOAU is now assisting with the development of the African 
Standby Force Road Map III, which aims to complete the operationalisation of 
the ASF by 2015 (United Nations 2011a: 4). 
Further, there was a small East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) mission to 
AMISOM right at the end of 2011; the APSA’s first decade in existence ended 
with the drafting of a plan by the East African Standby Force Coordination 
Mechanism (EASFCOM) to deploy 14 staff officers and 57 trainers from 
EASBRIG, in October 2011, and a level ll hospital in December 2011, to 
Mogadishu. This constitutes the first operational deployment of ASF assets; a 
major milestone in the operationalisation of the ASF, and a positive sign for the 
APSA’s future military capacity (African Union 2011c: 8-9). 
However, despite these promising developments, the ASF has not been able to 
play a role in any of the PSOs mounted during the APSA’s first ten years (with 
the exception of the small mission to AMISOM). As the AU states in Article 3.3 
of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF, “There are clear, 
significant and fundamental gaps between the capabilities needed to realise the 
AU goals and current capacity. The main areas of concern being lack of political 
will and readiness; lack of financial resources; lack of equipment and logistical 
capacity; and in some areas, lack of training. For these reasons, the full 
development of the ASF will need to be viewed as a longer-term project” 
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(African Union 2003d). Unfortunately, these capacity gaps are almost as 
prevalent today as they were in 2003. In an interview with the author, Thomas 
Peyker, Head of the Peace and Security Section of the EU Delegation to the 
AU, explained his view that the effort expended in overcoming these problems, 
largely led by the EU, will be more than compensated for by the 
operationalisation of the ASF; reaction times and deployment timetables will be 
much faster, the field missions will have a larger impact, and it will be easier for 
the UN to take over mission leadership (Peyker 2010: interview). This reflects a 
generally positive view shared by the AU’s other international partners on the 
value of the ASF project (Moss 2010: interview; Warthon 2010: interview).  
All the same, by some estimations, it might take another five to ten years before 
the ASF is operationalised to the point that it can deploy in a PSO (Murithi 
2010: interview; Jeremy 2010: interview). As such it will not be able to increase 
the APSA’s capacity to act for the foreseeable future and will therefore not play 
a major part of the current study, despite being the crown jewel of the APSA on 
paper. The ASF is such an ambitious project that it is difficult to see its slow 
progress as a failure. In an interview with the author, Sandy Moss from the UK 
Embassy in Addis Ababa suggested that we shouldn’t “... blame the AU for the 
problems of multilateralism ... You’ve got the linguistic barrier, you’ve got 23 of 
the 25 poorest countries in the world, you’ve also got religious differences 
between the states” (Moss 2010: interview). Even with all the resources 
available to Western nations, where force generation concepts are well 
understood and highly developed, they still run into difficulty during 
interventions (Warthon 2010: interview). Further, there are logistical difficulties 
associated with the ASF that could limit their effectiveness even after they are 
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operationalised; as Goams pointed out, “it’s one thing to have brigades in 
formation, it’s another thing to have the requisite logistical resources that allow 
you move from point A to point B in 30 minutes as opposed to 5 days” (Gomes 
2010: interview).  
However, much of this is academic to the current study; the ASF remains a 
focal point for the APSA and its partners, but it has not had a major effect on 
the role of the APSA throughout the period of study. Instead, it is possible to 
view the ASF project simply as a trust-building exercise throughout this period, 
or as a symbol of the member states’ commitment to security cooperation. One 
other indirect way in which the ASF may have helped to enhance the role of the 
APSA during its first ten years is that less developed African militaries are 
getting exposure to the professionalism of the more developed militaries in 
Africa, such as those of South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt, which may help to 
contribute to the process of professionalising African militaries in general 
(Jeremy 2010: interview).  
Regardless of the relatively promising progress in the operationalisation of the 
ASF, it has not yet been able to provide any meaningful capacity to the APSA. 
As a result, the APSA has to go outside the treaty framework discussed in the 
previous chapter and rely on ad hoc force generation (i.e. ‘passing the hat 
around’), which is still the only means of generating a viable force for PSOs 
today. This complete reliance on ad hoc troop generation has proven to be a 
major limiting factor on the APSA’s role in humanitarian intervention—probably 
the most definitive element of the APSA’s role. Ad hoc force generation is 
extremely unreliable, relying on the political interest, political will and the military 
and logistical capacity of the member states, without which a mission is either 
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impossible or severely compromised. For example, Ghana and Nigeria pledged 
troops to AMISOM and were promised additional US training equipment and 
logistical support to bridge all the capacity gaps that would have prevented 
deployment. Nevertheless, neither country deployed its forces to Somalia. As 
USAF Major Cochran recounted “when asked to explain this lack of response 
despite previous pledges, a senior US military official in the region opined that 
Somalia “scared the ... out of them” and that they had no direct interests related 
to the mission. In other words, “Why would Ghana care about Somalia?” 
(Cochran 2010: 136). 
The AU’s current ad hoc force generation method is known as the ‘Burundi 
model’, after the APSA’s first PSO AMIB, which was the first time the model 
was used. This model requires troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to support 
their own troop contributions in the field until the United Nations can take over 
responsibility for the mission or until they can be reimbursed with funds from 
other external partners such as the US or the EU. The Burundi model is a 
pragmatic approach to force generation against a backdrop of the debilitating 
resource gaps of the APSA and its member states.  
However, as will be explained in chapter seven the Burundi model’s strategy of 
placing the significant economic burden of deploying and supporting troops 
contributed to a PSO on the TCCs themselves is undermined by TCCs’ own 
lack of resources, especially logistics capacity (African Union 2005b: 11). For 
example, the deployment of the first two battalions of Burundian peacekeepers 
earmarked for AMISOM was delayed by a lack of resources and logistic 
capacity required to transport them to Somalia and sustain them in the field. 
The same problem has prevented the deployment of a contribution of the 1,200 
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desperately needed troops from Nigeria and Ghana (Hull and Svensson 
2008:8-9).  
In some ways, the weakness of the Burundi model stems from a lack of synergy 
between the AU and the UN. AMISOM’s original mandate was adopted by the 
AU Peace and Security Council at its 69th meeting (African Union 2007f), which 
explicitly stated that the mandate was for six months, after which it was 
supposed to begin to evolve into a UN mission. In spite of UN resolution 1744 
(2007b), which agreed that the secretariat should look for a way to allow the UN 
to take over the mission, five years later, the UN is still no closer to deploying.  
Another major problem with the Burundi model of force generation is the opt-in 
element. With the responsibility to support your own troop contributions for the 
first few months, and the AU’s poor reputation for paying soldiers’ wages and 
reimbursing costs to member states, it is not surprising that APSA troop levels 
were so low before funding levels increased. The capacity to project power 
across the continent and sustain a contingent of peacekeepers for years is well 
beyond the capacity of most African states. Even Burundi and Uganda were 
heavily reliant on external support; in the first year alone external partners such 
as the United states and the EU had to provide force multiplying capacity 
including heavy airlift, logistics, planning and training staff, as well as paying 36 
million USD bilaterally (only a tenth of AMISOM’s operating costs in the first 
year) (Hull and Svensson 2008:19-30). Out of the fifty-three African Union 
member states, only Burundi and Uganda had supplied troops to the mission 
until 2012; and it took them five years to get up to the full mandated force-
strength. In addition to the financial cost and logistical challenges posed by the 
Burundi model, member states are further put off by a lack of political will. 
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Warthon (2010: interview) suggested that many nation states simply don’t see 
Somalia as their problem, regardless of their commitments and responsibilities 
enshrined in documents such as the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AU CADSP 
and the ASF Protocol.  
However, the case of Somalia shows that the Burundi model is not a total 
failure. Because Uganda and Burundi were the only countries that were 
prepared to contribute troops to AMISOM, they have had to step up to the 
challenge of being the lead nations, and, with significant support from external 
partners, they have been able to keep the mission alive. In 2010, shortly after 
the Al Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kampala, President Museveni stated that 
12,000 UPDF soldiers were ready to deploy to Somalia, but despite 
considerable political will, Uganda lacked the resources to deploy them to 
Mogadishu; "we can raise any number which our brothers and sisters ask us to 
raise. But they must bring the money and the equipment. We have the human 
beings, we have the experience, we have the training, but we cannot provide 
the money" (Habati 2010). Further, because of the APSA’s interventionist 
stance, the AU TCCs are gaining a great deal of combat experience quickly, 
especially in Mogadishu, where the small Ugandan and Burundian 
peacekeeping force has slowly grown in confidence and ability, eventually 
turning the tide on the Islamists in 2010, killing 300 enemy combatants during 
Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive and, expanding to capture 11 new forward 
outposts and about 40% of Mogadishu (African Union 2010a). The successes 
in Somalia since then, as well as successes in the APSA’s other PSOs 
(discussed in detail in chapter seven), show that the future of the AU’s military 
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capacity is far from worthless; it is, however, inextricably linked to the capacities 
of the TCCs, and external support, as the following chapters will explain. 
Financial Resources  
The capacity gaps defined in the previous two sections both have their roots in 
the most serious of all the APSA’s capacity problems: financial capacity. Just 
like with the APSA’s military resources, the APSA’s financial capacity is 
inextricably linked to the poverty of its member states. The Peace Fund, 
established in the PSC Protocol (African Union 2002b: Article 21), is a bourse 
drawn from the General Budget, and topped up with donor contributions, and it 
is ear-marked for use by the APSA to fund peace missions. In 2007, the same 
year that AMISOM was launched, the AU Peace Fund income was 145,290,000 
USD. Less than three million USD of that money had come from AU member 
states’ contributions (Franke 2009:146-147). Of that 3 million, Libya, Algeria, 
Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa paid 75%, followed by Tunisia, Zimbabwe and 
Sudan. Thus, eight countries paid about 85% of the member state contributions 
out of 53 member states (Kambudzi 2010: interview). 
The APSA is acutely aware of the problem and has been striving to increase 
member state contributions. Article 18 of the Tripoli Declaration commits 
member states to substantially increase their contributions to the Peace Fund, 
in order to enable Africa to “truly own” the APSA. The declaration also 
requested that the Commission take the necessary preparatory steps for the 
increase of the statutory transfer from the AU regular budget to the Peace Fund 
from 6 to 12% (African Union 2009e). The AU’s Conference of African Ministers 
of Economy and Finance (CAMEF) has been tasked with identifying alternative 
sources of funding because of difficulties in raising the money from voluntary 
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contributions by APSA member states, coupled with the lack of ownership 
associated with an over reliance on external funding (African Union 2009c: 
Article 9). 
Nevertheless, external funding remains the single most important source of 
funding for the APSA, especially the European Union’s Africa Peace Facility 
(APF), which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Securing 
reliable streams of funding is the biggest challenge facing the APSA. It is clear 
that, for the foreseeable future at least, the APSA will be completely dependent 
upon external partners for funding. This funding brings with it unease on the 
part of the APSA, which feels beholden to the donor countries for fear that 
funding will be cut off. This literal external ownership goes against the concept 
of African ownership which is considered to be such an important element of 
pan-Africanism.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has begun to show the extent of the discrepancy between the 
endemic functionalist role of the APSA and the real role that the APSA actually 
plays. The APSA’s internal capacity is a severe limiting factor, contributing to an 
interactionist role that is much more muted than its endemic functionalist 
counterpart. While African ownership was an integral part of the endemic 
functionalist role of the APSA, this chapter has already shown that the 
interactionist role of the APSA does not have the same high-level of African 
ownership; much of the APSA is currently paid for by its external partners.   
The AU’s military capacity is also weak. Although it has the troops, and they 
generally perform well when they are in theatre, the APSA has to rely on 
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impoverished member states to pay for the upkeep of their own contingents of 
troop contributions in the short term, and then relies on external support for the 
medium-to-long term. The APSA has also had great difficulty with specialist-
knowledge and capital-intensive tasks, such as mission planning, logistics and 
heavy airlift, that are largely out of its price range. These simple bottlenecks, 
which also derive from a lack of financial capacity, have a knock-on effect on 
the APSA’s military capacity: if the troop contingencies cannot be transported to 
the theatre because of lack of airlift capacity, or because they lack essential 
equipment, then those contingents cannot be counted towards the APSA’s 
capacity. The APSA’s military capacity gaps put considerable limitations on the 
APSA’s military-intensive role in humanitarian intervention. However, these 
gaps have not prevented it from playing that role altogether, thanks to external 
capacity enhancement efforts which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The APSA’s internal capacity problems are largely caused by one fundamental 
capacity gap: poverty. Despite this, the APSA is not a lost cause. Several of the 
APSA’s more powerful member states, including the eight mentioned above, 
have shown considerable political will to contribute to enabling the role of the 
APSA; however, if anything, this chapter has shown that, at the moment, the 
APSA’s indigenous capacity is not enough to provide a solution to insecurity on 
the continent, and is not enough to enable the APSA’s interactionist role to 
resemble the endemic functionalist role in any meaningful way. Therefore, 
internal capacity is only one part of the story of the APSA. The next chapter will 
examine the effects of the real driving force behind enabling the role of the 
APSA; the external partners. 
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Chapter Five:  
External Capacity Enhancement of the APSA 
Introduction 
“There is broad recognition that the ability of the African Union and its 
subregions to react quickly has, in most instances, been positive. They could 
have achieved much more if they had been given the necessary support” 
(United Nations 2008a: 14-15). 
As previous chapter explained, the APSA’s role is limited by several shortfalls in 
its capacity. This lack of capacity has made external capacity building 
measures a fundamental, day-to-day element of the APSA (Derblom, Frisell 
and Schmidt 2008: 48). The APSA’s external partners have been determined to 
support its role as a peace and security actor and have been able to shape that 
role through their enhancement of the APSA’s capacity in specific areas for 
specific reasons. 
This chapter will examine how the AU’s main partners limit and enable the role 
of the APSA through their capacity-building efforts. The chapter will confine its 
attention to the capacity-building efforts of the APSA’s three biggest external 
backers: the United Nations, the European Union and its member states, and 
the United States. Although there has been some capacity enhancement by a 
few states beyond these three partners—in particular, Canada’s provision of 
helicopters and APCs for AMIS, NATO’s extensive provision of airlift capacity, 
Norway’s Training for Peace programme, and China’s $200 million project to 
construct a new building for the PSC Secretariat—the UN, EU and the US 
constitute by far the largest and best established sources of external capacity 
enhancement for the APSA. 
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This chapter will first examine the United Nations’ more institutionally focused, 
top-down support for the APSA, then it will discuss the EU’s partnership 
approach, which seeks to enhance African ownership, and it will conclude with 
the United States’ bottom-up approach to capacity building for the APSA. Each 
of the three sections will be split into halves; first examining institutionalised 
support to the APSA, which is a much more predictable and reliable source of 
capacity enhancement, though focussed on long term development, and then 
going on to examine the more immediate and ad hoc support given to the 
APSA, which represents the bulk of the APSA’s practical capacity, internal or 
external. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the extent to which 
the APSA’s capacity gaps have been bridged, and how this external capacity 
building has affected the role of the APSA. 
The United Nations’ Capacity Enhancement of the APSA 
Two thirds of the active items on the Agenda of the Security Council concern 
Africa. About three quarters of the Security Council’s time is spent on African 
issues. The United Nations, therefore, has a considerable stake in the 
expansion of the role of the APSA to help shoulder that burden (United Nations 
2011a: 12). The UN believes that the APSA cannot operate without external 
support and that a “shared vision” between the African Union and the United 
Nations is imperative (United Nations 2011b), a view supported by the findings 
in chapter seven.  
The UN currently is one of the AU’s main sources of external capacity 
enhancement. Its wide-ranging partnership with the APSA is geared to enhance 
capacity in several key areas, enabled by the UN treaty framework as well as 
through an increasing number of agreements between the two organisations. 
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Cooperation between the UN and the AU occurs at the highest levels; members 
of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council hold regular joint 
consultative meetings in Addis Ababa and New York (United Nations 2011c: 3). 
According to Vinay Kumar, the UN’s efforts to enhance the capacity of the 
APSA frequently get “bogged down in helping counterparts meet urgent day-to-
day needs, and achieve little in terms of strengthened capacity” (United Nations 
2011a: 3). In order to avoid this outcome, the UN has heavily institutionalised 
their support for APSA capacity enhancement. The first half of this section will 
dissect the UN’s complex support structures for the APSA, examining the Ten 
Year Capacity Building Programme – the guiding document of the UN/APSA 
partnership – and then looking at the UN organs responsible for enhancing the 
APSA’s capacity to act as a peace and security actor. The second half of the 
chapter will focus more on the “urgent day-to-day needs”, examining how the 
United Nations’ mission-specific support to the APSA’s PSOs has enabled, 
sustained and transformed the role played by the APSA in African security. 
The Ten Year Capacity Building Programme 
The primary point of contact between the United Nations and the APSA has 
been the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa. Although the 
ECA is largely focussed on economic development issues, the ECA complex 
hosts the secretariat of the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa (RCM-
A), the workhorse of the UN/APSA partnership, as well as offices relevant to 
peace and security. 
In 2004, an ECA report expressed concerns that despite its promising rhetoric, 
the RCM-A had failed to deliver on joint action and strategic coordination (Nour 
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2008: 11). Frustrations with the lack of movement led to a fresh approach in 
2005, culminating in the launch of the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme 
(10YCBP). The programme was set in motion during the 2005 World Summit, 
which declared its support for “the development and implementation of a ten-
year plan for capacity-building with the African Union” (United Nations 2005: 
24).  The World Summit declaration was followed by a joint AU/UN declaration 
on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten Year Capacity 
Building Programme, signed by the AUC Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, and the 
UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in Addis Ababa on 16 November 2006 
(United Nations 2006a). The 10YCBP is designed to enhance the capacity of 
the AU as a whole, not just the APSA, and it is split up into six areas for 
cooperation: Institutional Capacity and Human Resource Development; Peace 
and Security; Political, Legal and Electoral Matters; Social, Human and Cultural 
Development; Economic and Environmental Development. The 10YCBP was 
described by the UN as “a model of true partnership” between the UN and the 
AU (United Nations 2011b). However, its impact on the role played by the 
APSA has been modest. 
The Declaration was conceived as an evolving strategic framework for 
UN/APSA cooperation (United Nations 2011c: 1). Paragraph 2 of the 
declaration on the framework for the 10YCBP describes the programme’s 
primary objective thusly: “to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and 
African subregional organisations to act as effective UN partners in addressing 
the challenges to human security in Africa” (United Nations 2006b). The AU’s 
external supporters often describe the key role of the APSA as being a ‘viable 
partner’ to act as a focal point for external support, highlighting in particular the 
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need for a partner in the field of peace and security (Warthon 2010; Peyker 
2010). During its first three years, the 10YCBP has focused on peace and 
security issues and on supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(United Nations 2010a: 6); however, most of this support has been confined to 
knowledge transfer and training for the APSA staff in Addis Ababa. 
The 10YCBP has faced difficulties during its operationalisation because of the 
lack of a clear work programme (United Nations 2011a: 9). As a result of this 
unsure start, the 10YCBP has had a very limited impact on the role of the 
APSA, and there is a very low level of awareness of the 10YCBP amongst 
stakeholders; consequentially the UN’s cooperation with the APSA is still firmly 
based on the pre-existing cluster system of the Regional Coordination 
Mechanism for Africa (RCM-A) – a system which has been shown to be 
inefficient in the past (RCM-Africa 2010a). 
Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa 
The RCM-A operates through nine thematic clusters. However, it should be 
noted that the RCM-A’s nine clusters do not reflect the six areas for cooperation 
outlined in the 10YCBP Cooperation Framework; instead, the cluster system 
still reflects the priorities of NEPAD, its former partner, rather than the APSA. 
Despite this, the success of the 10YCBP depends upon the work of the RCM-A 
and its clusters because the 10YCBP is largely implemented within this cluster 
system, through the Peace and Security Cluster (RCM-Africa 2010b: 38).  
The RCM-A decided at its seventh session, in 2007, that it would serve as the 
main implementation mechanism of the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme 
to help UN agencies to synergise and avoid duplication in their support for the 
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APSA. This required the RCM-A to expand its remit, which was previously 
focused purely on capacity building for NEPAD, in contrast with the 10YCBP’s 
APSA-focused approach (RCM-Africa 2007: 1-2). The RCM-A, however, was 
not necessarily the best choice for an APSA-focused approach, as it had not 
been designed to support the AU and its wide-ranging requirements; its original 
focus was on the Special Initiative for Africa in the 1990s, which was 
superseded by NEPAD after the policy framework was finalised in 2001 (Nour 
2008: 34).  Despite the fact that NEPAD has been subordinate to the AU since 
2002, it is only relatively recently that the RCM-A has started to shift its 
consciousness from NEPAD to the wider AU and the APSA. As a result, 
institutionalised support for the APSA’s capacity has been slow to develop. 
Peace and Security Cluster 
The Peace and Security Cluster of the RCM-A is co-chaired by the United 
Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), which represents the UN-
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the African Union Peace and Security 
Council secretariat (UNOAU 2010: 1). The head of the UNOAU (who is also the 
chairperson of the Cluster) is a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General at the level of Assistant Secretary-General; an indication of how 
seriously the UN takes the UN/APSA partnership (United Nations 2011a: 2). 
The UNOAU works closely with the APSA, consulting with senior AU officials on 
a daily basis (United Nations 2011a: 2). The head of the UNOAU also regularly 
participates in AU PSC meetings on country-specific issues (United Nations 
2011a: 3). This has helped to consolidate the APSA’s role as part of the global 
peace and security architecture. 
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The Peace and Security Cluster focuses on expanding the role of the APSA by 
strengthening the AUC in the fields of peace and security, post-conflict 
reconstruction and development, human rights, justice and reconciliation. It also 
supports the implementation of the 10YCBP. The Cluster has devoted most of 
its resources to enhancing the APSA’s personnel and management capacity, 
helping to bridge many of the capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter 
through dozens of training activities and workshops for APSA and REC staff on 
peacekeeping, planning, logistics and other operational and administrative 
issues (United Nations 2011a: 4-6). Chapter 7 will highlight how important some 
of these key areas are in determining the extent of the role the APSA has been 
able to play in-theatre.  
The Peace and Security Cluster has been organising desk-to-desk meetings 
since 2008 in the interest of enhancing APSA capacity, sharing knowledge and 
expertise and enhancing synergy (ECA 2010: 1). A regular series of desk-to-
desk consultations was held in 2011 between staff of the UN Secretariat, the 
AU Commission, UNOAU, the RECs/RMs and members of the Peace and 
Security Cluster. The meetings involved thorough discussion and analysis of 
contemporaneous security hot-spots such as Somalia, Sudan and Ivory Coast 
(United Nations 2011a: 4). Further, the UNOAU, on behalf of the Cluster, and 
working with the European Union and NATO, supported the AMANI AFRICA 
Command Post Exercise (CPX) in 2010, which was designed to assess the 
operational readiness of the African Standby Force (ASF) (United Nations 
2011a: 4). These processes are of considerable use to the APSA, enhancing its 
organisational, logistical and strategic capacity. 
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The Cluster has also focussed much of its energy on revising and standardising 
the APSA’s many documents and strategies; in particular, UNOAU is currently 
assisting with the development of the African Standby Force Road Map III, 
which should culminate in the operationalisation of the ASF by 2015 (United 
Nations 2011a: 4). 
Sub-Cluster on the African Peace and Security Architecture 
The Peace and Security Cluster is made up of three specialised Sub-Clusters: 
Peace and Security Architecture of the AU; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development; and Human Rights and Justice and Reconciliation (UNECA 
2011). Of the Peace and Security Cluster’s three Sub-Clusters, the Sub-Cluster 
on the African Peace and Security Architecture has had the largest enabling 
effect on the APSA’s role. The Sub-Cluster is chaired by the United Nations 
Department of Field Support (DFS) and the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations’ African Union Peacekeeping Support Team (DPKO-
AU PST) (UNOAU 2010: 6). This Sub-Cluster has been instrumental in 
implementing the 10YCBP (Haastrup 2011: 6); its support programmes are 
intended to reflect the priorities of the 10YCBP and the AU Strategic Plan 2009-
2012, focusing on the APSA’s operational development and the African 
Standby Force (ASF) in particular. The DPKO-AU PST itself was set up in 
January 2007 specifically to support the implementation of the 10YCBP 
(UNECA 2008: 5). 
Support from the Sub-Cluster is focused on the development of the ASF, 
Strategic Air, Sea and Ground lift and civilian police capacity. The DFS has 
taken the lead in assisting the APSA to develop a logistics capacity, helping to 
relieve one of the APSA’s most debilitating limiting factors (United Nations 
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2011a: 11). The Sub-Cluster is also supporting the development of a civilian 
component concept, as well as manuals for logistics, field medicine and 
evaluation of the ASF (UNOAU 2010: 7). The DPKO-AU PST has also taken 
the lead in working with the Situation Room of the APSA’s Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS) to help to expand the APSA’s role in the area of 
prevention and rapid deployment (UNOAU 2010: 3). 
The Sub-Cluster has likewise been heavily involved in training APSA personnel, 
facilitating specific training requirements for the ASF and the African Union 
Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD), such as senior mission 
leadership and strategic and operational planning courses, senior-level retreats 
and training programmes (UNOAU 2010: 7). The DPKO-AU PST, with the 
support of the EU and other APSA partners, also frequently organises the 
training workshops for senior representatives of the ASF brigades, with the 
understanding that they can then go on to transfer the knowledge to their sub-
regions and adapt it to the local context (Haastrup 2011: 8). Building up the 
APSA’s in-house expertise has helped to reduce the effects of the APSA’s 
expertise capacity gaps; an endemic limiting factor. 
Strategic Level Capacity Enhancement 
In addition to the support structures outlined above, the strategic relationship 
between the United Nations and the APSA is further strengthened by three 
bodies that do not operate through the RCM-A system; the Joint Support and 
Coordination Mechanism, the United Nations/African Union Joint Task Force on 
Peace and Security, and United Nations Security Council Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. 
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The Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) was established at the 
AU compound in Addis Ababa to facilitate AU/UN communication, coordination 
and information sharing.  
The United Nations/African Union Joint Task Force on Peace and Security was 
established on 25 September 2010 to enhance cooperation at the operational 
level (United Nations 2011a: 5) and was launched at UN headquarters in New 
York by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and AU Commission Chairperson 
Jean Ping on 15 November 2010. The task force enhances UN and AU 
strategic cooperation through meetings twice a year at the senior level to review 
immediate and long-term strategic issues (PANA 2010). This expands the 
APSA’s capacity by allowing it access to UN expertise, and it further expands 
the APSA’s role as an integral part of the UN system, allowing APSA missions 
to become interoperable with UN systems, to facilitate streamlined UN support 
for APSA missions, effective cooperation, and ultimately smoother APSA-UN 
transitions of mission ownership.  
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is a 
subsidiary organ of the Security Council, pursuant to the Security Council 
presidential statement of 31 January 2002 (S/PRST/2002/2) (United Nations 
2010b: 193). Its mandate is to monitor and implement the recommendations of 
S/PRST/2002/2, which includes a desire to cooperate with the OAU (since 
updated to the AU), “including assistance within existing resources ... in the 
field of capacity building, particularly in early warning conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping” (UNSC 2002: 1).  
Overall, the UN’s institutional enhancement of the role played by the APSA is 
focused on knowledge transfer, specialist training and collaboration; it has 
130 
 
provided important support, with real effects on the APSA’s proficiency and 
professionalism. However important, this type of support is cheap. What the 
APSA really wants, as highlighted in chapter four and chapter seven, is not 
desk-swopping and specialist brainstorming retreats, but hundreds of millions of 
dollars in cash and military hardware which would give it the capacity to 
succeed in the field. This type of capacity enhancement is not provided by the 
UN on an institutional basis, but is grudgingly disbursed ad hoc, under the 
direst of circumstances. 
Mission-Specific Support 
This mission-specific ad hoc capacity enhancement has meant the difference 
between success and mission failure in both AMIS and AMISOM. It is therefore 
an extremely important element of the APSA’s capacity, which has enabled it to 
play a much larger and much more militaristic role than would otherwise have 
been possible. This section will outline the effect that such UN support has had 
on the interactionist role of the APSA through a discussion of the extent and 
direction of the UN’s capacity enhancement to the APSA’s missions in Burundi, 
Sudan and Somalia. 
The African Union Mission in Burundi 
As explained in Chapter 3, AMIB was largely supported by the TCCs 
themselves, led by South Africa, through the Burundi Doctrine, and there was 
only limited support from the UN—AMIB being very early in the development of 
the UN/APSA relationship. However, the UN, through the UN Mission in DRC 
(MONUC), did manage to enhance the role played by the APSA in Burundi 
through the provision of technical support including assistance with public 
information, headquarters administration and some limited support with the 
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assembly stage of the DDR process (Svensson 2008a: 14). The UN support to 
Burundi did not have a transformative effect upon the role of AMIB, but it did 
help AMIB to play its role more competently.  It is also arguable that the United 
Nations provided a significant level of support to AMIB simply by agreeing to 
assume control of the mission, thereby providing the APSA with an exit strategy 
before its chronic capacity problems became too obvious (Paul Williams 2006: 
354). The UN’s support in this regard also contributed to the early evolution of 
the APSA as a bridging force for the UN. 
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
Nowhere is the United Nations’ partnership with the APSA as pronounced as 
the hybrid operation in Sudan: the United Nations/African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID). However, the UN has helped to enhance role of the APSA in 
Darfur since the very beginning. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 
which was involved in the North/South dispute, was tasked to work closely with 
AMIS. The UN dispatched a planning assistance team from New York to Sudan 
from 4 to 17 August 2004 (UNSC 2005b: 10). In October 2004, the APSA’s role 
in Darfur was about to expand, and the UN accepted the AU’s request to 
establish a full-time assistance and liaison cell at the African Union Commission 
to provide a more suitable basis for ad hoc capacity enhancement (United 
Nations 2004: 14). The UN Assistance and Liaison Cell was mandated to assist 
AMIS in planning, provide technical advice, identify where the United Nations 
could offer further support and to advise the UN Special Representative and the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations accordingly. The Liaison Cell also 
worked closely with other external partners to secure much needed resources 
132 
 
from donor governments to further enhance the role played by AMIS (UNSC 
2005b: 10). 
The cell enhanced AU Command, Control and Communications (C3) capacity 
by connecting AMIS offices in El Fashir, Khartoum and Addis Ababa to the 
United Nations communications network. It also assisted the AU in the drafting 
of the expanded CONOPS and logistics plan; as well as helping to coordinate 
support from external partners (UNSC 2005b: 10). The United Nations 
contributed to the MAPEX in El Fashir, and arranged for training for AMIS. Even 
at the strategic and tactical levels, the AMIS military observers (MILOBS) and 
their Protection Force coordinated closely with UNMIS and the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs staff in all three of the Darfur states 
(UNSC 2005b: 11). This close relationship between UNMIS and AMIS helped to 
bridge many of the APSA’s capacity gaps in technical expertise outlined in 
chapter four, enabling the APSA to play a more sophisticated and more 
professional role in Darfur. However, this positive relationship was undermined 
as the situation in the south became more fragile following the death of John 
Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), in 2005, and the 
UN decided to not to spread itself too thinly by supporting AMIS with force 
reserves (Ekengard 2008: 37-38).  
One of the UN’s most important contributions to AMIS was, as in Burundi, 
simply agreeing in principle to take over the mission, providing the APSA with 
an exit strategy and contributing to the role of the APSA as a bridging force. 
However, the government of Sudan refused to give its consent for a UN mission 
in Darfur, leaving AMIS as the only viable peacekeeping force in the country. As 
a result, the focus switched from replacing the faltering APSA mission to 
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bolstering it (United Nations 2007a: 2-3). Resolution 1706 had a transformative 
effect on the role of AMIS; through a series of capacity enhancing support 
packages, AMIS went from being a small peacekeeping mission crippled with 
logistics and financial problems, to being the largest peacekeeping mission in 
the world, shifting the role in a much more militarised direction, and adopting 
more of a protection role (UNSC 2006b: 3-4).  After considerable international 
pressure and a series of consultations and meetings with the Government of 
Sudan, permission was finally given for a hybrid UN/AU mission to deploy to 
Darfur: UNAMID (GoS 2007: 2). UNAMID was established on 31 July 2007 with 
the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769 (UNSC 2007c: 3).  
The UN and the APSA agreed that the transition from AMIS to UNAMID would 
be managed in three stages (Ekengard 2008: 38). The first stage was the 
provision of the Light Support Package, which provided capacity enhancement 
to AMIS that was immediate, if limited in scope. The ‘Light Support Package’ 
enhanced the APSA’s technical capacity through the provision of more UN 
advisors, including intelligence advisors, and field equipment such as GPS 
technology, light amplifiers, tents and generators. The Light Support Package 
also included 105 military personnel, 33 police and 48 civilian staff (Ekengard 
2008: 38). The second phase was the ‘Heavy Support Package’, a major 
bolstering force of 2,250 military personnel, 721 police and 1,136 civilian staff 
for AMIS, fully funded and equipped by the UN, which had a significant enabling 
effect on the peacekeeping role played by the APSA in Darfur (Ekengard 2008: 
38). The third phase was the transition of the mandate from AMIS to UNAMID, 
under joint AU/UN authority. 
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UNAMID contributes to capacity enhancement of the APSA through information 
sharing and mentoring—through work on joint projects such as the African 
Union-United Nations joint mediation—continued consultations with the 
government, armed movements and other Darfur stakeholders. The mission 
has been supported by a Joint AU-UN Special Representative (JSR), appointed 
by the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General of the 
UN. At the time of writing, the current JSR is Ambassador Abiodun Bashua 
(African Union 2011b: 1). The Force Commander and Police Commissioner are 
appointed by the Chairperson of the AUC in consultation with the Secretary-
General; the Force Commander also has to be African, in deference to African 
ownership (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 41). This has helped entrench 
the APSA into the UN framework, developing a previously unseen role for the 
APSA as not just an ally of the UN, but an integral part of the UN system, while 
at the same time maintaining the APSA’s role as an African-led organisation. 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
Despite the UN’s heavy footprint in Somalia in the 1990s, it is currently running 
a much smaller humanitarian operation with no security component. This is 
largely a result of the chronically unstable security situation in the country. The 
UN has provided significant support to AMISOM, but the UN has been wary of 
supporting peacekeeping in the country: “We stress that the capacity 
development of peacekeeping personnel, though essential, is not a substitute 
for adequate equipment, logistics and training” (United Nations 2011a: 7). 
The Peace and Security Cluster helped to enable the mission through the 
provision of vital expertise. In the early stages of the AMISOM, the UNOAU 
conducted several pre-deployment visits to gather intelligence to facilitate the 
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insertion of African Union troops. The UNOAU also provided assistance to the 
African Union Commission in generating the required troops, as well as support 
in recruiting civilian staff for the mission. The Cluster has also helped the APSA 
to update AMISOM’s strategic and operational documents to ensure that the 
operation is in line with UN standards, including updating the communications 
strategy and the strategy on the protection of civilians, as well as translating 
and publishing a pocket version of the AMISOM mandated rules of engagement 
and code of conduct. (United Nations 2011a: 4). This support has ensured 
interoperability with the UN, but has been of limited utility in real day-to-day 
terms, because the proposed UN mission to take over from AMISOM seems no 
closer to deploying. 
Although this type of support has been useful, it is not really expanding the role 
played by AMISOM, simply further enabling it. However, following the 
announcement of Ethiopia’s intention to withdraw from Somalia, and after 
repeated requests for support from the APSA, the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1863, on 16 January (UNSC 2009), authorised a large logistics 
support package for the APSA. Logistics has been a chronic problem for the 
APSA, so the logistics package went a considerable way to enhancing the role 
that the APSA was able to play in Somalia, accelerating the deployment of the 
mission and resolving some of the mission’s capacity gaps. The UN Support 
Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was established in Nairobi in April 2009 to 
implement the support package, and by 2010, the UNSOA has rolled out 
logistical support to AMISOM in the areas of public information, rations, secure 
communication, fuel and airlift support for Medical Evacuation. The UN support 
cost $210 million, taken from UN assessed contributions (African Union 2010i: 
136 
 
11).   AMISOM personnel also received specialist training in logistics, and the 
UNSOA began work on the building of the AMISOM headquarters in 
Mogadishu; erecting hard-walled secure office and residential accommodation 
for the civilian, police and military personnel of the mission (African Union 
2010i: 11).  
The same resolution also authorised a voluntary Trust Fund to help pay for 
AMISOM, which was managed by UNSOA and has been used for 
reimbursements to TCCs for Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) (African 
Union 2010i: 11). The Logistic Support Package, helped prevent AMISOM from 
failing, but little more. The APSA, meanwhile, continued to argue that the UN’s 
support to the mission was insufficient and that it would have to be substantially 
enhanced and improved to effectively meet the challenges that faced the 
mission on the ground, highlighting in particular the inadequacy of contributions 
to the Trust Fund for military related expenditure, resulting in AMISOM troops 
going without wages (African Union 2010h: 19). 
Conclusion 
“The United Nations retains the primary role in the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and therefore there is an expectation that it 
must contribute to the role of regional and subregional organisations, which 
has in recent years been shown to be seminal, especially in the context of 
the African Union. We are convinced that the interests of peace will be well 
served if the requisite synergy and cooperation exist between the two 
organisations at both the strategic and operational levels” (United Nations 
2011a: 5).  
Enabling the role of the APSA through capacity enhancement is increasingly 
seen to be in the interests of the United Nations. However, it is indispensable 
for the APSA. The first half of this section has shown how UN institutional 
capacity enhancement has enabled the APSA to overcome many of the 
institutional capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter, particularly in the 
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areas of logistics, technical expertise, specialist training, standardisation, 
planning, and other core areas. However, the labyrinthine complexity of the 
institutional framework appears to be the source of some confusion, even within 
the UN, as to, for example, how the cluster system relates to the 10YCBP.2   
Despite the depth and complexity of the institutional framework surrounding the 
UN’s efforts to enhance the APSA’s capacity, the second half of this section 
has shown that the UN’s biggest impact has been in its ad hoc support for the 
APSA’s PSOs. Although this support has always been late and inadequate, it 
has been nonetheless essential, providing the APSA with the minimum capacity 
required to perform its role; maintaining its operations in the field and 
preventing mission failure. Without the UN support for the missions outlined 
above, AMISOM and AMIS would probably have ended in mission failure, so 
the UN has massively enabled and expanded the role that the APSA has 
played in these countries. 
The UN prefers not give monetary contributions to the APSA. There is a sense 
that the UN has more to offer in terms of experience and expertise. However, 
as Haastrup points out, this is symptomatic of the United Nations’ own chronic 
capacity shortages (Haastrup 2011: 7). The United Nations’ support to the 
APSA is heavily focussed on training, management, expertise, knowledge 
transfer, long-term planning and doctrinal globalisation. The UN takes a 
sophisticated, value-added and long-term approach to enhancing the capacity 
of the APSA. However, this approach frequently frustrates the APSA which is 
usually faced with more pressing financial and military concerns, such as 
                                                 
2
 For example, a recent UNSC meeting used these terms interchangeably when they in fact represent 
completely separate institutions (United Nations 2011a: 3) 
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running out of money to pay for troops, and lacking the capacity to deploy and 
rotate troop contingents, which will be discussed in detail in chapter seven. For 
predictable support in these areas, the APSA relies more heavily upon capacity 
enhancement from the EU and the USA. 
European Union Support to the APSA 
Of all the APSA’s external partners, the European Union has had the most 
substantial long-term institutional support for the APSA. The EU, like the UN, 
has also provided invaluable capacity enhancement to the APSA on an ad hoc 
basis. Although this support has not been as significant as the UN’s ad hoc 
support, the EU’s efforts in this area are still extremely important. The first half 
of this section will examine the EU’s institutionalised efforts at capacity building 
and explain how these have affected the role played by the APSA. The second 
half will be devoted to explaining how the EU and its member states have 
enabled the role played by the APSA on an ad hoc basis. 
Institutionalised Capacity Building 
The EU’s approach to capacity building for the APSA is built around the Joint 
Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). The JAES sets the tone for the EU’s approach to 
economic development in Africa; “It is now universally recognised that there can 
be no sustainable development without peace and security. Peace and security 
are therefore the first essential prerequisites for sustainable development” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005). The JAES founding 
documents include major innovations aimed at overcoming the traditional 
donor-recipient relationship and fundamentally changing Africa-EU relations 
(Bossuyt and Sherriff 2010: 3). The JAES highlights Africa’s right to 
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development, and in the light of this new partnership, the EU has become the 
APSA’s largest financial supporter. (European Union 2007: 3). Most of the 
European Union’s institutionalised support to the APSA is provided through the 
capacity building component of the APF, as well as EU programmes, such as 
Euro-RECAMP/AMANI Africa (European Union 2007: 7).  
Africa Peace Facility 
At its second ordinary session in 2003, the AU Assembly requested that the 
European Union establish a bourse of EU monies that were already earmarked 
as African development aid. The idea was that these monies could be re-routed 
through the AU instead of going to member states individually. This process, in 
no small way, defined the role played by the APSA by enabling it with the 
capacity to finance extremely expensive peace support operations, like AMIS or 
AMISOM, without having to wait for contributions from member states which 
might never materialise and would almost certainly never be enough (African 
Union 2003c: Decision 16). In response to this request, the EU established the 
Africa Peace Facility (APF) in April 2004, with a starting budget of EUR 250 
million—200 million of which was earmarked for support of APSA PSOs, 35 
million of which was destined for capacity building for the APSA, and the 
remaining 15 million of which was used to cover audits, evaluations and 
contingencies (Mpyisi 2009: 7).  The capacity building budget has been used 
for several institutionalised projects, including support to the Peace Support 
Operations Division (PSOD) in the form of office space, which has been rented 
out for them by the EU, and from the provision of funds for additional staff, 
whose salaries will also be covered by the EU. The capacity building funds 
have also allowed for PSOD staff to participate in training exercises run by the 
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Kofi Annan Centre (Vines and Middleton 2008: 27-28). This type of support 
addresses the personnel capacity problems outlined in the previous chapter 
head-on, helping to ease their limiting effect on the APSA’s interactionist role. 
The facility was exhausted much sooner than intended, as a result of the 
exponential expansion of AMIS, and increased to €440 million in 2007, most of 
which was paid for by France and Germany (Pirozzi 2009: 26). The facility was 
subsequently renewed in the 2008-2010 EDF with EUR 300 million under the 
intra-ACP Indicative Programme (Franke 2009: 240-241). This renewal has 
allowed the APF to continue to act as a fundamentally pivotal enabling factor, 
without which much of what the APSA has done in the field would not have 
been possible. AFP grants were allocated to provide the APSA with the 
capacity to shoulder the heavy economic burden of AMIS and AMISOM (Mpyisi 
2009: 7). The Africa Peace Facility (APF) has provided vital support to 
AMISOM, covering expenses relating to pre‐deployment, troop allowances, 
payments for death and disability and other day-to-day expenses (African Union 
2010h: 18).  
The APF has been an extremely reliable source of funding for APSA PSOs, and 
the new APF includes an early response mechanism fund for the financing of 
fact-finding and pre-deployment missions. This fund is pre-approved by the EC 
so the APSA simply requires an exchange of letters to disburse funds, allowing 
the APSA to begin preparations for mission deployment very quickly, enhancing 
its role in the area of rapid deployment (Pirozzi 2009: 27). 
However, there are limits on what the APF can achieve. The APF is part of the 
European Union’s global security or multilateral security approach, where it 
strengthens regional organisations to take more responsibility for what happens 
141 
 
in their own spheres (Peyker 2010). However, because it is drawn from the 
European Development Fund (EDF), the money is only allowed to be used for 
‘non-lethal’ purposes – quite a set back for a security actor. Decision 2003/3 of 
the APC/EC Council of ministers of 11 December 2003 proscribes the use of 
APF funds for military and arms expenditure, military training, EU military 
technical assistance, or offensive military equipment for the ASF; these are 
major handicaps for a bourse designed specifically to support the APSA’s 
PSOs, and as a result, most of these vital areas have to be covered through ad 
hoc support to the APSA, as well as through the efforts of individual EU 
member states (Pirozzi 2009: 25).  
Italian African Peace facility (IAPF) 
The Italian African Peace Facility (IAPF) is an example of one of these member 
state-led efforts. The IAPF was established at the Africa-EU summit in 
December 2007 to support the EU peace and security agenda. The IAPF has a 
budget of €40 million, which is allowed to be used for the development of 
offensive military capabilities as it is funded directly by Italy. The IAPF is 
focussed on regions of particular interest to Italy and has been particularly 
involved in the Horn of Africa. The IAPF has provided financial support to the 
components of the ASF training plan and has been invaluable in the ongoing 
operationalisation the ASF-Brigades (Pirozzi 2009: 24). 
Training Programmes 
Although economic capacity enhancement through the APF has been the EU’s 
biggest institutional contribution to enabling and expanding the role of the 
APSA, the gaps in expertise highlighted in the previous chapter highlight the 
importance training has as an enabling factor. The EU and its member states 
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have taken a leading role in the provision of training for the APSA, and some of 
the highlights of this process are discussed below. 
Euro Recamp/Amani Africa 
RECAMP was originally a French training programme, but has since been 
absorbed by the European Union as a framework for EU support for the APSA’s 
extensive training requirements (Bagayoko 2007: 9). Under French leadership, 
the RECAMP programme was focused purely on tactical level operational 
training of military units for peacekeeping missions. However, since 2005, the 
RECAMP concept began to take a broader approach, bringing in strategic level 
support (Bagayoko 2007: 4), including support for the African Standby Force 
(Bagayoko 2007: 19). 
The programme has since been europeanised, and is now run by the EU 
Political and Security Council and implemented by an international team 
involving European and African representatives. The programme is financed by 
the APF, as well as EUR 20 million from voluntary contributions (including 
contributions from partners outside the European Union, such as Canada and 
the United States). EURO RECAMP/Amani Africa promotes a “multifunctional 
approach”, enhancing police capabilities, civil affairs, human rights, and more 
(Bagayoko 2007: 5). It delivers strategic-level military and civilian training to the 
APSA, and in 2010, it also provided vital support to the Command Post 
Exercise (Pirozzi 2009: 36-37). 
Some elements of the RECAMP programme have not been fully europeanised, 
however. For example, France established three supply depots: one in Dakar, 
one in Libreville and another in Djibouti. These French depots are available for 
use by the AU and the REC/RMs, marking a first step in alleviating some of the 
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APSA’s logistical capacity gaps, which have been limiting its role in the field. 
However, most of the EU member states have indicated that they were not 
interested in contributing to these logistical depots (Bagayoko 2007: 19). 
Africa Conflict Prevention Pool 
The United Kingdom’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) is a fund for 
capacity enhancement in sub-Saharan Africa run by the Department for 
International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD).  The ACPP has more than 130 
military personnel permanently based in Africa, delivers training to APSA 
personnel and provides financial and technical support to the Peace Support 
Operations Division of the AU Commission. It has been particularly involved in 
the development of the East Africa brigade of the ASF (EASBRIG) (Pirozzi 
2009: 38). 
Ad Hoc support to the APSA 
Ad hoc support from the EU and its member states comes in many different 
forms, and is far from rationalised. Each country has its own preferences and 
caveats, and separate reporting and oversight requirements. These, coupled 
with the requirements of the APSA’s many other donors, place such a strain on 
the AUC’s limited secretariat that it creates a bottleneck for the APSA’s 
absorption capacity (Murithi 2010). However, ad hoc support for the APSA 
nonetheless constitutes an absolutely vital source of capacity enhancement, 




African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
The capacity of the African Union Mission in Burundi was significantly 
enhanced by support from the EU and its member states. The UK assisted the 
Mozambican contingent of AMIB with equipment and provided airlift capacity to 
deploy it to Burundi. However, once the Mozambican forces arrived in the 
mission area, they were largely dependant on South African support (Boshoff, 
Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 71). In June and July 2003, AMIB set up a 
cantonment area at Muyange, which housed hundreds of fighters waiting to 
take part in the DDR process. The APSA relied upon the EU to pay contractor 
GTZ for the delivery of food to these men during August 2003. When even 
more fighters arrived at Muyange during November, the EU agreed to provide 
food for them as well (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 64). 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
The United Kingdom also provided a particularly high level of support to AMIS, 
providing $3.4 million to help pay for the initial deployment of the observer 
mission (African Union 2004c: 4). The UK also helped to significantly enhance 
the mission’s mobility, enabling AMIS MILOBS to reach a much larger area of 
the operational zones through the provision of 143 vehicles in December 2004. 
The UK went on to provide another 476 vehicles through British private security 
company (PSC) Crown Agents in 2005, which also provided satellite 
communications technology, including Thuraya satellite phones, which were 
vital for the monitoring mission (Erikson 2010: 22). 
The Netherlands also supported AMIS through the provision of financial support 
for the lease of four fixed-wing aircraft from JMC; helping to bridge the APSA’s 
very broad capacity gaps in the area of air-support and airlift (African Union 
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2006c: 15). Denmark provided financial support to the mission totalling 
$736,664.25 within its first few months (African Union 2004d: 8). Germany 
provided $1,165,120.20 to the mission, supplemented with €100,000 worth of 
communications equipment. 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
There has also been some limited ad hoc support for AMISOM, particularly 
from the UK, which contributed £8.5 million to help pay for AMISOM 
deployments and to provide assistance to AMISOM’s Support Management 
Planning Unit (SPMU) (African Union 2008d: 9). The UK also provided £4 
million for the reimbursement of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for 
Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) (African Union 2011d: 3). Further, on 19 
May 2009, the UK High Commission in Nairobi released £75,000.00 for the 
urgent purchase of medical supplies for AMISOM clinics in Mogadishu (African 
Union 2009d: 8).  
Other EU member states contributed to the mission too. The Government of 
Sweden provided the mission with a level-II hospital, which represented a 
significant enhancement of AMISOM’s capacity; the facility provides healthcare 
not only for AMISOM but also for the United Nations agencies and local staff 
operating in Somalia (United Nations 2008e: 5).  And in the pre-deployment 
period, France conducted a training programme for the first Burundian battalion 
to deploy to Somalia, and provided airlift support to get the troops to Mogadishu 
(African Union 2007j: 3). 
Finally, the EU, in addition to payments through the APF, pledged €5 million for 
AMISOM’s Strategic Planning Management Unit (SPMU) and another €500,000 
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to cover insurance costs as well as technical assistance for budget-related 
matters (African Union 2008d: 9).  
 
Conclusion 
This section has shown the extent to which the European Union has been able 
to bridge many of the APSA’s endemic capacity problems, highlighted in the 
previous two chapters. In particular, the EU’s structural support to the APSA is 
invaluable; training up military planners, peacekeepers and civilian police 
through several programmes. The EU is also extremely important because of 
the APF, which goes some way to solving the biggest problem highlighted in 
the previous chapter: economic capacity. 
The APF has been an invaluable source of funds for AMIS and AMISOM; 
however, the restrictions on its use mean that it cannot completely bridge the 
APSA’s economic capacity gaps, especially when it comes to contracting 
offensive military equipment, or even simply paying the salaries of 
peacekeepers. To provide this much needed support to the APSA, the EU 
relies on its member states, but also its allies; particularly the USA. 
United States Support to the APSA 
The European Union’s African development priorities are echoed by the United 
States. In a 2009 speech to the AUC-ECA Partners Dialogue Meeting, 
Ambassador Battle, the leader of the United States Mission to the African 
Union, explained that “the U.S. sees peace and security as foundationally and 
fundamentally integral to all other issues.  It is only in a context of peace and 
security that the tenets of good governance necessary to address the 
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development needs of the African continent can flourish.  It is therefore of no 
surprise that the U.S. relationship with the African Union focuses heavily, 
though not exclusively, on Peace and Security” (Battle 2009).  
In contrast to the EU, a 2010 report by the Chairperson of the Commission of 
the African Union highlighted the fact that the United States seems to eschew 
providing support directly to the APSA, preferring to support AU member states 
individually, especially TCCs, rather than support the organisation as a whole. It 
also prefers to give support in kind, as opposed to the UN and EU, which has 
offered significant financial support (African Union 2010h: 19). 
In contrast to the UN and the EU, the United States’ capacity building for the 
APSA is focused around operational support, specifically enhancing APSA 
capacity in areas relevant to US foreign policy. To achieve this, the US supports 
the APSA at all levels, with targeted funding, specialist support, training, 
cooperation and coordination between US forces and the APSA. In general, the 
USA’s priorities for the APSA are focused around moulding it into a viable 
partner for US efforts to promote security on the continent (Warthon 2010). 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
The US State Department-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was 
founded in 2004 and is designed to enhance the capacities of US partners in 
the fielding of peace support operations. The Initiative is focused on key APSA 
member states, rather than the institution as a whole, and aims to increase the 
roster of capable military elements and formed police units available for 
deployment in peace support operations, with the goal of training-up 75,000 
peacekeepers, mostly in African countries.  The Initiative also facilitates the 
preparation, logistical support, and deployment of military units into the mission 
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theatres (Serafino 2009: i), and sponsors retired U.S. Army officers who are 
contracted as advisors to the APSA (Serafino 2009: 7). The GPOI has focused 
mainly on supporting TCC capabilities, but some support has been provided to 
institutions, including around $9 million a year for the AU (Serafino 2009: 13). 
US African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
The US African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 
programme is the GPOI’s principal training program in Africa, and one of the 
United States’ most developed forms of institutionalised support to the APSA 
(Serafino 2009: i). It is managed and funded by the US State Department, and 
designed to improve the APSA’s ability to respond quickly to crises by providing 
selected African militaries with the training and equipment required to 
successfully conduct peace support operations (Council on Foreign Relations 
2008). 
The training programme is similar to EURO RECAMP/AMANI Africa, but 
ACOTA has logistical and tactical elements that are not available through the 
European programme. ACOTA is not just focussed on peacekeeping, but has 
courses more suited to the realities of APSA PSOs; ACOTA prepares African 
troops for operations conducted in complex and hostile environments, training 
troops in offensive manoeuvres as well as defence. ACOTA also helps bridge 
another major capacity gap pointed out in chapter 3, by equipping the African 
units trained under the programme. ACOTA includes a weapons component 
and provides all the equipment necessary for combat, something that would be 
difficult for EDF-derived EU programmes (Pirozzi 2009: 38). 
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Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) 
The Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP) is another US State Department 
programme designed to build peacekeeping capacity amongst African armed 
forces bilaterally through training programmes in peacekeeping, conflict 
management and prevention, as well as through the provision of logistics and 
necessary construction activities (Avant and Nevers 2011: 2). The work of the 
AFRICAP is provided through PMC contractors. AFRICAP has awarded 
contracts for training, air transport, information technology, infrastructure, 
mission support, disaster relief and public relations to DynCorp and PAE, which 
have both been heavily involved in AMIS and AMISOM (Avant and Nevers 
2011: 4). New York-based Bancroft Global Development also employs about 40 
South African and European military trainers who have been working with 
AMISOM troops, particularly focusing on how to deal with the specific threats 
posed by Al Shabaab without harming public support for the mission through 
collateral damage. They were officially retained by the APSA at a cost of $12.5 
million, but the APSA was reimbursed by the US State Department (Kelley 
2011). 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) 
Unlike the programmes discussed above, the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) is a military command structure, run by the Pentagon. It was 
operationalised on 1 October 2008, and is based in the buildings of the 
European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart. AFRICOM’s mandate is to build up 
the capacity of African national defence forces rather than focusing on 
enhancing the capacity of the APSA directly. AFRICOM’s ultimate goal is 
keeping American troops out of Africa in the long term, without compromising 
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security on the continent (Cochran 2010: 111). Nonetheless, AFRICOM does 
provide some institutionalised support to the APSA; in particular, it provides 
financial support for the ASF’s Command and Control infrastructure 
development. AFRICOM also provides expert support through its Liaison 
Officer as well as through a programme that provides US military experts to 
help mentor African officers and to advise on issues related to peacekeeping, 
training, reconnaissance, patrolling, maritime security and communications 
(Pirozzi 2009: 38). 
AFRICOM also enhances APSA member state capacity in areas of interest to 
the United States; especially counter-terrorism through the framework of 
Operation Enduring Freedom. Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara, 
through the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Programme, provides funds in 
support of anti-terrorist training and border security for countries bordering the 
Sahara, including the May 2010 three-week-long ‘Flintlock 10’ training 
programme, which included 400 troops from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia (Pham 2011: 112). 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa also plays a capacity enhancing 
role, and is led by the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA), which is housed in the United States’ only major African base in Camp 
Lemonier, Djibouti (Pham 2011: 115). Its goal is to enhance local capacity for 
counter terrorism against the backdrop of the Islamist insurgency in Somalia 
(Pham 2011: 115). The United States’ support to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia 
in 2006 was largely provided in this context, and is discussed in more detail 
below. In addition to bilateral training with selected militaries in the region, 
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CJTF-HOA has also worked closely with the APSA on the establishment of the 
EASBRIG. 
Ad Hoc Support 
In addition to its extensive training efforts, aimed at increasing the capacity of 
the APSA through its member states, the United States has also been 
invaluable to enabling the peace support operations of the APSA through ad 
hoc support to the missions or their TCCs directly, paying particular attention to 
AMISOM; Somalia, defined as a third front in the War on Terror by several US 
generals, is a key strategic location for the US (McLure 2011: 235). 
African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
The United States did not support AMIB extensively, but it did provide financial 
support for the deployment of Ethiopian forces to the mission theatre, which 
made up the second largest contingent in the mission after South Africa 
(Svensson 2008a: 13). Heavy airlift is something which has continued to place 
severe limitations upon APSA TCCs, and external support has been integral to 
getting troops on the ground. 
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
After the initial 300-strong AMIS protection force arrived in Darfur in July 2004, 
it became clear that the existing logistics system would be insufficient to sustain 
the mission’s increasing size. The logistics system needed to be enhanced to 
allow AMIS to carry out its new mandate and support from the United States 
was instrumental in achieving this. Rather than becoming directly involved on 
the ground in Sudan, the U.S. opted to fund a contract with Pacific Architectural 
Engineers (PAE), a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin, to construct camps, provide 
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water and food, and provide other fundamental services such as laundry and 
maintenance (Ekengard 2008: 18). The United States spent about $240 million 
from June 2004 to August 2006 and pledged another $40 million in September 
of 2006, primarily to build and maintain the thirty-two camps that house AMIS 
forces throughout Darfur. PAE also provided AMIS with three fixed-wing 
aircraft; two Antonov An-26 and one Antonov An-24, which PAE rented on 
AMIS’s behalf on an ad hoc basis (Ekengard 2008: 22). By 2006, the US had 
also paid $23.5 million to US PSC DynCorp on behalf of AMIS to provide 
equipment and strategic transport for U.S. efforts to build AMIS camps (GAO 
2006: 55). 
In 2005, the US provided AMIS with equipment for three Rapid Response 
Teams, enabling the mission to deploy small units rapidly to enable it undertake 
preventive deployments, reinforce unstable areas and respond rapidly to crises 
(African Union 2005b: 11-12).  
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
In the run-up to the African Union Mission in Somalia, the United States security 
strategy in the Horn of Africa revolved around bilateral support to Ethiopia. In 
2002, the US allocated $3.6 million in security assistance for Ethiopia, 
increasing over the subsequent years, and in 2005 Ethiopia became the top 
recipient of US security assistance in Africa (Cochran 2010: 130-131). This 
support was geared at encouraging participation in regional peacekeeping 
initiatives and in the African Crisis Response Initiative (Cochran 2010: 130). In 
2006, the year that Ethiopia invaded Somalia, Ethiopia had received $21 million 
of military capacity building support from the United States’ Global War on 
Terror budget (Cochran 2010: 131). During the Ethiopian invasion and the 
153 
 
subsequent occupation, the United States cooperated militarily with Ethiopian 
forces on the ground, many of which the United States had trained and 
equipped through ACOTA. US special operations forces, intelligence assets, 
and precision airstrikes, supporting a large-scale intervention by a US partner 
became known as “the Somali Model” (Stevenson 2007: 44). By enabling the 
Ethiopian invasion, the United States made AMISOM possible. However, the 
invasion also contributed to the increased militarisation and the confrontational 
nature of the security environment in Somalia, creating serious difficulties for 
AMISOM. 
The United States also provided considerable support to Uganda’s two initial 
battalions for AMISOM, providing Uganda with assistance in terms of airlifting, 
the provision of equipment and procurement of supplies, logistical support and 
sustenance for the Ugandan troops in the mission area (African Union 2007j: 
3). After the expansion of the mandate of the African Union mission in Somalia 
and the withdrawal of Ethiopia, US support was vital in bringing the mission 
strength to the UN mandated 12,000. The US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Elisabeth Frazer, fearing a recrudescence of the 
UIC in the wake of the Ethiopian withdrawal, referred to AMISOM as “a crucial 
component of our strategy in Somalia”, leading to US training, equipment, and 
logistical support to be provided bilaterally to Uganda and Burundi, specifically 
to enable their deployment to AMISOM (Cochran 2010: 133-134). As will be 
discussed in chapter seven, one of the main stumbling blocks for the 
deployment of troops, especially the Burundian battalions, was the lack of the 
necessary equipment. In 2011, the US facilitated the deployment of an 
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additional 4,000 Ugandan and Burundian troops to the mission through the 
provision of this necessary equipment (African Union 2011d: 3).  
Although US support to AMISOM TCCs has been vital, the US strategy also 
highlights a failure of the APSA’s partners to bridge the capacity gap of flagging 
political will: Ghana and Nigeria in particular received considerable military 
capacity building from the US, and were offered more support tailored to the 
requirements of AMISOM, but without any strategic interest in Somalia, and in 
light of the collapsing security situation, both countries continued to prevaricate 
when it came to deployment (Cochran 2010: 136). This highlights the limitations 
of external support; even extensive training and support from the US cannot 
make sending troops to Somalia seem like a good idea. 
Conclusion 
While the EU has tried to redesign the donor-recipient relationship to highlight 
African ownership, the US has continued to pursue a more traditional model; 
attempting, as US Air Force Major Shawn T. Cochran puts it, “to translate 
donor-recipient relationships into effective sponsor-surrogate relationships as a 
means of shaping the African security environment and pursuing US objectives” 
(Cochran 2010: 137). The United States takes a ground-up approach to 
capacity building for the APSA, leaving much of the structural capacity 
enhancement to the UN and the EU. The United States prefers to support 
member state capacity, supporting Ethiopia in Somalia out of the belief that the 





This chapter has shown that, despite the APSA’s reputation for debilitating 
capacity gaps as highlighted in the previous chapter and chapter one, the 
reality is quite the opposite; the APSA has access to vast resources, all the 
resources required to field some of the world’s largest peace operations, 
allowing the APSA to play a major role in this area. These resources are largely 
provided by its external partners. In fact, almost all of the billions of dollars 
spent by the APSA since its inception have come from external sources. 
However, in practical terms, the APSA’s ‘surrogate’ capacity has been 
underestimated by much of the discourse, as have the attendant roles that the 
APSA is capable of playing. 
External support from the UN, the EU and the US has bridged many of the 
capacity gaps highlighted in the previous chapter to a greater or lesser extent, 
enhancing, or frequently creating, capacity in core problem areas–namely 
funding, planning, training, contingent owned equipment, heavy air lift, military 
intelligence, and many technical and specialist areas. Moreover, external 
support that creates capacity in areas which were never explicitly part of the 
APSA’s endemic functionalist role, such as counter-terrorism, show how the 
pull factors of the APSA’s external partners have shaped and twisted the role of 
the APSA. Further, the role played by the APSA in the field can be transformed 
and expanded through support such as the United States’ provision of heavy 
air-lift and rapid-reaction capacity to AMIS. Although not all support to the 
APSA has had such a transformative effect on the role played in the African 
security arena, even small amounts of capacity enhancement have helped the 
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APSA’s missions to appear more professional and more competent to the 
outside world, allowing the APSA to attract confidence and support. 
One capacity gap that has remained unaddressed, however, is the APSA’s 
limited administrative staff; still over worked and underpaid, the APSA’s 
bureaucracy is struggling under the weight of the myriad accounting 
requirements for each of its individual sources of external aid. A case in point is 
the €6 million from the APF which was earmarked for strengthening the AU 
PSOD in 2008. A year after it was pledged, only €1.6 million had been spent 
and only 11 out of the required 40 personnel had been recruited because of 
major procedural obstacles within the AU Commission that the original pledge 
had been designed to ameliorate (low staff levels, out-dated systems, lack of 
specialists etc.). This demonstrates that the APSA has a limited capacity to 
absorb external support, limiting the extent to which external partners can 
bridge the APSAs capacity gaps (Pirozzi 2009: 26).  
Further, there are still capacity gaps in the mandate and mission planning 
process: a need for improved interoperability and further standardisation of the 
doctrine, particularly for civilian police components and a need for more 
equipment and logistics support, which, as will be shown in chapter seven, has 
only ever been at the minimum level required to postpone mission failure (G8 
2009: 6). Although significant airlift capacity has been provided by the United 
States via DynCorp contracts, as well as through partnership with NATO, the 
lack of strategic airlift is still a major operational limiting factor for the APSA and 
African TCCs. This was made clear in 2010; after the bombings in Kampala, the 
Ugandan government made thousands of troops available to AMISOM that 
were not deployed for months because there was no strategic airlift available 
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until the US stepped in. Similar cases can be seen with other troop-contributing 
countries such as Nigeria, which had pledged thousands of troops to AMISOM 
but has not had the means to deploy them. Finally, although external partners 
did provide AMIS with considerable financial backing, the majority of this 
support has not been institutionalised and the ad hoc nature of these sources of 
funding has created a high level of uncertainty, hindering planning (Ekengard 
2008: 37). The APSA could not function without ad hoc external support; 
however, the slow and complex process of institutionalising the provision of 
external support further limits the APSA’s freedom to act, and its ability to plan 
effectively, limiting the APSA’s capacity, African ownership and ultimately 
limiting the interactionist role. 
It is clear that, even with the support of the APSA’s external partners, its 
capacity to act as a peacekeeper is limited by enduring capacity problems in 
familiar areas—mission funding, specialist equipment and expertise, logistics 
etc.. However, external partners have enhanced the APSA’s capacity beyond a 
minimum level required to carry out its mandates. In contrast to claims by 
scholars such as Paul Williams, the APSA, with the support of its external 
partners does have the capacity to successfully complete its mandates; all four 
of its peace support operations have been hugely dependent upon external 
capacity enhancement, but all four of them have also met with success; so 
limited internal capacity does not need to be the defining factor of the role of an 
institution like the APSA. 
In total, the APSA’s external partners have transferred training, equipment, 
services and capital to the APSA worth billions of US dollars, most of which has 
been spent on the operational requirements of AMIS and AMISOM. This shows 
158 
 
how different the APSA’s de facto capacity is from a plain reading of the 
APSA’s internal resources, as presented in the previous chapter. It is not simply 
that the APSA’s external partners are enhancing the APSA’s capacity; to a 
large extent the APSA’s partners are its capacity. Without external partners to 
facilitate them, the APSA’s PSO’s in Somalia and the extended mandate in 
Sudan would probably never have reached the mission theatre. Operation 
Democracy, which will be discussed in chapter seven, has shown that the 
APSA does in fact have the capacity to mount operations on its own based on 
the Burundi model, but only small and/or fast missions, with lead-states willing 
to take ownership of the mission. Further, the early days of AMIS and AMISOM 
show how far the APSA is able to go without significant support. However, even 
before the mass mobilisation of funds for AMIS and AMISOM, external 
contributions still dwarfed internal pledges; and when it comes to transforming 
the mission environments, as we have seen in Somalia, hundreds of millions of 
dollars of external funding is not just helpful, it is a prerequisite. 
Therefore, the external partners, while external to Africa, are not truly external 
to the APSA. They are at the very heart of the APSA. Moreover, the APSAs 
external partners are not only providing the bulk of the capacity required to 
drive the APSA forward, they are also steering the APSA into specific areas by 
the selective provision of their aid in a form of passive governance. By selecting 
specific elements of the APSA’s role to enhance in accordance with their own 
Africa policies, the APSA’s external partners have shaped the role of the APSA 
into something they would see as more useful. External capacity enhancement 
of the APSA has focused on military aspects; even the provision of expertise 
and specialist training is aimed at enhancing the military side of the APSA. The 
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APSA’s missions have become expansive intercontinental security cooperation 
projects. It is therefore clear that external partners have a significant effect on, 
not just the APSA’s capacity, but how that capacity is used. An examination of 
how this ‘external governance’ affects the role of the APSA will be the subject of 
the subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter Six:  
Governance of the APSA 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown how external capacity enhancement of the 
APSA has not just bridged most of the APSA’s capacity gaps outlined in 
chapter four, but has enhanced and expanded the APSA’s capacity to act. This 
has meant that the APSA has been able to play a much larger role than its 
modest internal capacity would indicate. However, when it comes to the effects 
of external capacity enhancement on the interactionist role of the APSA, the 
‘elephant in the room’ is ownership. The previous chapter concluded that 
external capacity enhancement is not supplemental to the APSA; the APSA 
could not exist in its current form without it, and the role it plays in the African 
security environment would be very different. Dependency creates leverage 
and control, giving the external partners considerable influence over the scale 
and direction of the capacity which they provide.  
Member state governments also have a considerable influence over the role 
played by the APSA, even if they are not involved in the official decision-making 
framework. The Burundi model creates a similar type of dependency and the 
choice to intervene in a conflict or not often depends not on a decision by the 
PSC to launch a mission, but the willingness of key lead states to act. 
While the previous two chapters have examined the APSA’s capacity and how 
that capacity shapes the APSA’s interactionist role, this chapter will address 
how that capacity is directed and by whom. In the effort to understand the 
interactionist role of the APSA, an understanding of the APSA’s interactionist 
governance processes is more informative than an understanding of the 
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endemic functionalist governance of the APSA, i.e. the way that governance of 
the APSA is supposed to be conducted.  
It is therefore imperative to systematically quantify and analyse governance in 
the APSA. In pursuit of this aim, this chapter seeks to answer a few key 
questions: What do the APSA’s governance structures look like? Who is 
‘pulling’ the APSA’s ‘strings’, and to what ends? Whom does the APSA serve—
is it the African people, their leaders, or is it external powers like the United 
States or the European Union? And most importantly; how does the 
governance of the APSA limit, enable and direct its role?  
In order to effectively and objectively answer these questions, it will be 
necessary to problematise the concept of governance. As a result of the fact 
that no appropriate theoretical framework for the analysis of governance in this 
way exists in International Relations, a new theory of governance will be 
developed for use in examining the effects of the APSA’s governance 
structures upon its interactionist role. This process will constitute the first part of 
the chapter. With a technical definition of the core elements of the APSA’s 
governance structures clearly established to focus the study, the chapter will 
then go on to examine the APSA’s internal governance structure, explaining 
which African actors are involved and what the relationship is between them, 
and challenging a core element of the endemic functionalist definition of the role 
of the APSA: African solutions for African problems. The last half of the chapter 
will discuss the subtle and not-so-subtle ways in which the APSA’s external 
partners can use their influence to guide and mould the interactionist role of the 
institution through selective capacity enhancement, conditional aid, unequal 
relationships and other techniques. 
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Defining Governance and Establishing the Boundaries for 
Study 
Governance is significant because it doesn’t just limit or enable the APSA’s 
capacity like the factors discussed in the three preceding chapters; it dictates 
how that capacity is to be used. When the concept of governance was originally 
developed, it was captured with the German word Steuerungstheorie, literally 
‘steering theory’ (Mayntz 2003: 27). This term perhaps gives a better image of 
what governance does when applied to institutions – it steers the organisation 
into the desired role or roles. In this sense, understanding governance 
processes takes us to the very core of understanding the interactionist role. 
In order to systematically analyse the effects of governance on the role of the 
APSA, the most appropriate way of conceptualising governance must first be 
established, so that the concept can be applied consistently throughout the 
chapter. Governance theories are most often used to provide an idealised 
model of governance that organisations should aspire to, similar to the 
functionalist approach in Institutional Role Theory. In the context of Global 
Governance—IR’s most influential theoretical framework for the 
conceptualisation of governance—this approach has been referred to as the 
normative use of governance theory (Dingworth and Pattberg 2006: 193-196). 
Normative governance theory includes theories such as Good Governance, 
which are models describing an ideal of governance—they list the requirements 
of effective governance, sometimes outlining a strategy for adopting these 
requirements. Therefore, the normative use of governance theory is not useful 
to the present study, which is less interested in what the governance of the 
APSA should be, but needs to understand the practical effect that the APSA’s 
governance has on how the organisation employs its capacity and, therefore, 
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the effect it has upon the APSA’s interactionist role. By invoking Good 
Governance in the context of the APSA, academics and practitioners are 
making value judgements of the quality of the APSA’s governance structures; 
claiming, for example, that the APSA’s governance is not good enough to meet 
a shopping list of various preconditions. The current thesis does not challenge 
the value of such scholarship in other contexts, but it is clearly a projected 
functionalist endeavour, and as such cannot be used to systematically explain 
what those governance structures are and how they affect the APSA’s role.  
This study needs to investigate the APSA’s governance structures as they are, 
rather than what they ought to be, and to that end, it is more useful to employ 
what Dingwerth and Pattberg refer to as the analytical use of governance 
theory (Dingworth and Pattberg 2006: 189-193). One such analytical framework 
for governance is Rosenau’s Global Governance theory, outlined in issue one 
of Global Governance (Rosenau 1995). Global Governance provides the 
archetypal form of analytical governance theory.   
Rather than simply writing out a shopping list of processes that Western 
academics claim are necessary for ‘effective’ governance to take place, 
Rosenau adopts a completely different approach to the subject, conceptualising 
the world’s governance, good and bad, as a “crazy quilt” of millions of different 
interdependent actors, from families to supranational organisations, all 
attempting to assert their influence over governance mechanisms in order to 
achieve their ends (Rosenau 1995: 15-16). In this way, Global Governance 
opens up the field of governance, moving beyond the staid examination of 
official descriptions of governance and allowing us to examine any and all 
influences that may contribute to the steering of an organisation, enabling us to 
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better understand the processes behind governance and how they shape the 
role of an institution. 
However, it is the sheer scale of Rosenau’s concept of governance that makes 
it difficult to implement in the study of institutions like the APSA. Critics of 
Global Governance have highlighted the problem that if ‘everything is 
governance’, then the theory is difficult to use as an analytical tool. Therefore, 
the problem is how to make sense of these governance processes: e.g. how 
can we isolate and evaluate the most important governance actors affecting the 
interactionist role of the APSA, and isolate them from the dazzling “crazy quilt”?  
One way to tighten the focus on the APSA’s governance structures is to 
introduce concepts from outside the field of International Relations and 
synthesise a new theoretical framework for the analysis of the effects of 
governance on the interactionist role. The Policy Governance model, developed 
by John Carver, is an offshoot of Corporate Governance. Carver’s most 
significant contribution to the Corporate Governance literature is his separation 
of the governance structures of corporations into three groups: the owners, the 
managers and the board (Carver 2001: 59-60). Governance, in Carver’s view, 
is only carried out by the board. The board is a small group of elites who 
represent the owners. It is the board’s responsibility to interpret the wishes of 
the owners, develop ends (objectives or goals) that are in line with those wishes 
and ensure that the management is working towards means (policies) which 
can achieve these ends (Carver 2001: 54-59).  
This model makes it possible to analyse the effects of an organisation’s 
governance structures by isolating and analysing the board and its relationship 
with the management and the owners. This will facilitate an understanding of 
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the origins of governance ‘policies’, by tracing them back to the parts of the 
board that originally developed them.  
Although Policy Governance is a conceptualisation of the governance of private 
enterprises, and is largely normative in nature, the value of this model lies in the 
clarity with which governance processes have been isolated from conventional 
management and ownership.  With some slight alterations to the theory, the 
APSA’s governance may also be isolated in this fashion; enabling an 
understanding of which parts of the “crazy quilt” are able to design policies for 
the APSA, or otherwise penetrate the APSA’s governance structures. Thus, by 
splicing together aspects from Global Governance and Corporate Governance, 
we can create an analytical framework to analyse the effects of governance on 
the interactionist role of institutions like the APSA.  
Policy Governance in the AU 
In the Policy Governance model there is a fundamental division of labour 
between the act of management and the act of governance—a distinction often 
overlooked in definitions of governance found in International Relations. The 
APSA is a large and complex organisation, with many stakeholders, and its 
governance structures are multifaceted. The first step to analysing these 
governance structures is to apply Carver’s model; identifying and isolating the 
APSA’s ownership, management and board.  
The board is the only element in any organisation that can ‘steer’, so to 
understand governance in the APSA it is important to first find board elements 
and separate them from ownership or management elements. Likewise, as the 
most fundamental task of the board is to represent the ownership (Carver 2001: 
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56), understanding the relationship between the APSA’s board and its 
ownership is of considerable use in understanding the APSA’s governance and 
its effects. Carver asserts that (in functionalist terms) “both the state and the 
public organisation are creatures of the public and wholly subject to its 
dominion” and defines the ownership as “the legitimacy base formed by the 
general public” (Carver 2001: 55).  The management elements, on the other 
hand, are responsible for operationalising the board’s interpretation of the 
intentions of the owners. These three elements, board, management and 
ownership aid in charting governance processes, and will serve as the focal 
points for an analysis of governance in the APSA and its effects on its 
interactionist role. 
Who are the Owners of the AU? 
Defining the ownership of a corporation is a straightforward task; shareholders 
have literally bought a stake in the corporation; collectively, they are the 
ownership. Naturally, the African Union does not sell shares; for an international 
institution like the APSA, a different approach to ownership is required. This is 
often based upon projected functionalist approaches such as Good 
Governance, which explains that ownership of organisations like the African 
Union should be built upon concepts such as fairness, self-determination, and 
democracy. Therefore, as Carver stated, the owners of a public organisation 
like the APSA should be the African public; an assumption reinforced by the 
APSA’s endemic functionalist role which is defined in the treaty framework. For 
example, article 4(c) of the Constitutive Act makes the “participation of the 
African peoples in the activities of the Union” a principle of the organisation 
(Organisation of African Unity 2000). Article 3.7 of Chapter 3 of the African 
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Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance expresses “[e]ffective 
participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in 
governance of public affairs” as a principle of the Union (African Union 2007a). 
Further, much of the APSA’s work is declared to be conducted on behalf of the 
African people, as opposed to the member states, external partners, or other 
stakeholders. Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act lists one of the AU’s objectives 
as to “promote and protect human and peoples' rights” (Organisation of African 
Unity 2000). Article 4(m) of the Constitutive Act commits the AU to “respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” 
(Organisation of African Unity 2000) and Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act 
rejects impunity; those who commit crimes against the African people will never 
be immune from prosecution. Finally, the PSC Protocol states one of its 
objectives is to “promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to 
guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of 
the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions 
conducive to sustainable development” (African Union 2002b: Article 3(a)). 
Arguably, the APSA’s most explicit endemic functionalist statement of where its 
ownership lies is the Constitutive Act’s Article 4(h) (Organisation of African 
Unity 2000), which establishes the organisation’s right to intervene in a member 
state specifically in situations where the people of that state are suffering at the 
hands of the government or as a result of the negligence or impotence of the 
government. This article is the ultimate expression of the African people’s 
ownership of the AU’s security structures. However, Article 4(h) has yet to be 
invoked, and the AU’s commitment to protecting the interests of the people over 
the interests of the member states is unproven. These declarations are 
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evidence that the APSA is working on behalf of ‘African people’; they are the 
primary referent object of the APSA, which has securitised processes that are 
seen to threaten them. 
It is clear from the above rhetoric that, at least in endemic functionalist terms, 
the APSA is committed to good governance, and promoting increased 
awareness and participation throughout Africa. However, it is significant that the 
majority of Africans have heard very little of the AU, and few have ever heard of 
the Peace and Security Council, the Military Staff Committee or the Peace 
Support Operations Division (Murithi 2010; Jeremy 2010).  
The APSA is trying to promote awareness throughout Africa, a process which 
could potentially increase the relevance of African ownership in interactionist 
terms. The APSA does have a presence outside Addis Ababa, including key 
organs such as the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, as well as some smaller regional offices. The quantity and frequency of 
AU documentation made available to the public and civil society is increasing, 
including leaflets and booklets designed to raise awareness. However, it has 
not made as much progress as it might have, and awareness amongst the 
public is still extremely low, meaning that African ownership has a very low 
impact on the interactionist role of the APSA (Murithi 2010). In an interview with 
the author, Peyker described the “problem of invisibility” as a problem that 
affects all international organisations, and made a comparison with lack of 
awareness of the European Union’s agenda amongst the general public in the 
United Kingdom (Peyker 2010). This could indicate that high-minded notions of 
popular ownership of these types of institutions may mean little to the day-to-
day running of such organisations. 
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The failure to push through what Murithi (2010) calls an effective ‘popularisation 
agenda’ is itself arguably a reflection of weak governance processes which 
undermine the endemic functionalist role of the APSA. Murithi used the 
example of the African Union’s ‘Year of Peace’ in 2010; a perfect opportunity for 
the APSA and the wider AU to promote its agenda amongst the people in Africa 
from “capitals, even down to the village level” that, nonetheless, resulted in very 
few initiatives to increase popular ownership (Murithi 2010). Another example is 
the African Cup of Nations in January 2010, for which there were ‘grand plans’ 
to use football stars as AU ambassadors to help raise awareness of the AU and 
its agenda that, unfortunately, failed to translate into action (Murithi 2010). The 
2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa—another huge opportunity to spread the 
word—similarly passed without any significant action. Murithi ascribes this 
failure to fully engage the African people in the APSA’s work to a lack of vision, 
leadership, and delegation—pure governance issues—in addition to the usual 
capacity problems (Murithi 2010). 
How can the ownership call upon the APSA’s board to represent their wishes if 
they are not aware that they are the ownership? A comparison with Carver’s 
normative model would suggest that a lack of owner participation leads to 
reduced legitimacy for the organisation (Carver 2001: 55). However, in this 
analytical governance model, it can simply be said that the African public is not 
(currently) the ownership of the APSA. The African public does not have 
awareness of what the APSA’s is doing, and the APSA can hardly interpret the 
wishes of the African public from which to distil governance policies. The 
African public has no real leverage over the APSA; there are no direct means 
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for the APSA to be held accountable to the African public, which has not bought 
shares in the APSA and does not need to be consulted on major decisions.  
If the wishes of the African people are represented at the APSA at all, then they 
only have two avenues through which they can be interpreted; either via civil 
society groups that lobby the AU, or via their national governments which are 
directly represented, in the AU Assembly. The normative legitimacy of the 
APSA’s governance is therefore directly proportional to the level of public 
participation within the domestic political systems of individual African member 
states, and the effectiveness of civil society at lobbying on their behalf (although 
this only enhances the popular ownership of specific, usually wealthier and 
better educated, sections of the African public). However, normative questions, 
such as the extent of the legitimacy of the APSA’s governance, are outside the 
scope of this study. The important question here is: if the African people are not 
the APSA’s ownership, then who, or what, is, and how does it affect the APSA’s 
role? 
In interactionist terms, the day-to-day ownership of the APSA is made up of 
African governments (as well as some influential member states and external 
partners, an element of the APSA’s ownership which will be explained in more 
detail later in this chapter). Like a group of shareholders, they each have a vote 
in the Assembly (external partners are represented through various advisory 
organs and the UN), and all treaties, conventions, protocols, charters and 
Decisions and Declarations are signed in the name of the member states and 
are themselves representations of the general will of the member state 
governments. Further, member states and external partners have, to a greater 
or lesser extent, bought-in to the APSA, which is dependent upon them for the 
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materiel and capital required for it to perform its role; as such, they have 
leverage over the APSA in a way that the African public cannot. In practical 
terms, African governments may not necessarily represent the African people, 
but the APSA certainly represents African governments. 
Demarcating the APSA’s Board 
The role of the board is “to ensure, on behalf of some ownership, that an 
organisation achieves what it should and avoids that which is unacceptable” 
(Carver 2001: 65). Governance is therefore the execution of the authority to 
interpret the general will (the aggregate wishes of the ownership), and to 
establish governance policies in the form of organisational values and ends, or 
strategic objectives based on these values. In other words, the board interprets 
the wishes of the ownership, (referred to in Policy Governance, à la Rousseau, 
as the general will), and devises ends to further those wishes. The board does 
not and, according to Carver’s normative approach, should not concern itself 
with the means to achieve these ends—that is the domain of management. 
While the board may proscribe specific means that are not in line with its 
established values, such as corrupt or illegal practices, the Policy Governance 
model does not consider meddling in operational details to be effective 
governance (Carver 2001: 62-63). 
In the AU (if not the APSA), the appellation of board seems to fall upon the AU 
Assembly, as it interprets the wishes of the ownership, and sets long term ends 
without involving itself in the day-to-day management. The AU Assembly only 
meets in ordinary session twice per year; this simple fact precludes the 
Assembly’s capacity to develop complex strategies, limiting its remit to 
governing the AU. However, in interactionist terms, and in light of the previous 
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section, there may well be some overlap between the Assembly as board and 
ownership. If the de facto owners of the African Union are the member state 
governments, rather than the African people, and the Assembly is made up of 
the Heads of State and Government of African Union member states, then the 
Assembly may well be seen to be more like a twice-yearly stockholders’ 
meeting (i.e. ownership) than a board meeting. A close relationship between 
the board and the ownership would be a good thing, but if the board has 
effectively redefined itself as the ownership, then there are serious 
repercussions for good governance, as the normative, or functionalist, 
ownership has effectively been cut out of the governance process.  
The Peace and Security Council, one step removed from the Assembly, cannot 
be described as an owner in interactionist terms; even though it is made up of 
state representatives, its membership is rotating and never constitutes the 
entirety of the ownership as one might argue that the Assembly does. It 
constitutes the APSA’s board, and is focused on interpreting the general will of 
the Assembly, as expressed in the Assembly’s Decisions and Declarations. 
Whether the Assembly is a representative of the ownership, or whether it is the 
ownership, does not affect the PSC’s position as the board of the APSA in 
interactionist terms. The PSC meets more frequently than the Assembly 
(several times a month), and is focused directly on peace and security issues, 
but nonetheless limits itself to setting policies and governing the APSA.  
Demarcating the APSA’s Management 
The day-to-day running of the APSA, including developing means to achieve 
the values-driven ends set by the Assembly and the PSC in their governance 
policies, is left to the AU’s main management body: the AU Commission; 
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specifically the Peace and Security Council Secretariat, the Peace Support 
Operations Division, the Military Staff Committee, as well as other management 
structures within the commission such as the Department for Political Affairs 
(DPA) which deals with issues related to conflict prevention, structural issues 
and refugees. The PSC Secretariat itself can recommend new ‘policies’ to be 
adopted by the PSC, primarily through the reports of the Chairperson of the 
Commission, which are presented to the Peace and Security Council on a 
regular basis on specific issues. The Secretariat also provides the PSC and the 
Assembly with advice on which areas of the APSA require the most attention, 
but it cannot adopt its own policies, its own values or long-term objectives; thus, 
as in the policy governance model, the act of governance in the APSA is a one-
way street from the owners (African governments/the Assembly), through the 
board (the Peace and Security Council), to the management (the PSC 
Commission/the Department for Peace and Security (DPS), the Department for 
Political Affairs (DPA) and the office of the Chairperson of the Commission).  
Carver’s model, as he says himself, is normative; an aspirational ideal. As we 
have seen, the APSA does not correspond perfectly to it, particularly in terms of 
ownership, and, as will be discussed later in the chapter, the APSA’s 
governance is even more complex when full account is made of all the 
interactionist influences which affect it. In an organisation as complex as the 
APSA, the chain of governance is much less elegant, less linear and much 
more complicated. 
Governance in the APSA 
“…the governance function is a derivative of ownership rather than of 
management. A theory of governance does not begin with considerations of 
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the needs and language of management, then, but considerations of the 
needs and language of ownership” (Carver 2001: 59) 
According to Carver, “the size of the population of owners and the breadth of an 
organisation’s charge will contribute to the difficulty in determining the general 
will” (Carver 2001: 55). This fact has a significant impact on the APSA’s 
interactionist governance structures. Establishing the general will of the 
ownership is a difficult job for the board of any organisation. The APSA consists 
of 54 member states with a combined population of over nine-hundred million 
people. There is very little awareness of the APSA amongst the general 
population, which is compounded by low levels of literacy and education, a 
weak civil society, limited government control in some areas, low public 
participation in national politics, limited free speech and limited freedom of the 
press coupled with many long running and searing conflicts. This results in 
innumerable contradictory interests between ethnic groups, states, civil society 
groups, businesses and other parties. In light of this, discerning an aggregate 
general will is next to impossible. 
This means that, as explained above, the Assembly is less interpreting the 
general will of the African people, and more representing the interests of their 
own governments (which may or may not include the interests of the public).  
However, settling upon African national governments as the de facto ownership 
presents further problems as there is a further lack of representation here; 
many African governments lack the capacity or the political will to take 
ownership at the continental level. Murithi feels that many African states are 
treating the AU with a ‘take it or leave it’ approach (Murithi 2010). For example, 
in an interview with the author, when discussing member-state participation in 
AMISOM, Warthon bemoaned a lack of knowledge about the situation in 
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Somalia amongst member state governments, resulting in a lack of interest, a 
lack of support and ultimately a severely constrained APSA PSO in Mogadishu 
(Warthon 2010). In practical terms, there is only a small core of member states 
that actively govern the organisation. African sub-regional powers such as 
Nigeria, South Africa and, until recently, Libya, have dominated the APSA’s 
board, setting the agenda, financing elements they agree with and neglecting 
those they are not interested in.   
Carver states that the “People-as-a-whole makes an inspiring anthem” (Carver 
2001: 56), that is to say that they hold the key to legitimacy; however, to get 
things done requires material support. In a corporation, this material support 
comes from the practice of buying stock; this represents the owners’ (the 
stockholders’) investment in the company and is the main reason that the 
owners’ views are ever respected.  
In an organisation such as the AU, the legitimate owners (in normative terms), 
the African people, have not put any money or resources into it directly, and as 
a result, the APSA can continue to function without needing to consult with 
them at all—they have no leverage over the institution and as a result are not 
part of the governance process. However, the APSA does need material 
support in order to continue to function and those who provide it with such 
support (such as key member states and external partners) do have to be 
consulted. In this sense, they are the real owners of the APSA, as they are the 
only elements of the ownership that affect the APSA’s interactionist role; they 
are the ones that wield influence in practical terms, regardless of whether this is 
‘legitimate’ in normative terms. The APSA’s dependency upon them for support 
is not unlike corporate dependency upon key stockholders for fluidity, and they 
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have similar power over the APSA, and can shape its interactionist role using 
the resources they provide as leverage. The remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to understanding these interactionist owners, and the effects that they 
have upon the role of the APSA. 
Member-State Governance of the APSA 
The development of the African Union in the late 1990s was driven largely by 
the efforts of three African leaders: Oluṣẹgun Ọbasanjọ in Nigeria; Thabo Mbeki 
in South Africa, and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (Tieku 2004: 251). The 
following section examines how the influence of these governments over the 
governance of the APSA has in turn shaped the interactionist role of the 
institution, through their participation as owners, according to their own military, 
economic and political priorities. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria has become one of the wealthiest African states, as well as possessing 
one of the most powerful military forces on the continent. Nigeria forms the 
backbone of ECOWAS and ECOMOG, and, as such, is a staunch supporter of 
regional integration. By the time the African Union was established, Nigeria had 
become very active in regional peacekeeping through ECOMOG’s efforts in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, which were becoming increasingly expensive and 
unpopular domestically. It is against this back-drop that Nigeria was committed 
to refocusing the continental architecture to take a more active role in peace-
keeping (in contrast to conflict prevention or addressing structural violence), 
and was an early proponent of the Peace and Security Council (Tieku 2004: 
264). Ọbasanjọ hoped to maintain Nigeria’s ‘vanguard’ role in West Africa, by 
using the AU to mobilise financial support to help shoulder the million-dollar-
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per-day financial burden of its own military peacekeeping efforts (Tieku 2004: 
158-260). 
Nigeria’s focus on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and its need to 
secure international backing for such operations, has been driven by the ‘pax 
Nigeriana’ concept (Adebajo 2002: 93-92). The Nigerian strategy has been to 
consolidate its power as a regional hegemon allowing the government to 
entrench its increasingly powerful position in the wider geostrategic 
environment.   
South Africa 
Under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, South Africa took up a leadership role 
within the Pan-African movement. South Africa, as the continent’s richest state, 
is also mistrusted by many of its peers. This is largely because South Africa’s 
financial interests have moved it to pursue a neo-liberal economic agenda. 
South Africa’s GEAR policy in the 1990s was focused on attracting FDI by 
improving South Africa’s image and by providing economic conditions attractive 
to external investors (Vale and Maseko 1998: 229-243).  
South Africa was instrumental in the drafting of the Constitutive Act and, as a 
result, had a significant influence upon the endemic functionalist role of the 
APSA which reflects its own national preferences. Firstly, despite its popularity 
among many African states, there is almost no trace of Libya’s United States of 
Africa concept, which South Africa consistently opposed and vowed never to be 
a part of. Secondly, there is a focus on human rights, good governance and 
human security in the treaty framework, which had been popular with foreign 
investors, and in-line with GEAR and South African priorities, bearing many 




Libya has been one of the most vocal supporters of the APSA, and was one of 
its most significant backers. Throughout the 2000s, the Gaddafi regime 
increasingly adopted a leadership role, not just within the AU project, but within 
the pan-African movement as a whole. Gaddafi turned to African Unity as his 
main passion coincidentally with his increasing frustration with other Arab 
leaders and the stagnation of pan-Arabism (Totman and Hardy 2009: 10-12).  
The Libyan concept of the role of the APSA is much more extensive than the 
endemic functionalist role described in chapter three. Libya under Gaddafi saw 
the AU as a nascent pan-African nation-state, the United States of Africa, and 
the ASF as an embryonic pan-African army. Despite his attempts to take over 
the OAU reform process, the constitutive legal text that was approved at the 
Lomé summit in June 2000 contained none of the ideas of the ‘United States of 
Africa’ (Tieku 2004: 262). 
However, the Gaddafi regime continued to be a diving force behind the 
integration process, and Libya tabled a list of amendments to the African Union 
Constitutive Act to try to get some of these concepts into the treaty framework. 
The most significant of these was the amendment to Article 4(h), which would 
give the AU the right to intervene in a state in order to prevent ‘unconstitutional 
changes of government’ (African Union 2003e). This has proved prescient in 
light of the recent revolution Libya, undoubtedly an ‘unconstitutional change of 
government’, where Gaddafi’s amendment to Article 4(h) could have provided a 
legal basis for an APSA intervention to defend or reinstate his regime. 
Considering the fact that Gaddafi’s own route to power was through a similar 
‘unconstitutional change of government’, it is not a stretch of the imagination to 
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presume that Gaddafi was using his country’s role as a member of the AU’s 
ownership not in the interests of the African people, or even the Libyan people, 
but in the interests of his regime security, allowing unelected African leaders 
like Gaddafi to stay in power with the blessing and support of the African Union. 
These concerns, amongst others, have so-far prevented Libya’s proposed 
amendments from being ratified by the required number of states to make the 
amendments an official protocol to the Constitutive Act (Baimu and Sturman 
2003). 
In 2009, Gaddafi was elected chairperson of the African Union and intended to 
use his time in office to push for a single pan-African army (Polgreen 2009). 
This vision of the APSA has been opposed by many other major African nation 
states, including Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia, resulting in the failure of his 
bid for re-election in 2010 and his subsequent disillusionment with the pan-
African project (McLure 2010). 
From this brief examination of three of the most active members of the AU 
board, it is clear that African states do not have a single unified agenda; their 
preferences represent competing factors that militate against each other to 
steer the APSA and set policies according to their own interests and 
preferences in an interactionist fashion. 
Civil Society 
Civil society organisations, such as unions, media, business groups and 
charities, as representatives of some elements of the APSA’s normative 
ownership, the African people, only have a very muted influence upon the 
governance of the institution. The APSA conducts its activities in close 
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coordination with civil society organisations and think tanks such as the Institute 
for Strategic Studies. Despite the fact that Civil Society is not a formal part of 
the APSA, they are still representatives of core parts of the African public; so, in 
the interest of increasing its perceived legitimacy, the AU has tried to increase 
its relationship with civil society (AU Civil Society Forum 2004). 
Civil society organisations frequently lobby the African Union, if not the APSA 
itself. An example is the 2002 declaration on NEPAD, where forty-one civil 
society organisations came together during the Durban Summit to condemn the 
neo-liberal economic leanings of NEPAD, which was being incorporated into 
the AU (SAPRN 2002). Much of the conference’s concerns about NEPAD 
stemmed from external ownership issues; NEPAD, they claimed, serves the 
interests of external powers (SAPRN 2002). However, Civil Society groups are 
almost unanimously focused on economic and social issues, not peace and 
security issues. Further, the board has no legal requirement to act on civil 
society suggestions, and like the African people, they contribute little to the day-
to-day running of the organisation. The appearance of a close relationship with 
such organisations does, however, check boxes for various external partners, 
which, as the previous chapter highlighted, contribute more to the operational 
costs of the APSA than the member states themselves. 
External Governance 
In practical terms, the APSA’s board and management do not only represent 
the interests of the African Union member states. As highlighted in the previous 
chapter, the APSA could not conduct its business without the financial and 
material support of its many external partners. This support has become 
increasingly important over the course of the AU’s existence, and the APSA in 
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particular has become heavily dependent on it; close to 90% of the APSA’s 
costs have been shouldered by external partners (Franke 2009: 239).  
The European Union and the United States are the APSA’s main financial 
donors, each contributing hundreds of millions of dollars over the APSA’s first 
ten years. Such a vast transference of resources cannot occur without a 
significant level of oversight. This includes (in policy governance terms) the 
management of the processes of raising money and distributing it, but there is 
also a very important governance element involved; the various boards of the 
EU, the USA and the UN (the European Council/Council of Ministers, Congress 
and the Security Council respectively), all get involved in setting policies for 
their support packages. These policies (in terms of accounting practices, 
conditions on support, targeted aid etc.) are usually enforced by the APSA’s 
own management structures (i.e. the AUC), allowing a certain level of external 
governance of the APSA.  
Further, aspects of external management can become embedded in the 
APSA’s own management structures, creating a much more robust, direct and 
pervasive form of external governance.  In order to preserve African ownership 
of the African Union, the APSA is restricted to employing African citizens 
exclusively, at all levels of its business. However, as described in chapter four, 
a range of problems has led to a lack of highly skilled, highly qualified staff in 
the APSA’s managerial elements, including the highly important PSOD and the 
PSC secretariat. This has resulted in an increasing reliance on external 
advisors who are not (in functionalist terms) part of the APSA system, but who 
nonetheless take on significant responsibility for the day-to-day running of some 
aspects of the organisation. There are representatives of the UN, the EU and 
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the US operating in the APSA in this manner. These operatives do not just 
report to the APSA’s board, but to representatives of the boards of their own 
organisations or states.  
The APSA’s external partners do not all interfere in the APSA’s management to 
the same extent, and to give an idea of the level of influence these external 
partners have ‘steering’ the APSA’s interactionist role in this way, the thesis has 
split up external governance practices into three major categories; unobtrusive 
governance, parallel governance, and invasive governance. The practices of 
the APSA’s main external partners all fall into one of these three categories. 
The following sections will discuss the impact that external governance has had 
in the interactionist role of the APSA, briefly looking first at Chinese support, 
which represents a low impact on the APSA’s governance structures 
categorised as unobtrusive governance. This will be followed by the United 
States’ medium impact approach, parallel governance; moving on to examine 
intrusive governance of the type practiced by the EU and the UN. 
Chinese Governance of the AU (Unobtrusive Governance) 
Unobtrusive external governance is exemplified by the Chinese approach to 
supporting the AU (and other Chinese partners), and has the lowest impact on 
the steering of the APSA and its interactionist role. Chinese financial and 
material support to the APSA is accompanied by a unilateral pledge of 
impartiality and non-interference (Li 2007: 74-75). The effect of unconditional 
aid upon human rights, safety, the environment and corruption within recipient 
countries is still debated (Woods 2008: 1207, 1211). The PRC, when 
conducting business and politics in Africa, frequently refers to itself as a non-
colonial power, or even a fellow victim of European imperialism (Li 2007: 73-
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75). As a result, the Chinese government does not put conventional conditions 
on its support packages (Woods 2008: 1211). This is also true of its 
relationships with the individual African member states; the PRC is fully 
prepared to make substantial arms deals and other security-related agreements 
without any stipulations or preconditions (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 221-
222). Further, the PRC’s principle of impartiality, which it uses to justify dealings 
with many states considered by the West to be undemocratic or oppressive, 
has resulted in China being accused of propping up violent dictatorships, such 
as Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Bashir’s Sudan, and turning a blind eye to the abuse 
of human rights and democratic principles in Africa (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 
2006: 220). However, the PRC has not yet become heavily involved in 
supporting the APSA directly, beyond providing $200 million for the new AU 
building in Addis Ababa, which houses the PSC secretariat (BBC 2012). As 
Chinese support for the APSA is limited in scale and scope, it does not create 
the same levels of dependency as Western support, and China therefore has 
fewer opportunities to interfere in the APSA’s governance anyway.  
Nonetheless, the Chinese policy on external support for African security has 
split the international community. In many ways this is a very old argument 
about development aid in general that has now spread into the realm of 
continental security cooperation. There is a particular divide between the APSA 
and the Western donors in this respect, with many APSA officials and African 
national governments preferring China’s minimalist approach, which is seen to 
be more in keeping with the principles of African ownership and African 
solutions to African problems (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 222; Suifon: 
2010; Gomes 2010). Although all the APSA’s other external partners are also 
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ostensibly committed to these same principles, many of them see an important 
role for conditional aid and trade ‘with strings attached’ to incentivise 
democratisation and promote good governance, liberal values and free-market 
economics in Africa (Eisenman and Kurlantzick 2006: 224). However, in 
interactionist terms the conditions attached to support packages provided to 
APSA member states are a limiting factor on the APSA’s freedom to act; they 
not only constrain the steering of the organisation, but influence the APSA to 
steer in directions compatible with the donor states’ interests and objectives, 
thereby having a significant effect on the interactionist role of the APSA. 
The United States’ Governance of the APSA (Parallel Governance) 
The United States has taken a much more active role in supporting the APSA 
than China, and as a result, it has had many more opportunities to influence the 
APSA’s governance structures. The US has established a formal mission to the 
AU, with offices in Washington D.C. and Addis Ababa. Although, historically, 
Africa has not been high on the list of American strategic concerns, 
developments over the past two decades have motivated the United States to 
become deeply involved. Nigeria and Angola are now major suppliers of oil to 
US, making Africa more strategically important in its quest to diversify its supply 
(Ploch 2010: 15).  
Further, the ‘War on Terror’ has spread to Africa, particularly in the Sahel and 
the Horn. It is against this background that the United States has targeted much 
of its support for African military capacity enhancement as discussed in the 
previous chapter (Mills and Herbst 2007: 43), including the establishment of a 
separate military command for Africa; AFRICOM. African states have been 
highly suspicious of AFRICOM, believing the nation building strategies it 
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represents to be an updated form of colonialism. This belief has been so 
prevalent that the United States had to give up its plans to rebase AFRICOM in 
Africa from its current home in Stuttgart, as no African nation was willing to host 
it (Friedman and Sapolsky 2011). However, the United States, like the APSA’s 
other partners, rejects the notion that it is trying to take ownership of the APSA: 
“the United States has no interest in controlling anything; the United States has 
interests in partnering” (Warthon 2010).  
As the previous chapter explained, one of AFRICOM’s key objectives in Africa 
has been to enhance African capacity, but a major reason for this is to allow the 
United States to achieve its strategic objectives, without compromising its own 
forces, arguably turning African capacity into a proxy force in pursuit of 
objectives not set by the PSC or the Assembly, but by the Pentagon; in the 
words of a senior AFRICOM officer, speaking anonymously, “We don’t want to 
see our guys going in and getting whacked . . . We want Africans to go in” 
(Cochran 2010: 111).  
An example of this in action is US support to the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia, which is referred to by the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa 
as the ‘third front in the War on Terror’, and operations in the country are 
conducted under the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 
successful use of US special operations forces, intelligence assets, and limited 
precision air strikes, combined with a large-scale intervention by the Ethiopian 
army, has been dubbed “the Somali Model” (Cochran 2010: 132). This division 
of labour could represent the APSA taking on the unpleasant role of 
‘expendable asset’ in America’s ongoing, but hands-off, war on terror in Africa, 
but also develops the APSA’s interactionist role as a front-line force. 
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The US seems to have a preference for dealing with Africa at the nation-state 
level rather than focusing most of its attention at the continental level, as the EU 
has done. For example, the US refuses to supply weapons, equipment or 
training to regimes that it perceives to be a threat either to people within the 
state or to international peace and security. By increasing or decreasing the 
capacity and status of targeted member states, the US is able to promote its 
own values within the APSA’s governance structures from the outside. It does 
this by ‘backing winners’. African states that share US objectives and are 
committed to promoting those values, such as South Africa and Ethiopia, 
receive considerable support; states that have very different or even 
contradictory values, some of which might be openly anti-American such as 
Libya under Gaddafi, will naturally receive little or no support and may even find 
themselves faced with sanctions. This strategy strengthens the militaries and 
economies of board members and owners who are in line with American 
objectives, while sidelining those with contrary objectives.  
The US’s parallel governance strategy eschews the minimalist Chinese 
approach. However, despite AFRICOM’s poor reputation, America’s strategy is 
not as invasive as that of the EU or the UN. The United States influences the 
steering of the organisation without much direct interference in the governance 
of the APSA. The decision of which states to support and which to isolate is 
made within the United States’ own governance structures and has a greater 
effect on the APSA’s governance than the Chinese model without openly 




European Union Governance of the APSA (Intrusive Governance) 
The European Union has already been explained to be one of the APSA’s most 
significant partners, and that role is set to increase further as major EU member 
states gradually europeanise their support programmes. The European Union 
Mission to the African Union, based near the AUHQ in Addis Ababa, was the 
first of its kind, and forms a focal point for the AU/EU partnership. Further, some 
of the EUs most powerful member states were colonial powers in Africa, and 
still have important economic interests to protect in the continent. The EU itself 
has even launched its own peace mission in the DRC. 
However, the EU has taken particular care to adopt the language of African 
ownership (Sicurelli 2010), insisting that its relationship with the APSA is a 
partnership and that the APSA maintains ownership of its own processes; “we 
see where we have common interests and where we can support them, but 
basically it’s their decisions. We are looking for dialogue” (Peyker 2010). 
Unsurprisingly, some African governments are still sceptical of the good 
intentions of the Europeans. The EU has its own security plan for Africa, 
embodied in the ‘EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the 
Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict’. Although the EU has 
committed itself to African ownership, it has also stated that cooperation 
between the EU and the APSA will be guided by the EU Concept, where 
appropriate, a concept that is much more militaristic than the APSA’s endemic 
functionalist role described in chapter three (European Union 2007: 5).  This 
preference for military solutions may lead to a situation in which developmental, 
governance and human security questions related to conflict cannot be 
adequately addressed by the APSA (Klingebiel et al. 2008: 83). However, given 
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the experience of the APSA’s resource-starved PSOs, this militaristic focus is 
not necessarily contradictory of the APSA’s leadership, even if it does, 
arguably, diverge from the APSA’s endemic functionalist role. 
The European Union’s relationship with the APSA is governed by several key 
documents: the Cairo EU Summit in 2000; the 2005 New Strategy for Africa; 
and the Joint Africa Europe Strategy on Peace and Security 2007. The latter 
document focuses heavily on African ownership and the principle of joint 
responsibility, stating that the relationship between the EU and Africa should be 
based upon co-management and co-responsibility (European Union 2007: 3). 
The 2005 mid-term evaluation of the Africa Peace Facility, commissioned by 
the EU, praised the APF’s practical and flexible approach, and commented that 
it “respected the principle of African ownership” (Assanvo and Pout 2007: 24). 
The EU makes available considerable supplies of financial support through the 
African Peace Facility and providing money rather than training or equipment 
ostensibly allows the APSA’s own governance structures the freedom to direct 
how external support is utilised, thereby enhancing African capacity without 
threatening African ownership. However, the reality is that there are numerous 
conditions attached to the money provided under Africa Peace Facility, which 
are determined by the EU’s own governance processes.  
The APF is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF), and the 
EU developed policies governing how money from the EDF should be spent 
during the Cotonou Agreement negotiations. The EDF is funded by member 
states directly and managed by a committee according to its financial rules. 
These rules follow the APF funds to their destination, effectively extending the 
EUs governance structures inside the APSA as in order to secure EU funding 
189 
 
via the APF, the AU must agree to abide by the regulations stipulated by the 
European Development Fund, and enforce them through its own management. 
This results in the unusual situation wherein the APSA’s management is 
enforcing policies devised by the board of an external organisation: So in 
interactionist terms the EU’s board is also part of the APSA’s board as both 
design policies which must be implemented or operationalised through the 
APSA’s management. Although the APF is specifically designed to support the 
AU’s Peace and Security Architecture, its EDF-sourced funds may not be used 
to cover military and arms expenditures, military training, technical assistance 
and so on (Pirozzi 2009: 25). In this way, the external EU board of the APSA is 
making it more difficult for the APSA to operate as its ownership intends, or 
may even constitute an interactionist element of EU ownership of the APSA to 
go along with the funding which the EU provides (i.e. the EU has ‘bought-in’ to 
the APSA corporation). Moreover, the APSA’s management structures may not 
necessarily think that they are good policies. For example, a 2010 AU report 
criticised the EU’s “’one-size-fits all’ conditionalities” such as “the need for all 
RECs/RMs to spend at least 70% of their previous APF allocations before new 
funds can be disbursed,” which raises problems for RECs with varying levels of 
absorptive capacity (African Union 2010g: 10). 
Thus, the EU forms a hazy parallel governance structure, adding a few of its 
own governance policies to those devised by the APSA’s own board. Of course, 
the APSA’s endemic functionalist board has the power to refuse the EU’s 
money; however, as with development aid and foreign debt amongst individual 
African nation states, the African Union’s financial capacity problems leave it 
with little choice but to accept. This gives the EU a certain amount of influence 
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allowing the EU to help steer the APSA’s interactionist role (Klingebiel et al. 
2008: 54).  
Many Africans have expressed concern over such practices. René Kouassi, 
director of Economic Affairs at the AUC, recently indicated that he hoped that 
the European Union would “reformulate its cooperation policy with Africa” 
drawing inspiration from the Chinese policy, which provides no strings attached 
development aid for African states (Sicurelli 2010). 
Klingebiel et al. (2008: 82-83) suggest that external donors have preferences 
not necessarily shared by the African functionalist ‘owners’, and that they can 
target their financial support to ensure that the APSA is working on specific 
areas more than others. It is a policy of the EU’s board that the EU cannot, and 
should not, be responsible for funding all the APSA’s programmes, and that the 
responsibility for funding areas of the APSA that the APF cannot cover lies with 
other external partners, including EU member states (Peyker 2010). However, 
rather than letting the APSA’s own functionalist board decide where EU support 
is targeted, the EU, as part of the interactionist board, has an equal say in the 
allocation of APF funds through the APF Committee. In this way the EU can 
have a significant impact on agenda setting and prioritisation in the APSA—one 
of the most important elements of governance.  
In particular, Klingebiel et al. are concerned about what they term the “donors’ 
darling” of military capacity. They suggest that hard-power issues may be being 
over-funded at the expense of developmental, governance and human security 
issues, which may not be addressed as a result (Klingebiel et al. 2008: 82-83). 
For example, the APF was established in 2004 with €250 million; eighty percent 
of that money was earmarked for APSA PSOs (Mpyisi 2009: 7). Mpyisi and 
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others suggest that by focusing on military projects like the African Standby 
Force rather than strengthening domestic political institutions, the APSA’s 
external partners, and the EU in particular, are shaping the role of the APSA 
into something much more militarily focused than the endemic functionalist role 
would indicate (Mpyisi 2009: 8). Scarce resources have been funnelled into 
‘special-interest’ initiatives such as the creation of an AU Anti-Terrorism Centre 
(Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 149). External partners, including the EU and 
the UN, have remade the role of the APSA in their own image. “As a result, a 
notable dichotomy has developed between how Africans think about the 
concept of ‘African security’ and how non-Africans think about it” (Franke and 
Esmenjaud 2008: 149). 
The EU member states’ individual interests also have come into play, 
influencing the APSA by lobbying for specific EU governance policies. For 
example, the United Kingdom’s traditional influence in Zimbabwe has motivated 
it to spearhead the European Union’s anti-Mugabe policies. In the run-up to the 
2007 EU-AU summit in Lisbon, the UK lobbied hard to have Zimbabwe 
excluded from the summit, prompting criticism from Alpha Konaré, who 
characterised Zimbabwe as a problem for “Africans themselves” and urged the 
EU to focus on the summit agreements instead of interfering in African politics 
(Sicurelli 2010).  
As the Prodi Report explains: “Much has been said about the principle of 
African ownership over the development of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture. Yet it is difficult to achieve ownership by augmenting the African 
Union Commission with external support. Ownership will only be achieved 
through the development of home-grown structures and procedures supported 
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by effective mechanisms for funding” (United Nations 2008a). As the principle 
source of much of that external funding, the EU plays a major part in shaping 
the role of the APSA. 
UN Governance of the APSA (Intrusive Governance) 
As the previous chapter showed, the United Nations has a wide-ranging 
operational and legal partnership with the AU, as well as being a major source 
of support for capacity enhancement. This comprehensive relationship naturally 
brings with it many opportunities for the UN to affect the interactionist role of the 
APSA through its effect on the APSA’s governance, which will be evaluated in 
the following sections. Because the United Nations governance of the APSA 
takes place on more levels than that of other external partners, this section will 
look at these levels separately; first examining the formal relationship between 
the UN and the APSA, then it will look at influence gained through the provision 
of support. It will then discuss operational control, concluding with an 
examination of how the UN influences the APSA through agenda setting. 
The Formal Relationship between the UN and the APSA 
The APSA is considered by the UN and the AU to be a ‘Regional Organisation’ 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (United Nations 2008c: 13); this has 
significant ramifications for the interactionist role of the APSA, as regional 
organisations are generally considered to be subordinate to the UNSC. The 
United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission have worked 
together to incorporate the APSA more securely into the UN framework. The 
Prodi Report (United Nations 2008a) was the first time the UN considered using 
the UN assessed budget to support AU-led PSOs. However, this funding would 
only be available for six months, and only if the APSA were to gain UNSC 
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authorisation and were able to get the UN to agree to take over the mission. 
This practice was made a reality when the UN established a special account of 
assessed contributions to the regular budget to support the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (Browne 2011: 11). This globalisation of the APSA, and the 
adoption of UN norms and values, SOPs and operational doctrine in the 
organisation, has resulted in the APSA’s role looking less like the endemic 
functionalist vision of a framework for regional solidarity, and more like a 
regional subsidiary of the UNDPKO.  
The APSA’s relationship with the United Nations is largely governed by Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter (1945). Article 54 requires the APSA, as a regional 
arrangement, to report to the UNSC, which it has done, reinforcing the 
hierarchy. Importantly, Article 53 of the UN Charter asserts UNSC supremacy 
over the APSA in the area of enforcement action: “no enforcement action shall 
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorisation of the Security Council” (United Nations 1945). Ostensibly, this 
makes the UNSC a board member in interactionist terms, giving the UNSC the 
right of veto over the policies of the APSA’s board in the area of peace and 
security; a power similar to Carver’s ‘proscription of unacceptable means’; one 
of the cornerstones of the board’s responsibilities in policy governance (Carver 
2001: 63). This is a significant level of governance coming from above the 
continental level, outside the APSA’s own governance structures. However, the 
extent to which such a veto is feasible is unclear as there is significant 
precedent for operations being granted UNSC approval retroactively. Indeed, 
one of the APSA’s comparative advantages, and a core element of its 
interactionist role is its capacity for relatively fast action. 
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In terms of interventions under Scenario 6, it can be argued that the APSA does 
not need to seek UNSC approval. The APSA’s Article 4(h) allows for a violation 
of state sovereignty in the interests of protecting civilians and it is the only legal 
basis that the APSA has for launching such missions; Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter does not extend (nor proscribe) such extensive powers to regional 
organisations (Dersso 2010: 82). This is an example of the AU creating its own 
legal space, shaping and extending its role and reinforcing the primacy of its 
own board through its legal capacity.  
The precise legal status of regional organisations relative to the United Nations 
is still evolving. For example, a recent UN resolution has given the EU Council 
president almost all the same rights at the UN as a president of a UN member 
state. In order to get support for the resolution from other regions, the EU 
suggested an amendment that extends the same rights to other regional blocs, 
including the AU, should they ask for it (Phillips 2011). This further entrenches 
the position of regional organisations within the UN system, and, in particular, 
the United Nations’ primacy over them. 
While these factors may limit African ownership in some ways, the APSA’s 
proactive engagement within the UN framework may also be seen to enable 
African ownership, enabling it to force the priorities of the AU board onto the 
agenda at the United Nations. The APSA has come under some criticism for 
pursuing its policy of non-indifference in Somalia and Darfur; taking on more of 
a burden than it had the capacity to deal with (Williams 2006). However, 
Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter clearly state that action by regional 
actors does not preclude action by the UNSC. For example, when AMISOM 
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deployed, it was with the expectation that the UN would take over the mission 
within six months, a situation explained in detail in chapter seven.  
Many APSA officials and APSA scholars have referred to its role as a ‘bridging 
force’, preparing the way for a UN mission. The UN will not deploy until there is 
a peace agreement, so the APSA’s goal is to create the necessary conditions 
for a peace agreement so that the UN has no excuse not to deploy. In the case 
of AMIS, it took the APSA four years before it could get the UN to finally enter 
the field; but even this belated response may have been a victory for the APSA, 
which was able to use its fast action on Darfur to take the moral high ground 
and force the issue high on the UN’s agenda. In this way, the APSA’s role has 
evolved and developed in relation to the United Nations, to the point that the 
organisations have become largely interdependent. 
Dependence on UN Support 
However, this legal discussion is rendered a moot point by the realities of the 
APSA’s capacity problems; the APSA may have the right to intervene without 
the support of the UNSC, but doing so would be impossible without significant 
backing from the APSA’s external partners; the UN in particular. Chapter VII, 
Article 51 of the UN Charter explains that Member States have the right to 
“collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security” (United Nations 1945). This, coupled 
with the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (African 
Union 2005a), clearly legitimises the AU’s right to respond in the interests of 
security; but it does not provide any guarantee of support from the United 
Nations for such collective action. For the UNSC to withhold material and 
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financial support for a PSO is as debilitating as withholding permission for a 
PSO. Policies of the UN board, such as the policy not to deploy a peacekeeping 
mission unless there is a peace to keep, are at odds with the APSA’s policy of 
non-indifference. However, the APSA’s dependence on UN support limits the 
APSA’s board’s freedom to act without the blessing of the United Nations’ own 
governance structures.  
UN Operational Control over the APSA 
One of the key elements of the policy governance structure is management. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the APSA’s capacity gaps in human resources 
have resulted in a heavy reliance upon UN (as well as EU and US) advisors, 
who have taken responsibility for large swathes of the day-to-day management 
of the organisation. The Declaration on the Ten-Year Capacity Building 
Program provides the legal basis for UN permanent representation at the AU 
and coordination of UN assistance to the AU (United Nations 2006c: 2). These 
UN officials, although embedded at the APSA, are still part of the UN 
governance structure, responding to governance policies from the UN as well 
as the AU. This situation facilitates further external governance, allowing the 
United Nations to shape the role of the APSA to something approximating a UN 
subsidiary: “It is not clear to what extent the AU can declare total ownership of 
the conceptualisation, design, planning and implementation of its peace 
operations, when ‘collocated’ UN personnel maintain a dominant presence in its 
affairs” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). Through this benign infiltration of the 
APSA’s management structures, the United Nations has become a significant 
part of the its interactionist governance, wielding a considerable influence on 
APSA PSOs in particular. Even before the United Nations began providing 
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support for AMIS, there had been a high level of UN involvement at the 
operational level. For example, “the AU together with UN launched an 
assessment mission to Darfur in March 2005, with the purpose of investigating 
means of strengthening AMIS. This mission did not recommend changing the 
mandate, but pointed to weaknesses in command and control capabilities and 
logistics. It also recommended a phased expansion of AMIS” (Ekengard 2008: 
20). 
The latest incarnation of this globalisation of the APSA’s management is the 
establishment of the UN/AU hybrid mission. This concept should ideally create 
a healthy synergy between the two organisations, allowing them to use the 
comparative advantages of both, as well as minimise their weaknesses. 
However, some experts urge caution, suggesting that this type of partnership 
might raise further governance issues: “Is the hybrid partnership in effect a 
hybrid form of paternalism in that AU troops and personnel will do the basic and 
dangerous work on the ground guided by the all-wise and ‘fatherly’ coterie of 
UN advisors?” (Murithi and Gueli 2008: 79). This concern is backed up by the 
statistics: by February 2009 UNAMID numbered 12,421 troops and 2,510 police 
officers, the vast majority of which were African (Møller 2009b: 15). However, 
the mission is directed by non-Africans and the mandate was drawn up by the 
UN. This represents a high level of Africanisation, without a corresponding 
increase in African control (Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 26). However, the 
heavily African aspect of the hybrid mission was part of the compromise 
agreement which formed it (Badescu and Bergholm 2009: 300). 
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Agenda Setting  
According to corporate governance theory, the capacity to set priorities is a key 
element of governance (Carver 2001: 69-70). The fact that most meetings 
between the two bodies have been chaired by the UN (usually the RCM-
A/ECA) indicates that it is the United Nations that is setting the agenda as an 
interactionist member of the board.  
The APSA’s dependence upon UN support for its PSOs and other capacity-
enhancement projects has also allowed the UN to set the capacity 
enhancement agenda. The UN gains real leverage over the APSA’s board 
through the UNSC’s ability to target financial support, encouraging growth in 
some areas while neglecting it in others. Although the United Nations is working 
for peace in Africa, its priorities, and those of key member states, are not 
always in line with those of the APSA. For example, the US, the UK and Mexico 
refused to back a UN office for Central Africa that would have provided capacity 
in preventive diplomacy despite the Under-Secretary General’s arguments that 
setting up the office would be cost-effective. The office was supported by 
African states, the UN and many external partners (United Nations 2010b: 195). 
Another problem is the UN’s NEPAD-centric approach, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. NEPAD has lost credibility in many quarters within Africa:  
“Critics of NEPAD argue that the programme relies heavily on a neoliberal 
market economy framework which, analysts argue, keeps Africa from 
developing and is therefore a part of the problem. Programmes that compel 
governments to repay their unsustainable and odious debts instead of 
investing in the health care and education of their people will only serve to 
reinforce Africa’s dependency and underdevelopment” (Murithi 2009: 9). 
However, these same neoliberal leanings have made NEPAD popular in the 
West, and the UN adopted NEPAD as the framework for all its support to Africa. 
UN documents reference NEPAD at least as frequently as the AU, frequently 
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using the blanket phrase ‘the AU and its NEPAD programme’. As the preceding 
phrase implies, NEPAD is subordinate to the African Union; however, the UN 
had for some time dealt with NEPAD as the overriding African interlocutor of 
continental integration and development. 
The relationship between the UN and the APSA may well be at risk of 
becoming a different kind of donor-recipient relationship; both organisations 
acknowledge the United Nations’ ultimate responsibility for peace and security 
in Africa, however, the division of labour is not clear; does the relationship 
mean “complementing UN activities [or] delegating the responsibility for peace 
support operations to regional arrangements” (Haastrup 2011)? The APSA was 
established in no small part as a result of the UN’s limited progress on the 
continent; in particular its failures in Rwanda, Somalia and Darfur. In this sense, 
one element of the role of the APSA is to do the jobs in Africa for which the UN 
holds primary responsibility but has, so far, been incapable of carrying out. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how important the role of governance has been in 
shaping the interactionist role of the APSA. It obvious that governance affects 
the role played by an organisation; however, in its attempt to document the 
exact effects of governance on the interactionist role of the APSA, the chapter 
was met with a serious obstacle; there are no techniques available to 
systematically and objectively chart the effects of governance upon an 
organisation. As a result, the chapter has blended concepts from global 
governance theory with Policy Governance from the field of Business Studies, 
and in so doing develop a version of policy governance, which does 
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problematise governance and track the effects of governance on an 
organisation, which can be applied to International Relations.   
This chapter has suggested that ordinary Africans do not have ownership of the 
APSA; indeed, in some cases, the elements of the interactionist ownership may 
be extra-continental. The straightforward African ownership discussed in the 
treaty framework is far from the reality of the APSA’s complex governance 
structures. The African people, the endemic functionalist owners of the AU 
project, are almost completely silent in the APSA. Their will is supposedly 
interpreted by the African Union Assembly, with some help from a very loose 
relationship with civil society groups such as the African Union Civil Society 
Forum. In functionalist terms, the Assembly represents the APSA’s ownership; 
however, it is not unified, and represents many diverse and conflicting interests 
as well as states of varying capacity and motivation. The constant compromise 
required to pass legislation has had a conservative effect on the role of the 
APSA, limiting radical changes such as the Libyan-proposed amendments to 
the Founding Treaty.  
For the most part, the APSA’s board, the PSC, is left to rule. However, it does 
not govern alone. The PSC is not the only source of governance policies, 
norms, values, objectives and interdictions. Through conditional aid and legal 
restrictions, the European Union and the United Nations have been able to 
permeate the APSA’s governance structures, coercing the APSA into following 
policies that have been devised by the boards of external organisations. These 
policies are not always in accordance with the African governments’ wishes. 
At the management level, the AU’s governance structures have been 
influenced and controlled by external powers through the placement of advisors 
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and liaison officers who are in the pay of external organisations and nation 
states. Although these advisors may be imperative for capacity enhancement, 
they are influencing the way the APSA’s management is conducted, making the 
APSA more similar to the organisations it is working with.  
All these different and often competing factors have to be taken into account 
when conceptualising the over-all governance of the APSA; a combined effort 
with many different actors involved, resulting in an interactionist role which is 
slowly globalising, increasingly military-focused, on the front-line, highly 
Africanised, but with an integral element of external governance. In 
interactionist terms, the APSA’s governance is thoroughly multi-continental: The 
owners consist of a few powerful African states, as well as external partners 
who are prepared to provide considerable financial support which buys them 
influence; namely the US, the EU and the UN. The board consists mainly of the 
PSC, but is supplemented with elements of the United States Congress, the EU 
Council of Ministers and the UN Security Council, all of which make policies 
related to their support packages which have to be operationalised by the 
APSA’s management, which itself, is filled with experts, specialists and advisors 
from the US, the EU and especially the UN, supplementing the work done by 




Chapter Seven: The APSA’s Operational Environment 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the experiences of the APSA’s three Peace Support 
Operations (PSOs), as well as the experiences of the AU-backed peace 
enforcement mission: Operation Democracy in the Comoros. It seeks to 
achieve three key outcomes: 1) it will provide a preliminary outline of the role 
being played by the APSA in Africa’s regional security environment, highlighting 
key patterns in the evolution of the role of the APSA over the course of the four 
missions. 2) The most important objective of this chapter is to begin to explain 
why and how the APSA has played the role that it has in these mission 
environments; in particular, it will focus on how major developments in the 
African security environment have shaped and moulded the interactionist role 
played by the APSA; presenting the APSA variously with severe challenges and 
unique opportunities, which serve as limiting and enabling factors of the 
interactionist role of the APSA. 3) The chapter also intends to give a preliminary 
examination of how all the limiting and enabling factors, including the stresses 
of the regional security environment, have come together to impede, facilitate or 
expand the role played by the APSA. 
The chapter will examine the four missions in the chronological order of their 
authorisation, allowing the chapter to highlight key themes and to identify 
patterns in the evolution of the APSA’s role over time. The chapter commences 
with a discussion of the evolution of the role played by the African Union 
Mission in Burundi (AMIB); it will continue with an in-depth look at the role 
played by the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), followed by an 
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examination of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and 
concluding with the AU-backed Operation Democracy in the Comoros. 
The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
The African Union’s first Peace Support Operation (PSO), AMIB, deployed as a 
response to the December 2002 ceasefire between the Transitional 
Government of Burundi and Colonel Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye’s faction of 
the National Council for the Defence of Democracy/Forces for the Defence of 
Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The agreement heralded the beginning of the 
arduous peace process after almost a decade of civil war. However, Burundi 
was still not fully secure; not all rebel factions were party to the agreement—the 
highly destructive Agathon Rwasa faction of the Forces Nationales de 
Libération (FNL) remained outside the negotiations and the conflict lingered on 
until 2005 (Rodt 2011: 9). While the Arusha Agreement had envisaged that the 
peace process in Burundi would be supported by a UN mission, continuing 
violent clashes meant that the UN was unable to play a lead role. More 
importantly, there were signs that one of the main rebel groups, Pierre 
Nkrunzisa’s faction of the CNDD-FDD, was losing patience with the UN 
Security Council, whose ambivalence towards the peace process in Burundi 
contrasted unfavourably with the AU’s enthusiasm. Perhaps as a result, the 
December 2002 peace agreement called for an African mission to verify and 
control the ceasefire agreement (Jackson 2006: 7). In this way, the APSA’s role 
in Burundi was in part a reaction to the vacuum left by the United Nations, 
which was not capable of fulfilling its role as the leading force behind the peace 
process; and was made all the more urgent by the presence of Burundian rebel 
groups in the ongoing conflict in Kivu Sud in the DRC. AMIB was approved 
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before the launch of the PSC by the seventh ordinary session of the old Central 
Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
on the 3rd of February 2003 (African Union 2003a: 1).  
AMIB contained troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa, Burkina Faso, 
Gabon, Mali, Togo and Tunisia, and when it was fully deployed, it consisted of 
3,335 personnel (Rodt 2011: 9). The endemic functionalist role of AMIB, as 
expressed in its mandate, was based on four key objectives: to supervise the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreements (Arusha Accords, the October 
2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the December 2002 Ceasefire Agreement); to 
support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on the 
reintegration of combatants; to strive towards ensuring conditions for the 
presence of a UN peacekeeping mission; and to contribute to political and 
economic stability in Burundi. The Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the military 
component were based on reactive self-defence (African Union 2003b: 2).  
Although it was never explicitly stated, one of the key interactionist roles played 
by the embryonic APSA in Burundi was that of first responder. The APSA 
deployed in early April 2003, not long (especially by UN standards) after the 
December 2002 peace agreement, against a backdrop of continuing outbreaks 
of violence, with considerable pressure from the government of Burundi and the 
international community to show that this peace process was moving along on 
the ground, and that something was being done (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 64). In partnership with the Multi-Country Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme (MDRP) of the World Bank, AMIB was able to 
establish a highly effective Joint Planning Group to oversee the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) , which remained operational 
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throughout the UN PKO that replaced AMIB (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 
2010: 54). AMIB also established the DDR cantonment area at Muyange in 
June/July as a response to this pressure, showing that the peace process was 
being implemented, and CNDD-FDD and FNL forces, emerging from their 
operational theatres both inside and outside the country, were assembled and 
disarmed by AMIB forces on the ground (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 
64).  
The disarmament process, originally envisaged as part of the APSA’s 
responsibilities in Burundi, was begun by AMIB, but was transferred to the 
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004, along with responsibility 
for providing security for the disarmament points (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 59). It was clear from the early stages of the mission that 
AMIB was never going to be able to complete the DDR process alone, and from 
the start it acted more like a stop-gap measure. The Joint Operations Plan 
(JOP), which was to act as a Memorandum of Understanding for the parties 
involved in the DDR process (the United Nations, the Joint Ceasefire 
Commission (JCC), the World Bank’s Multi-Country Demobilisation and 
Reintegration Programme (MDRP) and the Burundian transitional government’s 
own National Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration 
(NCDRR)), was not finalised until 9 November 2004, and the World Bank would 
not allocate the required funding for the MDRP until the JOP had been agreed 
upon. This resulted in AMIB having to go outside the mission framework and 
ask the European Union for infrastructure support, food and medical supplies 
for the 228 CNDD-FDD and FNL combatants gathered at the camp, which the 
EU provided with the caveat that AMIB did not process any more combatants 
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until the main mission began—actively (though not entirely successfully) trying 
to limit the role of AMIB to match its limited resources.  
In its early years, although the APSA always saw itself as part of the global 
peace and security architecture, the APSA struggled to develop interoperability 
with other organisations, especially the UN, limiting its role in this area. The AU 
efforts on the ground were not always fully understood or recognised by the 
UN, and as a result, work done by the APSA was not fully capitalised on and 
incorporated into the UN’s strategy. For example, when the JOP was agreed 
upon later in the year, the AMIB DDR assembly area at Muyange was left out of 
the official list of pre-disarmament assembly areas until much later, when it was 
taken over by the UN and renamed Bubanza (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 
2010: 64). Interoperability and even interdependence between the UN and the 
APSA would develop over the course of the APSA’s subsequent missions 
however, eventually becoming an integral aspect of its endemic functionalist 
role. 
A further limiting factor on AMIB’s role was the continuing low-level conflict in 
the mission environment, a natural symptom of early-phase peace support, 
which forced AMIB’s role to evolve in a more military-focused direction, 
becoming fast and flexible in the face of such difficult conditions. Throughout 
2003, in spite of the previous peace agreements, low-intensity fighting 
continued between the government forces and Nkurunzisa’s CNDD-FDD 
faction, which was pillaging supplies from the civilian population. The continuing 
violence in Bujumbura Rural and around Bujumbura itself prevented the UN 
from assisting (Jackson 2006: 8), so between August 2003 and January 2004, 
EU-funded GTZ food deliveries to Ruyigi, Makamba and Bubanza were 
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successfully protected by AMIB forces (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 
65). APSA peace operations have always been involved in fighting, and the 
Muyange camp came under attack by an unknown force in civilian clothes at 
the end of July 2004, which was successfully repulsed by South African AMIB 
peacekeepers, resulting in at least eight dead attackers (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 65). This incident highlighted how the unpredictable and 
violent nature of early-phase peace operations in Africa forced AMIB’s role to 
evolve beyond the reactive self-defence RoE of its endemic functionalist role, 
embracing an interactionist role with a small protection mandate. AMIB proved 
itself capable of defending itself and conducting operations effectively in a 
hostile environment. 
In order to enable the deployment of the UN mission, and fulfil its bridging role, 
AMIB began a reconnaissance mission in November 2003 to locate suitable 
areas for pre-disarmament assembly areas and demobilisation centres. AMIB 
located two potential sites, but was unable to begin preparing them as the 
government of Burundi delayed consent for their use (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 66). This delaying tactic can be seen as a form of external 
governance employed by the government of Burundi to shape, in this case to 
limit, the role played by the APSA. The Burundian government’s capacity to 
shape, or steer the role of the APSA in this way is enabled by the leverage it 
gains through the APSA’s requirement of consent to deploy (unless the mission 
were to deploy under Article 4 (h) where consent is not required), which in turn 
affords the government the power to withhold consent in total or in part.  
The role of AMIB was also limited by a lack of the force-strength required to 
guarantee security in the assembly areas after the main phase of the assembly 
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began, culminating in 21,000 combatants in 11 camps. Security was provided 
by the government and the armed groups themselves, which remained armed 
during the pre-disarmament phase for their own safety; AMIB focused on 
monitoring the implementation of the JOP (Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 
2010: 66).  
With all the combatants moved into the pre-disarmament camps awaiting 
processing, and the peace process well on its way, the UNSC approved the 
deployment of ONUB, under Chapter VII, in resolution 1545 on 21 May 2004 
(Boshoff, Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 75). ONUB was supposed to have a 
military component of 5,650 personnel, but experienced problems with force 
generation due to a lack of member state interest. The core of ONUB was 
provided by the 2,612 AMIS troops already deployed in the country (Boshoff, 
Vrey and Rautenbach 2010: 77), and South Africa’s Major General Derrik 
Mgwebi, AMIB’s Force Commander, remained in Burundi as Force Commander 
of ONUB (Jackson 2006: 13). In addition, the South African VIP Protection 
Force, which provided security to rebel leaders to allow them to participate in 
the peace process safely, remained in Burundi as the UN was not capable of 
incorporating this function into its mission, despite the integral role the VIP 
Protection Force played, and was continuing to play in enabling the peace 
process, without which the UN could never have deployed (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 69). 
Conclusion 
Burundi highlights the APSA’s role as a bridging force; AMIB deployed two 
years sooner then the UN was able to, and, far from being a mere token force, 
it held its own, providing security and laying the groundwork for the DDR 
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process, completing the pre-disarmament assembly phase before the ONUB 
was operational. More importantly, AMIB’s VIP security force was able to 
guarantee the safety of the leadership of the CNDD-FDD, enabling it to 
participate in the peace process fully, including briefing it about the JOP and 
taking its considerations into account– a task that was outside the capacity of 
the UN, but was imperative for the signing of the peace agreement which led to 
the UN’s deployment to Burundi.  
However, the limiting factors underlined in the chapter four came into play, 
especially a lack of funds, a lack of expertise, and a lack of critical equipment 
and logistics; AMIB depended on external partners for much of these. The 
realities of the situation on the ground showed that AMIB’s chronic lack of funds 
was a serious obstacle; while it wasn’t able to provide food for the assembled 
combatants, it was able to successfully lobby the EU to do so, all the while 
pressing for a UN mission to take over responsibility for the peace process in 
Burundi. This highlighted the fact that AMIB was not a long term solution, and 
was clearly incapable of executing the full DDR process alone, but its mere 
presence on the ground contributed towards an environment conducive to 
peace, and acted as a focal point for external support (Boshoff, Vrey and 
Rautenbach 2010: 69). The APSA is not playing the role of a surrogate UN in 
Africa, and can not be expected to ‘solve’ regional security problems alone. Its 
role is that of an enabling force for the UN, not a replacement for it. 
When the ONUB force was finally approved, it did not fully replace AMIB, but 
augmented it, utilising many of the facilities and institutions set up by the AU 
rather than deploying fresh troops and setting up new processes. As a result, 
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ONUB was able to begin its work immediately, instead of waiting for the slow 
process of force generation to be completed. 
Of all the African Union’s Peace Support Operations, Burundi has been the 
least unusual, and one of the most successful. The real outcomes of the 
mission correspond very closely to the stated mission objectives outlined in the 
mission’s mandate at the ninety-first ordinary session of the Central Organ of 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention. More importantly, the regional security 
environment had a significant effect on the role played by the organisation; for 
example, the incorporation of a VIP protection force reflected both the unstable 
nature of the early phase of the peace process in which AMIB deployed, filled 
with major spoilers and punctuated with violence between the peace agreement 
signatories, as well as the transnational nature of the Great Lakes conflict 
formation, which required the main rebel leaders to return to the country from 
their rear-bases in DRC. Although the APSA successfully anticipated this 
eventuality, this still shows the how the unique security environment into which 
the APSA deployed helped shape the role it played; it was the role of a faster, 
more involved, more flexible, and more ad-hoc organisation—one focused on 
making peace in Burundi, not simply protecting a pre-existing peace. As a 
result, the mission was not particularly well planned, supported nor well 
equipped, making transition to UN authority over the mission an absolute 
necessity, rather than a preference. This trade-off has helped to define the role 
played by the APSA throughout its short history, as a rapid reaction 
peacemaking force, laying the foundations for a UN PKO. 
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African Union Monitoring Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) and its 
Successors 
Although the interactionist role of AMIB corresponded quite closely to the 
endemic functionalist role outlined in its initial mandate, the APSA’s role during 
its second mission, the African Union Monitoring Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) 
was forged in the fires of enduring conflict. AMIS and its subsequent 
incarnations have received more criticism than any other APSA peace support 
operation, much of which can be attributed to external frustration with the 
continued interruptions of the peace process and the APSA’s inability to prevent 
them. AMIS’s role in Darfur has been moulded and shaped by the changeable 
security environment in the region, requiring major adjustments to the role 
played by AMIS based on these changes. These adjustments have often been 
interpreted as the APSA always being one step behind the realities on the 
ground; however, they could also be seen as evidence of the APSA’s role as a 
flexible first responder, continually responding to the evolving situation. 
AMIS was established in 2004 largely as a response to the lack of action on the 
deteriorating situation in Darfur by the UN and the international community 
(Aboagye 2007). Before the deployment of AMIS, the AU had been involved in 
the push for a peace agreement, including facilitating shuttle diplomacy in 
N’Djamena. The government of Sudan was insistent that the conflict could not 
be solved militarily, but only through dialogue (African Union 2004f: 4). On 8 
April 2004, under the auspices of President Déby of Chad and the Chairperson 
of the AU Commission, as well as in the presence of international observers 
and facilitators, the conflict parties signed a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
on the Darfur Conflict and a Protocol on the Establishment of Humanitarian 
Assistance in Darfur (HCFA) (African Union 2004f: 5). The following month, on 
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28 May, the ailing HCFA was supported by the signing of the Agreement with 
the Sudanese Parties on the Modalities for the Establishment of the Ceasefire 
Commission and the Deployment of Observers in the Darfur, which acted as a 
mandate for the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and the early stages of AMIS,  
authorising the deployment of two MILOBS teams for each of the initial six 
operational sectors. The 28 May agreement also made provision for a 
protection force to guarantee the safety of the observers in the event that the 
signatories to the HCFA were unable to do so (African Union 2004a). 
AMIS, therefore, started off as little more than an observer mission to ensure 
the HCFA was being implemented. The mission was planned to be similar to 
AMIB, though a little more comprehensive, with the APSA taking responsibility 
for more of the peace process than it had in Burundi. However, the realities of 
the security environment on the ground soon meant that the role of AMIS would 
have to change. From the start, the HCFA was ignored by all the conflict 
parties. There was little point in an observer mission to monitor a peace 
agreement that was not being honoured. The increase in violence forced the 
APSA to bring in the protection force mentioned in the HCFA document; by 
August, the AU Monitoring Mission was reinforced with two infantry companies. 
The Rwandan company (A-Coy) arrived in the mission area on 14 and 15 
August 2004, while the Nigerian company (B-Coy) arrived on 30 August 2004. 
Nigeria also provided two sections (about 16 soldiers) as a Quick Reaction 
Force attached to the CFC HQ. Both companies arrived with the necessary 
equipment (African Union 2004d: 6). 
AMIS deployed to Darfur to oversee the implementation of the HCFA, which 
was not a comprehensive ceasefire, let alone an end to the conflict; it was 
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merely a ceasefire in specific civilian centres to allow the provision of 
humanitarian aid, and the HCFA was not replaced with a more comprehensive 
agreement until the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006. The Protection 
Force was intended to protect the MILOBS, not the whole civilian population of 
Darfur, while the role of the mission was to monitor the implementation of the 
HCFA, which it did successfully. The problem was simply that the ceasefire did 
not hold, which cannot be said to be the fault of the APSA. Although there may 
be an argument to be made that it was too early to deploy MILOBS at all, the 
monitoring mission and the Protection Force got the international community’s 
foot in the door and had a positive effect on the situation disproportionate to its 
endemic functionalist role and mandate. 
As the HCFA became less relevant, AMIS began organically adapting the 
mission’s interactionist role to the realities on the ground, putting the emphasis 
on the protection force and taking on a more militaristic role as a response to 
the deterioration of the peace process but, with 310 soldiers on the ground by 
October 10th (African Union 2004d: 6), AMIS was at the limit of its mandate. 
Although the mission was only mandated for the protection of civilians within 
the direct vicinity of AU forces, and within the capacity of the Protection Force, 
the Rwandan company in particular pushed the limits of the reactive self-
defence RoE, deliberately moving to areas of instability to discourage attacks 
and protect civilians, frequently putting their own soldiers in harm’s way. 
Proactive deployment of this type, pioneered by the Rwandans, would 
eventually become a core part of the role played by both AMIS and the 
subsequent hybrid operation. However, in a region the size of France, there 
was a limit to what the two-company Protection Force could achieve. 
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The October 2004 report of the Chairperson of the Joint Commission was 
largely concerned with how best to enhance the effectiveness of AMIS on the 
ground, “including the possibility of transforming the said Mission into a full-
pledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite mandate and size, to ensure 
the effective implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 
April 2004” (African Union 2004d: 1). In the ensuing consultations, the conflict 
parties displayed a high degree of faith in the APSA, asking for AMIS to be 
strengthened in order to increase the effectiveness of the monitoring mission 
(African Union 2004d: 3). The conflict parties also wanted Sudanese 
government police and military stationed in Darfur to be replaced with AMIS 
personnel (African Union 2004d: 4). 
A new problem emerged in 2005, as the Sudanese government began limiting 
AMIS’s capacity to use preventative deployments to protect civilians through 
bureaucratic obstructionism: rather than restricting its protection force to 
defending the MILOBS and civilians/humanitarian personnel in the direct 
vicinity, as the mandate required, AMIS requested accommodation for troops 
who were to be deployed to the rebel-held towns of Nteaga and Khor Abeche 
as a proactive deployment, specifically to deter attacks. However, as a result of 
“deliberate government procrastination”, there were no AMIS troops in the 
vicinity when about 350 Miserya militiamen attacked Khor Abeche for the 
second time in three days, this time defeating the SLA and destroying the town, 
sparing only the school and the Mosque. The attack was retribution for the theft 
of 150 head of cattle by the SLA (African Union 2005b: 9). The rebel groups 
have frequently resorted to pillaging cattle in order to feed their standing 
armies, creating widespread unrest amongst the pastoralist groups; a major 
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cause of the expansion of the conflict in Darfur from a civil war to endemic 
instability verging on state-failure. 
As an interim measure, to deal with this increase in violence, the APSA 
increased the number of MILOBs to 80, while at the same time doubling the 
protection force to four infantry companies that were to be deployed 
immediately (African Union 2004b). Meanwhile, the Military Staff Committee of 
the PSC was working out a plan to establish a much larger AU force, which 
would have a much larger presence on the ground (African Union 2004d). At its 
17th meeting, held on 20 October 2004, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
decided that an enhanced African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), 
consisting of 3,320 personnel, would be deployed in Darfur for a period of one 
year (African Union 2006c: 1). A joint assessment of AMIS, presented to the 
PSC on 28 April 2005 requested a further expansion of the mission to 6,171 
military personnel and 1,560 police, with a budget of $466 million (Boshoff 
2005: 57). The same assessment punctuated the need for this expansion of the 
mission with reports of “deliberate targeting and firing at AMIS personnel and 
equipment, lately, by unidentified gunmen” (African Union 2005b: 8). By 28 April 
2005, having being deployed for less than a year, AMIS had suffered five such 
attacks, the first of many, and the SLA were implicated in some of these attacks 
(African Union 2005b: 9). Further, there were continuing attacks on civilians, 
commercial convoys and humanitarian organisations, and Darfur’s few working 
roads were (and remain) infested with janjaweed bandits (criminals not 
attached to any particular faction in the conflict), making the provision of 
humanitarian aid extremely difficult and impeding the peace process (African 
Union 2005b: 28). The AMIS mandates always stressed that responsibility for 
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protecting civilians in Darfur was not with AMIS, but with the Government of 
Sudan; however, by this stage, it was becoming clear that Khartoum lacked the 
capacity to enforce order in Darfur: “The assumptions on which the Mission was 
planned, particularly the ability of the Government of Sudan to assume its 
security responsibilities and the general level of compliance with the Ceasefire 
Agreement have not been borne out” (African Union 2005b: 25). 
A further limiting factor emerged around this time as it became clear that rebel 
leaders were never able to fully control or represent all affiliated groups; on 24 
February 2005, fighters from a Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) splinter 
group, the National Movement for Reconstruction and Development (NMRD), 
kidnapped seven humanitarian workers operating in El Geneina who were 
distributing food to IDPs, and shot at clearly marked UN World food Programme 
helicopters operating in SLA territory (African Union 2005b: 26). 
AMIS planners warned that the dynamics of the military operation had changed 
considerably. For AMIS to succeed, they argued, there was an increasing need 
for it to adopt a much more proactive role (African Union 2005b: 26). The Joint 
Commission recommended that the AMIS infantry companies be replaced with 
battalions with the attendant military capabilities to enable AMIS to fill the 
sovereignty vacuum left by the government of Sudan (African Union 2005b: 14). 
The 2005 Assessment Mission stressed that there was no need to change the 
existing mandate, but that AMIS would have to reprioritise; with the ceasefire in 
a precarious way, AMIS needed to place greater emphasis on creating a secure 
environment, particularly in the context of the delivery of humanitarian relief, 
and confidence-building measures. However, as seen above, AMIS had already 
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organically shifted its priorities towards this end to a large extent on its own 
initiative (African Union 2005b: 25).  
AMIS was becoming much more militarised. While the endemic functionalist 
role had not changed (the mandate remained essentially the same), the 
interactionist role of the Protection Force shifted from protecting MILOBS to 
protecting civilians, contractors and aid workers.  AMIS was now taking some of 
the responsibility for protection of civilians in Darfur, especially IDPs, away from 
the government. The CFC ordered the government to withdraw from certain 
towns in Darfur, to be replaced with AMIS military and police forces (African 
Union 2005b: 15). The government withdrew from Labado on the 23 January 
2005, and Ishma on 24 March, and Graidai on 11 March (although a police 
company was left in the town), transferring control to AMIS. After AMIS 
replaced government forces in Labado, IDPs from the area began to return 
home, showing greater confidence in the APSA forces than those of the 
government or rebel groups; when security was restored, IDPs were prepared 
to return, and the security provided by AMIS facilitated the provision of 
humanitarian aid. Similar improvements have occurred wherever AMIS was 
deployed, including the capital cities of the three provinces of Darfur, where 
security provided by AMIS facilitated the provision of humanitarian aid to the 
hundreds of thousands of IDPs which had gathered in those areas (African 
Union 2005b: 16). Also, throughout Darfur, AMIS CIVPOL units were working 
with the national police to help it shoulder its responsibilities for security in the 
villages and IDP camps (African Union 2005b: 26). The APSA’s role in Darfur 
was changing from monitoring the ceasefire to trying to protect civilians from 
the ongoing conflict—a huge conceptual change in the purpose of the mission. 
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The biggest problem was that AMIS simply was not large enough to provide 
security for all the six million residents of Darfur, yet it had already grown to the 
point that it was struggling to support itself. 
Since its inception, AMIS had been pushing at the limits of the mandate, but 
from the end of 2005 the limiting factors of the local security environment began 
to push back harder, constraining its role. AMIS troops were attacked again on 
8 October 2005, near Khor Abeche, resulting in the deaths of four Nigerian 
peacekeepers and two PAE drivers; on 29 October, an AMIS patrol was 
attacked by a JEM splinter group which made off with AMIS vehicles, weapons 
and ammunition (African Union 2006c: 11). Another attack on 6 January 2006 
claimed the life of an AMIS soldier when a patrol returned from a successful 
PAE escort mission (African Union 2006c: 12). Meanwhile, attacks on civilians 
and aid workers operating in and near rebel held territory increased and 
escalated, and there were several attacks by Arab militias and Janjaweed, 
sometimes coinciding with government assaults on SLA positions, resulting in 
over 400 civilians fleeing to the AMIS controlled IDP camps at Zamzam and 
Tawilla (African Union 2006c: 10). Ethnic conflict came to the fore during this 
period, with the SLA being split along ethnic lines, the Zaghwa factions 
becoming particularly aggressive, as well as continued fighting between Fallata 
and Masselit, which caused the deaths of 60 people between 6-7 November 
and displaced 15,000 (African Union 2006c: 12). 
Further, the expanded deployment of AMIS was putting significant pressure on 
the mission’s logistics; some of the AMIS camps were becoming overcrowded 
because of the rapid increase in the number of troops, and, by January 2006, 
AMIS was working with half the logistical capacity required for a mission its size 
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as it waited for orders to be fulfilled for 462 vehicles, 50 high-frequency mobile 
radios, 544 hand-held radios, 245 Thurya satellite phones and 16 VSATs 
(African Union 2006c: 13). A 2006 report by the Chairperson of the Commission 
highlighted that the AU has neither the logistical infrastructure nor the 
experience to handle urgent bulk purchases, worth millions of dollars, for such a 
large operation (African Union 2006c: 15). The mission was almost bankrupt by 
January 2006; despite the ample pledges of financial support from external 
partners, there was a huge shortfall in real contributions. The cash requirement 
for the enhanced AMIS for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006 
amounted to US $252.4 million, representing 54% of the total budget; the 
amount received up to 31 October 2005 was only US $ 65.4 million. Much of 
the shortfall was made up by the Africa Peace Facility, which helped keep the 
mission on its feet throughout 2006 (African Union 2006c: 16). 
The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was an attempt to move forward 
from the ill-fated HCFA, and establish a more comprehensive peace; however, 
the DPA fared little better: only the government and Minni Minawi’s faction of 
the SLA/M signed the agreement, rendering it effectively useless, and 
subsequent talks the following year in Tripoli in October also failed (Murithi and 
Gueli 2008: 77). Representatives of the Abdulwahid El Nour faction of the SLA 
and Khalil Ibrahim, representing JEM did sign a Declaration of Commitment to 
the DPA, and pledged to fully cooperate in the implementation of the DPA’s 
provisions, but were simultaneously condemned by the PSC for continuing to 
conduct military activities in Darfur and eastern Chad, including attacks against 
AMIS, the UN and aid workers (African Union 2006a: 1).  
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Like Burundi, AMIS ended with a transition to a UN force; however, unlike in 
Burundi, where preparing the ground for a UN mission had been part of AMIB’s 
role from the beginning, AMIS’s transition to a UN mission, or as it turned out, a 
UN/AU hybrid mission, was forced upon it by the strain placed upon its capacity 
to act by the worsening security environment and lack of external capacity 
enhancement. The logic behind the call for the United Nations to take over the 
mission was that, given the UN’s experience and vastly superior resources, a 
UN mission would succeed where the APSA had failed (Luqman and Omede 
2012: 61). 
The Peace and Security Council did not explicitly accept the idea of 
transitioning AMIS to a UN mission until January 2006—just as the first wave of 
funding was starting to run out, and the spiralling size of the mission was 
breaking the APSA’s logistics capacity (African Union 2006b). Even then, the 
UN resolution authorising the deployment of a much larger UN mission to take 
over from AMIS was delayed for over a year because the Sudanese 
government withheld consent (Luqman and Omede 2012: 65). The government 
claimed that it would not allow non-African troops to re-colonise Sudan, but it is 
commonly suggested that a weak international presence in Darfur was in the 
government’s interest. Negotiations continued, with Khartoum finally agreeing 
to the UN mission in May 2007, so long as it was African in character, with 
mostly African peacekeepers (Lynch 2007). Thus, the first UN/AU hybrid 
mission was, from its inception, shaped by the exigencies and intricacies of the 
security environment and the peace process in Darfur.  
The transition from AMIS to UNAMID was not part of the endemic functionalist 
role of the mission; preparing the ground for UNAMID was a role forced upon 
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the mission by the security environment; AMIS could not continue and UNAMID 
was the only viable exit strategy. By the middle of 2007, even Alpha Konaré 
was saying that AMIS was on the verge of collapse, dogged by government 
harassment, escalating attacks by the rebels—including more attacks against 
AMIS—and beleaguered peacekeepers going unpaid for months as a result of 
external partners not making good on pledges. Further, the continuing 
escalation of the security situation, including renewed government air strikes, 
was making AMIS adopt a less proactive approach, with fewer patrols. Rwanda 
and Senegal even threatened to withdraw their forces altogether unless 
external support for the mission increased (Lynch 2007). 
On 31 July 2007, the UN passed resolution 1769, authorizing the Deployment 
of a 26,000-strong United Nations-African Union ‘hybrid’ peace operation to 
take the necessary action to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace 
Agreement, as well as to protect its personnel and civilians “without prejudice to 
the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (UNSC 2007c). On the 31 
December 2007, AMIS peacekeepers swopped their APSA green helmets for 
UN blue ones, officially launching the United Nations-African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) (Jibril 2010: 10). AMIS, enhanced by the light and heavy 
support packages from the UN (discussed in chapter five), prepared the ground 
for UNAMID, and formed the majority of its troops. UNAMID has continued 
AMIS’s trend of increasing in size and becoming more militarised as the 
security situation shows little sign of improving; it consisted of 18,014 military 
personnel and 1,751 civilian police as of 30 June 2011 (African Union 2011e: 




The experience of UNAMID highlights how important the security environment 
is in defining the role played by the APSA in Africa, and that AMIS’s difficulties 
were not wholly a result of endemic capacity problems within the APSA, but a 
worsening security environment in which any PKO would soon be out of its 
depth; even with the resources and expertise of the United Nations at its 
disposal, the character of the mission has remained much the same. Although 
many of the logistical and financial problems have been solved, UNAMID still 
attracts similar criticisms to the APSA mission; this suggests that a lot of AMIS’s 
problems were not simply problems with the APSA, but were problems inherent 
in the extremely complex and challenging security environment of Darfur. In 
UNAMID’s first six months, an average of 1000 people were displaced every 
day, and attacks against aid workers actually increased; there were also more 
carjackings in the first half of 2008 than there were in the whole of 2007, which 
had a serious knock-on effect on the provision of aid outside the three main 
towns (Darfur Consortium 2008: 1-2). Even in 2012, a year after the Darfur 
Doha Document for Peace, carjacking incidents make it almost impossible to 
access Darfur by road. On 6 August 2012, a vehicle carrying $350,000 destined 
for UNAMID was stolen by gunmen in Darfur (Sudan Tribune 2012). The rebel 
movements remain fractured, and violations of the ceasefire are still common. 
Conflict is escalating with continued attacks against UNAMID patrols and open 
hostilities between the Minni Minawi faction of the SLA and the government, 
including continued aerial bombardment of SLA-held territory (Luqman and 




The APSA’s experience in Sudan shows how easy it is for the endemic 
functionalist role of the organisation to get muddled, or forgotten, and how 
different the interactionist role can be from the role initially foreseen. While 
AMIS’s initial mandate and endemic functionalist role had a very small footprint, 
its interactionist role ballooned until it was much too ambitious for the APSA 
and its partners to sustain. It is often claimed in the press, and even some of 
the scholarly work on AMIS, that the AU deployed in Darfur because of Article 
4(h), making it a Scenario 6 mission (protecting civilians against or in spite of 
their own government, without that government’s consent); “The AU 
intervention in Darfur has largely been in response to its constituent 
commitment to “... intervene in an Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assemble in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity”” (Jibril 2010: 10-11). Further, Bergholm consistently 
refers to the mandate as a ‘civilian protection mandate’, but provides no 
evidence for such an interpretation (Bergholm 2009: 160). However, as 
Bergholm acknowledges in her footnotes (Bergholm 2009: 161), the primary 
objective of AMIS was not the prevention of a genocide, but the conclusion of 
an extremely dangerous conflict. Even at its most militarised, AMIS was in 
Darfur primarily to facilitate the peace process, helping with negotiations, 
monitoring agreements, promoting confidence and discouraging violence by 
creating zones of stability. It also protected civilians where possible, and helped 
secure the large IDP and refugee camps around Abeché. A mission under 4(h) 
would have created a hostile relationship with the government. As it was, the 
APSA was in Darfur at the government’s discretion, albeit with a high level of 
international pressure. This meant that the government was able to abuse its 
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position to obstruct the mission’s progress, shaping the role and character of 
the AMIS by limiting the delivery of external support, such as the 105 APCs 
provided by Canada, which were held up in Khartoum for months. 
AMIS also showed the primary weakness of the role of the APSA as a bridging 
organisation for the UN; if the UN is not capable of deploying, the APSA is left 
to sink or swim with all its myriad capacity gaps, command and control 
problems, logistical gaps and operational weaknesses. In the case of AMIS, the 
UN/AU hybrid mission came at the 11th hour, just as it was on the verge of 
collapse. If AMIS had been forced to withdraw, there would have been no basis 
for the hybrid mission, which, as with ONUB and AMIB, relied completely upon 
AMIS for operationalisation; thus the relationship between the APSA and the 
UN is one of interdependence, not dependence. 
AMIS did not succeed in encouraging the conflict parties to stick to the HCFA 
and the DPA, but to say it was useless is not accurate. As Alex de Waal 
commented; "You don't put a force into a horribly difficult situation, where they 
are being shot at and having their soldiers killed, and then tell them that they're 
second-rate and deprive them of resources" (Lynch 2007). AMIS has been the 
only conduit for external support for the peace process; even the UN could not 
have operated effectively in Darfur without AMIS.  More importantly, AMIS 
protection has been vital for the hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees in 
core areas such as El Fashir and Abeché, and humanitarian organisations may 
not have been able to operate in Darfur at all without AMIS protection and the 
numerous agreements with the Movements and the government, largely 
negotiated by the APSA and its advisors, that have facilitated the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. Violence has certainly continued, but AMIS has been 
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operating beyond the limits of its endemic functionalist role (mandate and 
resources) from the beginning. 
The experiences of AMIS and the continued woes of UNAMID indicate that 
there is an upper limit on what it is possible to achieve with a peace mission of 
this type, the primary role of which is not, and cannot be, to guarantee order in 
the whole of Darfur, but to support the peace process and protect civilians 
where possible. To take full responsibility for the safety of civilians away from 
the government, and to live up to that responsibility to the fullest extent, would 
require the APSA to perform tasks such as shooting down planes and killing 
rebels who will not disarm; a mandate more akin to an invasion than a 
peacekeeping mission.  
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
AMIS and AMISOM are often mentioned together as part of a ‘new generation 
of African peacekeeping’; however, in conceptual terms, AMISOM is really a 
step beyond AMIS. Both missions have been described as ineffective. The 
cause of AMIS’s perceived failure was its limited mandate; AMISOM, however, 
has simply been perceived to be under siege and out of its depth. AMISOM’s 
main innovation has been breaking the peacekeeping taboo of partiality, 
fighting almost as a surrogate army for the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) against the Islamists. Therefore, unlike AMIB and AMIS, AMISOM is not 
a true peacekeeping operation in any sense of the word. However, AMISOM 
had humble beginnings, and in the early stages of the mission, Ethiopia, not the 
AU, played the leading role in supporting the TFG. 
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In February 2006, the two most powerful armed groups in the southern half of 
Somalia fought for control of Mogadishu. The fighting ended in June, with the 
victory of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) over the US-backed Alliance for the 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) (African Union 2007i: 2). 
Mogadishu was consolidated under a single political authority for the first time 
since the fall of the Barre regime. The subsequent six months have been 
described as the most peaceful and stable since the beginning of the civil war 
(Møller 2009a: 3). The UIC had considerable popular support from all segments 
of society within the areas it controlled (Barnes and Assan 2007: 159, Shank 
2007: 92). It was perceived by Somalis to be the only faction that had provided 
incorrupt administration and public services such as health care, education, 
policing, law and order and even road maintenance (Shank 2007: 98). The UIC 
had also successfully united many different clan warlords under their banner 
(Barnes and Assan 2007: 152-153). Furthermore, it had the support of 
Mogadishu’s business interests, who had consistently opposed the TFG and 
supported UIC rule in the capital (Barnes and Assan 2007: 154). Several relief 
aid organisations also expressed their preference in working with the UIC 
because of their efficient organisational structure.  
When the UIC was in control of Mogadishu, the city was united for the first time 
in 16 years (Barnes and Assan 2007: 154). The port and airport were both 
operational and under the control of the UIC, businesses boomed, there was 
security, law and order and the UIC began the repatriation of stolen property 
(Barnes and Assan 2007: 154).  There was even a massive clean-up campaign 
launched in Mogadishu, with hundreds of volunteers joining to collect litter and 
debris (BBC 2006). Despite these successes, the APSA reiterated its full 
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support for the TFG as the legitimate government of Somalia, pledging to do 
everything possible to enable it to gain control (African Union 2007i: 1). 
Replacing the popular and powerful UIC, with the weak, fractured and 
unpopular TFG was an extremely ambitious task. 
The TFG had relocated to Baidoa in February 2006 and, shortly after the UIC’s 
victory over the ARPCT in June, there were reports of UIC forces within 60km 
of Baidoa. In July, approximately 100 Ethiopian military vehicles carrying 
‘military advisors’ crossed the border from Dolo Odo and literally entrenched 
themselves in Baidoa. Ethiopia's Information Minister, Berhan Hailu, warned 
that they would use "all means ... to crush the Islamist group if they attempt to 
attack Baidoa"; the UIC in turn demanded that the Ethiopians leave, but added 
that they had no intention of attacking the TFG (BBC 2006).  
Although it harmed their credibility, the TFG was able to survive the UIC’s rise 
to power thanks to this protection force of Ethiopian troops, and talks began 
between the TFG, the UIC and other militias. On 4 September 2006, 
negotiations seemingly paid off, and the two parties signed an agreement 
where they committed themselves to the integration of the militias, to establish 
a new Somali national armed forces, and to discuss power sharing and security 
issues at a third round of talks. However, the third round never took place as a 
result of the UIC’s insistence that the TFG order the Ethiopian soldiers to leave 
the country. In October, the UIC called for a Jihad against Ethiopia and 
continued fighting against the TFG, prompting the TFG to request more support 
form Ethiopia, culminating in the full-scale Ethiopian intervention in the last 
weeks of December 2006 (African Union 2007i: 2-3). 
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The Ethiopians quickly pushed the ICU out of key areas, forcing it to retreat to 
its strongholds in the south without much of a fight. The massive Ethiopian 
presence enabled the TFG to relocate to Mogadishu, occupying the official 
government buildings for the first time (African Union 2007b: 1). The TFG 
requested the Ethiopian government to keep its troops in Somalia until the full 
stabilisation of the country and the deployment of AU troops (African Union 
2007i: 4).  
The Ethiopian invasion was seen by the APSA as a “unique and unprecedented 
opportunity to re-establish the structures of governance and further peace and 
reconciliation in Somalia” (African Union 2007i: 9). The APSA took the initiative, 
deploying a technical evaluation mission to Mogadishu from 13 to 14 January 
2007, where it undertook consultations with the TFG and Ethiopian forces 
(African Union 2007i: 6). The January 2007 report of the Chairperson of the 
Commission highlighted the vulnerability of the TFG should Ethiopia withdraw 
from Somalia, as it intended to do as soon as the situation stabilised, and 
recommended the deployment of a peace support operation of nine infantry 
battalions (approximately 7,650 military personnel) with a mandate to protect 
the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and their key infrastructure. The 
mission was also mandated to assist with the reestablishment and training of a 
new, all-inclusive Somali Security Force, to support the disarmament process, 
to monitor the security situation, and to facilitate humanitarian operations 
(African Union 2007i: 7-8). The report made explicit that the mission would 
evolve to a United Nations mission that would support the long term 
stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia (African Union 2007i: 
8)— the first time that the APSA’s evolving role as a bridging force for the UN 
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was included in the initial mandate. The mandate and operations plan outlined 
in the report was officially adopted by the PSC on 19 January 2007 (African 
Union 2007b), and endorsed under Chapter VII by the UN Security Council in 
resolution 1744, which also finally authorised a waiver to the arms embargo in 
Article 6 for arms and equipment intended for AMISOM or the TFG (UNSC 
2007b). 
Uganda was the only real supporter of the mission at the start, deploying the 
Force Headquarters in Mogadishu in March 2007, along with two infantry 
battalions (Hull and Svensson 2008: 28). The deployment of the two battalions 
pledged by Burundi was delayed because it lacked the adequate equipment; it 
eventually deployed the first 192 soldiers at the end of December, with the rest 
of the first battalion deploying by 20 January 2008, bringing the mission to 
2,613 personnel (United Nations 2008e: 5). During the intervening period, 
Uganda’s two battalions were the only APSA forces in the country (Hull and 
Svensson 2008: 28).  
Throughout 2007, AMISOM still did not play the lead role; it played the role of 
security guard, restricted largely to providing security and conducting patrols for 
the protection of the airport, seaport and the Villa Somalia (the Presidential 
Palace). Meanwhile, the security situation worsened. Within four months of the 
authorisation of AMISOM, one third of Mogadishu’s population had fled the city. 
Looting, rape and harassment of civilians by the armed militias that controlled 
vast swathes of the city went unchecked by AMISOM, as it was outside their 
responsibility and capacity (Hull and Svensson 2008: 27). Logistical problems 
were multiplied by lack of security around the airport; as AMISOM’s first troops 
arrived in Mogadishu on 6 March, the airport was mortared eight times (Mays 
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2009: 25), on 9 March 2007, a plane carrying AMISOM troops was shot at while 
landing, and later that month an AU contracted plane was shot down during 
take-off, killing 11 passengers and crewmembers (United Nations 2007b: 5). 
Further, the Islamists had recovered from the initial Ethiopian offensive. A 
Salafist paramilitary wing of the UIC, Al-Shabaab, had largely superseded the 
rest of the movement, and, from their stronghold in Hiraan and Juba districts, 
they struck out at Baidoa, Kismaayo, Jawhar, Beledweyne and Galkayo. More 
importantly, the Islamists were making gains in and around Mogadishu, and in 
the last quarter of 2007, the Ethiopians deployed indiscriminate weapons, such 
as field guns and mortars, against areas of the city that had come under the 
control of the Islamists, resulting in massive destruction of property, loss of life, 
and displacement (United Nations 2008e: 4). The use of weapons of this type 
turned public opinion further away from the TFG and its allies, further 
militarising the situation and making AMISOM’s endemic functionalist role even 
more difficult to fulfil. 
AMISOM’s role at this point was still very limited; being a much smaller force, 
AMISOM let the Ethiopians take the lead role in security, and the United 
Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, was taking the 
leading role in the peace talks. By mid-2008, peace negotiations between the 
government and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia were going well 
(United Nations 2008d: 1-2). In line with the commitments made under the 
Djibouti agreement, on 26 October 2008, members of the TFG and the Alliance 
for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) adopted a joint declaration on the 
establishment of a unity Government and an inclusive Parliament (United 
Nations 2009a: 1). In December 2008, an ARS delegation returned to 
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Mogadishu for the first time in two years. The Transitional Federal Parliament 
(TFP) was expanded by 275 seats, 200 of which were reserved for the ARS. 
The process culminated in the election of the ARS Chairman, Sheikh Sharif 
Sheikh Ahmed, as president in January 2009, who vowed to ‘extend a hand to 
hardline armed groups still opposed to peace talks (United Nations 2009a: 2). 
Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, representing the most powerful anti-government group 
in Somalia, vowed to continue the insurgency, severely limiting the 
achievements of the peace process (United Nations 2009a: 3). 
The subdued role of the APSA was shaken up when Ethiopian forces 
announced their intention to begin withdrawal from Somalia in November 2008. 
In spite of the worsening security situation, and the fact that AMISOM was still 
under half-strength, the Ethiopians chose to withdraw as a result of the 
considerable costs associated with maintaining their military presence in 
Somalia. By 15 January 2009 they had removed all their forces from Somalia, 
thrusting AMISOM into the lead role for providing security in Mogadishu (United 
Nations 2009a: 3). Shortly after the Ethiopian withdrawal, Al-Shabaab took over 
Baidoa without firing a shot (United Nations 2009a: 3). Attacks against 
AMISOM increased in intensity after the Ethiopian withdrawal, with Al-Shabaab 
conducting eight major attacks directed against AMISOM personnel in the 
second half of January 2008 (United Nations 2009a: 3-4). AMISOM was still 
seriously under-manned at this point but it was being forced to play a much 
more militant role, not as a neutral peacekeeping force, but as a conflict party. 
Nigeria, Burundi and Uganda stated that they had troops available for the 
mission, but lacked the capacity to deploy them (United Nations 2009a: 5). 
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Many of AMISOM’s problems stemmed from the fact that it was never intended 
to last much longer than the original six month mandate; its endemic 
functionalist role was a rapid reaction force, designed to capitalise on the 
security provided by the Ethiopian invasion and lay the groundwork for a much 
larger UN force. The original mandate for AMISOM highlighted the fact that the 
mission could not be a long-term solution to the security problems in Somalia, 
and envisaged a re-hatting of the force as soon as possible:  
“AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of six (6) months, aimed essentially 
at contributing to the initial stabilisation phase in Somalia, with a clear 
understanding that the mission will evolve to a United Nations operation that 
will support the long term stabilisation and postconflict reconstruction of 
Somalia” (African Union 2007b: 2). 
“The long term stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia will 
require the strong involvement of the United Nations. In this respect, Council 
urges the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing a United 
Nations operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the 
expiration of its 6 months mandate” (African Union 2007b: 4). 
Despite this conservative endemic functionalist role, almost a year and a half 
after its mandate was supposed to have ended, the APSA was still at only one 
third of the mandated force strength. The familiar problems of logistics, 
equipment and cash-flow plagued AMISOM. As the UN had not deployed as 
planned, the AU Chairperson, Alpha Konaré, wrote to the UN requesting a 
$817,500,000 financial, logistical and technical support package from the UN to 
bridge the capacity gap preventing full operationalisation of the mission (United 
Nations 2008e: 5). Nine months later, as the Ethiopians were preparing to 
withdraw, the UN developed a proposal for a possible transfer of $7 million 
worth of assets, including soft-skin vehicles, generators and air-conditioning 
units, which had been made available by the liquidation of the UN Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea (United Nations 2008b: 3). The disparity between this less 
than lukewarm response and Konaré’s initial request highlighted the gulf 
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between the external partners’ perceptions of the role of AMISOM as a fatally 
flawed token force, and the APSA’s ambitions for the mission. 
Unlike AMIS, where the transition from an APSA mission to a UN mission was 
obstructed by the government, the new ARS led government supported the 
deployment of a UN mission (United Nations 2009a: 5). The United Nations 
Secretary General’s office did make efforts to plan for a transition from 
AMISOM to a UN Peacekeeping force, but found that the conditions were 
particularly difficult; the UN would only be able to take over if the security 
situation resolved itself, which was also the only situation in which a UN force 
may not have been required. All the same, it did not happen, and still has not 
happened. In the event that the security situation did not improve, the UN 
posited replacing AMISOM with a UN-sponsored multinational peace 
enforcement mission, led by a coalition of the willing (United Nations 2007b: 13-
14). By the end of 2008, however, there had been a limited response to 
contingency planning for a UN mission to Somalia; member states pledged 
logistical, technical and financial support, but no state wished to play the lead 
nation role or contribute troops, and there was not enough support to allow the 
deployment of a multinational force (United Nations 2008b: 2). The UN began 
to realise that AMISOM, with all its flaws, was the only option for a multinational 
force in Somalia.  
In light of the power vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the 
Secretary General’s office wrote a letter to the Security Council, advocating 
and, for the first time, requesting, that AMISOM remain in place, but accepted 
that it would need to be strengthened with a support package (United Nations 
2008b: 2-3), just as Konaré had explained nine months earlier (United Nations 
234 
 
2008e: 5). The UN envisioned that AMISOM should perform the role that had 
been performed by the Ethiopian force, protecting more vital infrastructure 
across Mogadishu, in addition to its mandated responsibilities of supporting, 
mentoring and training the TFG forces (United Nations 2008b: 3). After failing to 
gather enough support for a UN-backed intervention, the Secretary General’s 
office requested that those countries which had pledged support for such a 
mission now redirect that support to AMISOM, making the APSA the focal point 
for external peace support in Somalia (United Nations 2008b: 3-4).  
Around the same time, the APSA’s rhetoric hardened. On 22 December 2008, 
the AU PSC renewed AMISOM’s mandate for only two additional months; the 
mandate itself remained the same, but included aspects related to the training 
of the 10,000 joint TFG-ARS security force envisioned in the Djibouti 
Agreement (African Union 2008a: 2). The same communiqué called on the UN 
Security Council to “immediately and without any further delay take the steps 
expected of it, in particular by authorizing the deployment of an international 
stabilisation force and, subsequently, that of a peace keeping operation to take 
over from AMISOM” (African Union 2008a: 3). The PSC went on to state that 
“the continued stay of AMISOM forces will depend on the availability of the 
required resources ... on the basis of the proposals contained in the letter 
addressed by the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council on 19 
December 2008” (African Union 2008a: 3). 
AMISOM’s stronger stance seemed to have paid off on 16 January 2009, when 
the UN adopted resolution 1863, which “requests the African Union to maintain 
AMISOM’s deployment in Somalia and to reinforce that deployment to help 
achieve AMISOM’s originally mandated troop strength of 8,000 troops” (UNSC 
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2009: 2). Resolution 1863 also expressed the UN’s intention to deploy a 
mission to follow on from AMISOM (UNSC 2009: 2). The resolution aimed to 
resolve AMISOM’s financial problems with the establishment of a trust fund for 
the mission, and authorised a logistics package which would include equipment 
and services normally only provided to UN peacekeeping missions. The 
package could cover accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured vehicles, 
helicopters, vehicle maintenance, communications, some enhancement of key 
logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services (UNSC 2009: 4), 
(United Nations 2008b: 4). The first $71.6 million of the support package was 
approved on 7 April 2009 (United Nations 2009b: 6). The UN institutionalised its 
partnership with the APSA in Somalia with the establishment of the United 
Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) in Nairobi in April 2009 (African 
Union 2010c: 2). By January of 2010, the African Union had directly received 
US$16,612,000 from the Trust Fund, as well as in-kind and logistical support to 
AMISOM TCCs, through third party contractors worth US$23,560,000. But 
unpaid pledges to the trust fund amounted to $126,919,377 (African Union 
2010i). 
With renewed international support for AMISOM, Uganda was able to deploy a 
further battalion in Mogadishu in March 2009, bringing AMISOM to five 
battalions (6,120 military personnel) out of the nine that had been authorised 
originally (United Nations 2009b: 5). In August 2009, Burundi was able to 
deploy a further battalion, bringing the mission strength to six battalions, for a 
total of 5,268 military personnel (African Union 2010i: 9). AMISOM started 
playing a slightly expanded role—still focused on reactive protection—providing 
security for TFG officials, the seaport and airport, Villa Somalia, the old 
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university and military academy, and other strategic sites in Mogadishu. The 
force escorted convoys of shipping into the port, and helped to secure basic 
medical support and provided freshwater to the local community. AMISOM also 
provided transport support and protection for visiting international delegates, 
including all United Nations teams, and support to the fledgling Somali National 
Security Force (United Nations 2009b: 6). The mandate was extended for 
another three months on 11 March 2009 (African Union 2009a: 2). AMISOM 
also began to provide more humanitarian assistance to the civilian population 
within its area of operation. The mission’s field hospitals, which were designed 
to cater for the troops, extended their services to local communities, providing 
medical services to approximately 3,000 patients per week. By 2010, AMISOM 
was also providing over 60,000 litres of safe drinking water per day to hundreds 
of families in Mogadishu (African Union 2010h: 9). 
A further indication that AMISOM’s role in Somalia was changing came on 15 
June 2009, when the Peace and Security Council renewed AMISOM’s mandate 
for a further seven months, indicating the beginning of a longer term strategy. 
While the PSC reiterated its call for the United Nations to deploy a mission in 
Somalia, it also asked the Commission to review AMISOM’s terms of 
engagement, which were still based on reactive self-defence, and called upon 
AU member states to urgently provide military support to the TFG to enable it to 
‘neutralise’ the armed insurgent groups (African Union 2009b: 3). 
However, despite these positive signs, the increase in instability continued 
throughout 2009, and Al-Shabaab continued to consolidate control over most of 
southern and central Somalia except for the key districts of Mogadishu held by 
AMISOM, and, despite some claims to the contrary, Al-Shabaab seemed to be 
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increasing in number (Marchal 2009: 2). The insurgents continued to plan and 
employ the use of vehicular and human-borne suicide attacks, improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), and mortar and sniper attacks against the TFG and 
AMISOM positions and convoys (African Union 2010i: 6). A major suicide attack 
on 17 September 2009 on the AMISOM force headquarters near the airport 
killed twenty people, including the Deputy Force Commander of AMISOM, 
Major General Juvenal Niyoyinguruza, and injured forty others (African Union 
2010i: 6). Similar suicide attacks continued unabated throughout 2009 and 
2010, and on 24 August 2010, three gunmen attacked the Muna Hotel, near the 
government buildings, killing 31 people, including four MPs (African Union 
2010h: 6). Further, the situation for Somali civilians continued to deteriorate, 
especially in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, where stonings and beheadings 
were commonplace, as well as rape, torture, kidnappings and disappearances 
(African Union 2010h: 9).  
On 11 July 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a bombing in Kampala 
that killed 79 people (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 2010: 1). If Al-Shabaab 
expected the bombing to encourage the Uganda People’s Defence Force 
(UPDF) to withdraw its three battalions from Somalia, it actually had the 
opposite effect, with the APSA calling on member states to produce another 
two battalions to deploy in Mogadishu (Cilliers, Boshoff and Aboagye 2010: 2). 
At the 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Kampala later that month, 
on the 25th to the 27th, Uganda pledged a further two Battalions, along with a 
150 strong support unit (African Union 2010h: 11). Further, the same summit 
finally approved the changes to AMISOM’s rules of engagement (RoE), which 
had been proposed after the APSA’s consultations with the troop-contributing 
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countries, the TFG and other stakeholders. The changes resulted in a much 
more aggressive interpretation of the mandate, permitting the APSA to perform 
aggressive defence, including pre-emptive attacks, radically altering its role 
(AFP 2010). With the enhanced RoE, and its strength finally approaching the 
mandated 9 battalions, and with much more focused support from the 
international community, AMISOM started to make real progress on the ground; 
beginning with advances leading to the control of seven out of Mogadishu’s 
sixteen districts, by 15 October 2010, AMISOM controlled twelve new positions 
in the city, consolidating AMISOM’s defences and cutting off the supply routs of 
the insurgents (African Union 2010h: 11).  
On 15 October 2010, the PSC expanded the mandated number of troops to 
20,000, more than doubling the size of the mission to capitalise on AMISOM’s 
recent gains (African Union 2010b). The subsequent UN resolution, however, 
limited this attempted expansion of AMISOM’s role;  it only authorised an 
increase in mission strength to 12,000 troops and limited the logistical support 
package to AMISOM accordingly (UNSC 2010). On 10 January 2011, 
AMISOM’s mandate was renewed for a full 12 months, perhaps indicating an 
acceptance of the fact that the UN would not be able to deploy in the 
foreseeable future (African Union 2011a). In February 2011, AMISOM was able 
to launch another major offensive, seizing control of the old Ministry of Defence 
building, and the milk factory that Al-Shabaab had been using as a logistics 
depot, consolidating the seven districts under their control, which now held 
about 80% of the population of the City (African Union 2011d: 4). In March, 
1,000 Burundian troops were deployed in Somalia, bringing the force strength 
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up to about 9,000 and exceeding the original mandate for the first time (African 
Union 2011d: 3). 
Throughout the rest of 2011, the Islamists were on the run; AMISOM, supported 
by allied militias and TFG troops, gradually seized more territory in Mogadishu, 
including Wadnaha Road and the symbolic Red Mosque, the old barracks, the 
Italian embassy building and several other key locations. On 7 June 2011, TFG 
police spotted and killed Al-Qaeda’s leader in East Africa, Fazul Abdallah 
Mohammed (African Union 2011c: 4). AMISOM took full control of Mogadishu 
by the end of 2011. Outside Mogadishu, pro‐TFG militias gained further ground 
in the Hiraan, Galgadud, Bay and Bakool, Gedo and Lower Jubba regions, and, 
throughout July and August, the insurgents attempted to recapture key parts of 
the Gedo and Jubba regions, but were repulsed (African Union 2011c: 5). 
Conclusion 
The endemic functionalist role of AMISOM was to deploy quickly to help 
capitalise on the withdrawal of the UIC, protect key infrastructure in Mogadishu, 
protect the TFG and provide it with technical assistance. The mission was also 
to play its usual role as a bridging force for the UN and prepare the ground for a 
UN PKO, which had been expected the following year. Although the mission 
was intended to be impartial, as explained in AMISOM’s Status of Mission 
Agreement (African Union 2007l: 4), it was by no means a straightforward 
peacekeeping operation; there was no peace to keep, no ceasefire to monitor—
the mission was playing a role closer to that of a rapid reaction stabilisation 
force. However, the real role played by AMISOM was even more unusual. 
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AMISOM’s interactionist role in Somalia has been entwined with the state-
building process in the country. AMISOM has never been an impartial 
peacekeeper; from the start it has been on the front line, fighting shoulder-to-
shoulder with the government against the rebels. AMISOM has not simply been 
responsible for training the nascent TFG army and police force; after the 
Ethiopians withdrew in January 2009, AMISOM had been the only force 
keeping the TFG alive, and keeping Al-Shabaab out of the Villa Somalia. In this 
sense, AMISOM, far from playing the impartial peacekeeper, has performed the 
role of a surrogate army for the TFG—AMISOM was able to keep the highly 
unpopular, factional and weak TFG in working order for four years, during which 
it was effectively under-siege by the Islamists. In addition to training up the 
TFG’s new military, AMISOM reconquered the TFG’s own capital city on its 
behalf.  
AMISOM’s extremely active interactionist role evolved organically over time, 
enabled by massive, if insufficient, external support, and shaped by many 
factors, especially the failure of its role as a bridging operation for the UN with 
the United Nations’ refusal to cross the rather dangerous looking bridge built for 
it by AMISOM. The state building process and the security environment also 
played an important part in shaping the role played by AMISOM, especially the 
extreme violence of the security environment, which, coupled with the 
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, forced AMISOM to begin a massive 
militarisation of the mission, turning it into something more akin to a full-scale 
invasion than a small protection and training force. 
Finally, UN Resolution 1863 is a turning point in the evolution of the role played 
by the APSA in relation to the United Nations, with the UN requesting the 
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APSA’s continued presence in a conflict zone for the first time, as opposed to 
condoning, or welcoming the APSA’s efforts, or even, in the case of the 
abortive IGAD mission in Somalia, IGASOM, actively discouraging a 
deployment. This development showed that the APSA had become a useful, or 
at least necessary, partner to the UN. 
Although the AU originally condemned the Ethiopian intervention, AMISOM 
performed a similar role; to militarily entrench the TFG into key parts of 
Somalia, and to deny as much ground to the Islamists as possible. AMISOM did 
have a protection role, like AMIS; however, where AMIS was mandated to 
protect civilians, AMISOM was mandated to protect the government. This is the 
most important break from the previous two missions. If, for example, AMIS had 
been deployed to protect Khartoum from the SLA/M and the JEM, it would have 
been a very different mission. 
The African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission 
(MAES) and Operation Democracy in the Comoros 
While the previous three missions were AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs), 
Operation Democracy in the Comoros was an AU-authorised coalition of the 
willing, along the lines of a UN-authorised enforcement mission. Like AMISOM, 
which started off life as a technical mission, the APSA’s role in the Comoros 
had innocuous origins, rooted in a series of simple election observation 
missions. However, as the security situation destabilised in 2007-2008, the 
APSA’s role on the Comorian island of Anjouan changed drastically, 
culminating in Operation Democracy, one of the APSA’s most aggressive 
missions, which continued a key feature of the APSA’s interactionist role in 
Somalia: partiality. Operation Democracy might also be considered to be the 
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first time that ‘peace enforcement’ becomes a major part of the role of the 
APSA. 
AU involvement in the political process in the country dates back to 2004, when 
the AU dispatched an AU Observer Mission to the Comoros (MIOC), consisting 
of 39 MILOBS, mandated for four months, which successfully oversaw the 
elections, reporting only minor disturbances (African Union 2004e). 
A further mission was deployed to oversee the second round of elections in 
spring 2006 to elect the new President of the Union of the Comoros with a 
mandate to provide security and monitor the election. The African Union 
Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) was composed of 
462 military and civilian personnel, made up largely of SADC member states 
with South Africa performing the lead role, and remained in place until 2 June 
2006, overseeing the Comoros’s first democratic transition of power (Svensson 
2008b: 19). 
In January 2007, the Assembly of the Union of the Comoros unanimously 
enacted a law requiring candidates for the post of President of the Autonomous 
Islands to give up their official positions three months prior to a further round of 
elections, which were to be held on 10 and 24 June 2007 and which would elect 
the presidents of the autonomous islands in the Union (African Union 2007k: 2). 
To ensure stability, and monitor the elections, the APSA authorised the African 
Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission (MAES) on 9 May 2007 
(Svensson 2008b: 19). However, several incidents taking place in Anjouan 
threatened the integrity of the electoral process (African Union 2007d). Colonel 
Mohamed Bacar refused to step down from the presidency of Anjouan prior to 
the elections. Bacar’s mandate expired on 14 April 2007, and the President of 
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the Union appointed an interim president for Anjouan until the elections; 
however, Bacar rejected the authority of the Union government and the 
appointment of the interim president, and relations between Anjouan and the 
Union government continued to deteriorate (African Union 2007k: 2). Of 
particular concern was the use of heavy weapons by the Anjouanese 
gendarmerie against elements of the Comorian national army and the premises 
of the Presidency of the Union on the Island, which resulted in the death of two 
government soldiers (African Union 2007k: 1).  
The election in Anjouan was originally scheduled to be held on 10 June, but in 
light of the security situation on the island, the President of the Union of 
Comoros pushed it back to 17 June (African Union 2007e). However, Bacar 
chose to go ahead with the elections on 10 June, printing ballets for the vote 
and ignoring the PSC’s warning that such an election would be unrecognised 
by the African Union and the international community (African Union 2007h). 
MAES, which was busy monitoring the elections on Grande Comore and 
Mohéli, and had not yet deployed to the island, so the elections went 
unmonitored, and unsupported by the Union government. The Anjouanese 
Electoral Commission announced Bacar’s victory in the 1st round, with over 
89% of the votes. All the other candidates had withdrawn from the race in 
protest. In spite of international condemnation of the vote, Colonel Bacar was 
sworn in as President of Anjouan on 14 June 2007 (African Union 2007k: 5-6). 
Bacar rejected proposals aimed at restoring Union authority on Anjouan 
peacefully, which were developed following meetings held in Cape Town on 8 
July, and Pretoria on 9 July and which had attempted to take Anjouanese 
concerns into account (African Union 2007c). In response to this development 
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in the security environment, the APSA chose to expand the role played by 
MAES, and on 10 October 2007, altered the mandate to deal specifically with 
the situation on Anjouan, giving it the power to implement sanctions on Bacar 
and his supporters, including an assets freeze and a travel ban (African Union 
2007c: 1-2). Unsurprisingly, the Anjouanese authorities refused to allow the 
deployment of the mission, and MAES was never able to play this expanded 
role (Svensson 2008b: 20). 
The APSA became concerned that any further delay in the holding of new 
Anjouanese Presidential elections would undermine the reconciliation process 
in the country, leading to further destabilisation (African Union 2007c: 1). At the 
10th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, the President of the 
Union of the Comoros requested support from the APSA to re-establish the 
authority of the State on the island of Anjouan by any means, including the use 
of force, stating that all peaceful means to resolve the crisis had failed (African 
Union 2008e: 1).  
The Assembly agreed, requesting “Member States capable of doing so to 
provide the necessary support to the Comorian Government in its efforts to 
restore, as quickly as possible, the authority of the Union in Anjouan and to put 
an end to the crisis” (African Union 2008b). On 20 February 2008, a meeting of 
the Foreign and Defence Ministers of those countries that had responded 
positively to the request for assistance made by the President of the Union of 
the Comoros agreed on practical, military and security measures to re-establish 
Union authority on Anjouan, resulting in a plan to take the island by force: 
Operation Democracy in the Comoros (African Union 2008e: 2-3). This 
coalition-of-the-willing, consisting of Tanzania, Sudan, Senegal and Libya, 
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emphasised that any attempt on the part of the illegal authorities in Anjouan to 
resist the military intervention in the Island would be regarded as a criminal act 
and would be dealt with as such (African Union 2008e: 3). A last-ditch attempt 
to persuade Bacar to capitulate, led by the French Ambassador to the 
Comoros, the Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in Madagascar, a 
representative of the Arab league and the head of the AU Liaison office in the 
Union Capital, Moroni, was rejected out of hand by the Anjouanese de facto 
government (African Union 2008e: 4). 
1,500 Coalition and Comorian troops began to assemble on the Island of 
Mohéli in early March, facilitated by French Airlift capacity, which transported 
troops from Tanzania to the Comoros. The invasion of Anjouan took place in 
the early hours of 25 March. In just a few hours, the Armée Nationale de 
Développement (AND), with the support of allied troops from Tanzania and 
Sudan, took control of key strategic areas in the Island. Comorian forces took 
the airport, while Tanzanian forces seized the port and Mutsmudu – the Island’s 
capital. Sudanese troops landed at Domoni, west of the Island. By the following 
day, the Island had come under the full control of the overwhelming coalition 
forces. General Bacar escaped in a Kwassa-Kwassa, a small traditional boat, 
with 22 of his supporters, and arrived safely in La Mayotte, where he requested 
asylum from the French government, and was transferred to Réunion island, 
pending a decision on the request, to ensure public order and stability (African 
Union 2008e: 5). 
After the invasion, MAES was able to gain access to the island, and was given 
a new mandate, which was to run until the end of October 2008 (Svensson 
2008b: 21). On 31 March 2008, the Union government inaugurated the interim 
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Chief Executive of Anjouan, Laiisamana Abdou Cheikh, to organise elections, 
which were to be held in May 2008, but divisions remained, with some parties 
wanting to re-run the entire electoral process in Anjouan (African Union 2008e: 
5-6). However, the presidential elections were successfully held in June, only a 
month later than planned; Moussa Toybou defeated Mohamed Djaanfari in the 
second round of voting (AFP 2008). 
Conclusion 
Operation Democracy was an unusual mission because of its more African 
nature; the AU Troop Contributing Countries were able to develop a mandate, a 
CONOPS and generate troops for the mission very quickly while negotiations 
continued in the background. In less than a year from the disputed elections, 
the coalition was able to deploy and effectively execute the mission largely on 
its own, with a robust mandate, and few casualties, achieving its objectives, 
with very little involvement from the external community—the APSA’s usual role 
as a bridging force was nowhere to be seen in this mission, in fact the mission 
did not even seek approval from the UNSC, making the mission the first solely 
AU-authorised PSO.  
However, one of the main reasons that Operation Democracy was so quick to 
deploy was its ad hoc nature. While Operation Democracy in the Comoros was 
AU-backed, it was not given an official mandate by the PSC. The driving force 
behind the mission was the troop contributing countries, legitimised by the 10th 
Meeting of the Assembly.  
All the same, the APSA’s experience in the Comoros could be seen as the 
continued militarisation of the APSA role. Although there were repeated 
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attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully, most of these were framed as 
demands for Bacar to capitulate. The government of South Africa, which had 
been a lead state for MAES, refused to take part in Operation Democracy, 
because it felt that the AU had not yet exhausted all avenues for a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, and called the invasion ‘unfortunate’ (Svensson 
2008b: 21). 
Rather than accepting a protracted dispute between Anjouan and the Union 
government, and help to negotiate a peace agreement, the APSA chose to 
resolve the dispute quickly by taking sides. While the Comorian government 
may have lacked the capacity to stage such an invasion on its own, the APSA 
was able to provide overwhelming military superiority in relation to Bacar’s 
limited gendarmerie. As in Somalia, the APSA performed the role of surrogate 
military; re-conquering the country on behalf of the government. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown what a transformative effect that developments in the 
African security environment can have on the role played by the APSA. While 
the endemic functionalist role of all four PSOs has been conservative, the 
Interactionist role played by the APSA has been extremely progressive; all the 
missions have taken the role of peace operations in a new direction. All of the 
missions have been much more militaristic and ‘hawkish’ than originally 
intended stretching the interpretation of their mandates and rules of 
engagement. 
While AMIB and AMIS played relatively familiar roles, more along the lines of 
traditional peacekeeping and monitoring forces, AMISOM and the AU-backed 
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Operation Democracy were unashamedly partisan; intervening in Somalia and 
the Comoros on behalf of the internationally recognised national governments 
of those countries, and actively fighting against the rebels. This approach may 
well raise the spectre of the dictators’ club, where the APSA plays the role of an 
enforcer for African governments. However, the circumstances of these cases 
belie the truth. The TFG, while flawed, weak and fractured, cannot be said to be 
a dictatorship, certainly not in comparison to the system envisaged by Al-
Shabaab; although the mere fact the UIC was so popular and the TFG so 
unpopular may well show authoritarian aspects of the role played by the APSA. 
In Comoros too, the APSA was intervening to support an internationally 
supported, democratically elected civilian government against a military 
strongman, who was attempting to stay in power by undemocratic means. The 
APSA has therefore established its role as a protector of constitutional order in 
Africa, showing a willingness to engage with crises which would have been 
considered to be well outside its capacity. 
AMIS and AMISOM have also highlighted the limitations of the APSA’s much 
discussed role as a bridging force for the UN; what happens if the UN will not or 
cannot deploy? The APSA’s role as a bridging force may be less viable than it 
seems. While it worked relatively well in Burundi, it took many years for the UN 
to deploy in Darfur, forcing AMIS to take on a role it had not expected; that of a 
long-term PKO. The same situation occurred in Somalia, where a UN 
deployment still seems unlikely, and the APSA has had to shoulder the burden 
that it expected to share with the UN. So while this has become a large element 
of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role, it is a much more subdued element of 
the APSA’s interactionist role. 
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A final observation to be noted from the preceding examination of the APSA’s 
experiences in the field is how all the limiting and enabling factors come 
together to shape the role played by the organisation. The role that the APSA 
has been able to play has been severely limited by its own capacity gaps—a 
problem highlighted by the near-collapse of AMIS, and the three year gap 
between AMISOM’s original deployment and the full deployment of the original 
nine mandated battalions. However, it has also shown that it has the capacity to 
deploy without support very quickly, as in Operation Democracy, helping to 
shape the APSA’s role as a first responder. Furthermore, the APSA’s huge 
capacity gaps have often been bridged by external support, which has 
enhanced the APSA’s capacity in certain areas, enabling it to perform roles 
which would be unthinkable from a simple reading of the APSA’s own internal 
capacity and revenue. At the same time, when such external support has not 
been forthcoming, especially where it has been expected or relied upon, such 
as UN support to AMIS and AMISOM, the lack of external support has acted as 
a limiting factor. Finally, in the context of this external support to the APSA 
which enables the role it plays in some areas and allows it to stagnate in others, 
it becomes clear that, despite the APSA’s claims of ‘African Ownership’ and 
‘African Solutions for African Problems’, the EU, the UN and the US hold a 
considerable amount of power over the interactionist role played by the APSA, 
which may be very different from the endemic functionalist role envisioned by 
the APSA on authorisation. A prime example of this was when the United 
Nations overrode the expanded mandate for AMISOM, disregarding the 
selection of a force strength of 20,000 as agreed upon by the APSA, and 
instead reducing the mandate to a more manageable 12,000. 
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In light of these conclusions, the thesis will now go on to rationalise what we 
have learned about the limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA and 




Chapter Eight:  
Conclusion 
Introduction 
This research project set out to answer what seems like a very basic question, 
fundamental to analysing the APSA’s impact on regional security in Africa: 
What is the role of the APSA? The more objectively accurate the answer to this 
question is, the more stable the basis for measuring the APSA’s success and 
utility will be, as there will be a common understanding of what the term role 
means, and therefore less variance in the interpretation of the APSA’s current 
role. The study has provided this stable basis though a reconceptualisation of 
the concept of the role of an organisation and by providing a methodology for 
ascertaining a more accurate outline of the role of the APSA at any particular 
time based on what it does, rather than what it says it does, or what APSA 
scholars variously say that it should do. This thesis did not simply aim to 
provide a snap-shot of the role played by the APSA at the beginning of 2012, 
but aimed to generate an understanding of the concept of role, as applied to 
institutions in general, which, instead of relying upon subjective preconceptions 
of what that role may be, allows for repeatable and objective descriptions of the 
role played in practice, which can be updated, analysed and debated, bringing 
together the key limiting and enabling factors which define that role at any given 
time. 
In Chapter 1, a review of the existing literature highlighted the lack of 
consensus on the role of the APSA and, as a result, the wide variance in 
perceptions of its success and utility, as well as the disparate policy 
recommendations based upon these perceptions. Attempts by academics such 
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as Paul Williams (2006), Kristina Powell (2005) and Benedikt Franke (2008) to 
evaluate the success of the APSA have been very different. Without an 
objective and repeatable method for defining the APSA’s role, scholars are 
measuring its success against their own expectations of its role without 
systematically defending those expectations.  
In response, this thesis provided such an objective and repeatable method for 
defining the role of the role of the APSA, or potentially any international 
organisation, by problematising the definition of the term role when applied to 
institutions. Borrowing from the disciplines of Sociology and Social Psychology, 
chapter two split the definition of the term role in this context into three 
separate, technical definitions; the endemic functionalist role (the role that the 
APSA’s designers and draughtsmen envisioned for it), the projected 
functionalist role (the role that observers assume that the APSA plays) and the 
interactionist role (the role that the APSA actually plays in its operating 
environment, in practical terms). When assessing the APSA in the past, 
academics have based their criticisms solely against the endemic functionalist 
role or whichever projected functionalist role that they personally adhered to. 
This reduced the understanding of the role of the APSA to either a simple 
extrapolation of the APSA’s role from the treaty documents, mandates and 
statements of intent, or an often unrealistic set of preconceived expectations.  
The remaining five chapters highlighted the high number, and numerous 
sources, of limiting and enabling factors that act upon the APSA, as well as the 
extent to which they alter its role by restricting, expanding and redirecting its 
capacity. Having established the appropriate variables, this chapter will now 
apply the interactionist equation (enabling factors minus limiting factors equals 
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the interactionist role) in order to provide an overview of the interactionist role of 
the APSA. It will then compare the interactionist role with the endemic 
functionalist role and some elements of the projected functionalist roles used in 
the APSA scholarship, and conclude with a discussion of how the present 
research into the role of the APSA, and the development of Institutional Role 
Theory, affects the discourse and acts as a basis for future research. 
Applying the Interactionist Equation 
The previous five chapters have focused on various limiting and enabling 
factors that have shaped the role played by the APSA. The following section will 
rationalise much of this information by giving a summary of the effects of these 
factors on four key areas of the APSA’s capacity: African ownership; personnel 
capacity; financial capacity; and military capacity. Each section will apply the 
interactionist equation to explain where limiting factors have been successfully 
bridged by enabling factors, concluding with an assessment of the APSA’s net 
capacity in each of these areas. This assessment of the APSA’s net capacity 
will explain the boundaries of the APSA’s capacity to act, which will help to 
inform the definition of the APSA’s interactionist roles, which will be outlined 
afterwards. 
African Ownership 
African ownership has consistently been described as an important part of the 
role of the APSA, both in endemic functionalist and projected functionalist 
terms; however, as this section outlines, it has not been a priority for the APSA 
in practical terms. Understanding this helps to reinforce the intercontinental 




Chapters five and six showed that the APSA is so dependent upon so many 
different actors within and beyond Africa for its capacity that it could not exist in 
its current form without that support. Chapter five also demonstrated that very 
few of these actors give their support without precondition or ulterior motive; 
most of the APSA’s external partners earmark their donations for specific 
projects, or ban their funds from being used for specific purposes. Especially 
restrictive is the limitation on the EU’s Africa Peace Facility (APF), stemming 
from the Cotonou Agreement, which prevents funds from being used for military 
purposes. This degree of Western interference in the governance of the APSA 
has resulted in accusations of a neo-colonialist attitude amongst western 
partners and a perception of reduced African ownership (Murithi 2009). The 
seriousness of these issues is an artefact of the level of dependence of the 
APSA upon external sources of capacity enhancement, especially 
institutionalised financial support like the APF. Chapter six demonstrated how 
the leverage gained through such dependence compromised the African nature 
of the APSA’s governance structures, resulting in external partners permeating 
the APSA’s governance at ownership, board and management levels. 
Therefore, while African Solutions and African Ownership is an important part of 
the endemic functionalist, and most projected functionalist roles, it is important 
to highlight the fact that the African nature of the APSA is not nearly as 
prominent in the current interactionist role; access to materiel, expertise and 
financial capacity, strings or no strings, takes precedence in the APSA today as 
it deals with the exigencies of two of the worlds most intractable conflict zones. 
Further, while external partners can pick and choose which parts of the APSA 
to support and which to relegate, targeting support to specific AU departments 
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or specific member states, the APSA itself has almost no freedom to allocate 
funds, except where that freedom is granted by the donor country, as 
contributions to the Peace Fund continue to overwhelmingly come from external 
partners. 
Enabling Factors 
However, those same ‘meddling’ external partners may hold the key to greater 
African ownership of the APSA in the medium-long term. The preceding 
chapters also demonstrated that external support is not just about dealing with 
security exigencies that concern the donors, but is also about building 
permanent capacity among African states. As Vines and Middleton suggested, 
successfully operationalising the APSA offers the prospect of more African 
solutions to African problems (Vines and Middleton 2008: 7). 
Chapter five explained how the United States in particular focused most of its 
efforts towards enhancing African capacity, including training and equipping 
African military units, although in some cases such offers were attendant upon 
commitments to deploy. Further, with external support, the APSA has been able 
to gain significant experience in fielding large-scale PSOs in terms of expertise, 
logistics and force generation. Finally, external support has been instrumental 
in operationalising the African Standby Force. Although it is still in the early 
stages, the ASF will significantly increase internal African capacity, and 
therefore African ownership, when it is finally ready to deploy.  
Conclusion 
African ownership is figurative and dependent upon the good will of external 
partners. African leadership is a necessity in some situations, such as the 
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mission in Darfur, which could not have been deployed under UN leadership 
without an enforcement mandate. However, Africa does not have the capacity 
to own the peace and security efforts of the APSA. African ideas are the driving 
force behind the organisation (non-indifference, pan-Africanism etc.), and, as 
Murithi and Gomes lament, the lives of African soldiers are the fuel that drives 
the APSA machine. Without Africa, the APSA obviously could not exist; but the 
APSA is paid for, equipped by and, in many respects, managed by external 
partners, particularly the UN, the EU and the US. Without their support, the 
APSA could not perform the role it is currently performing. Therefore, the 
APSA’s interactionist role looks the way it does today because of the influence 
of external powers. The reality is quite removed from the endemic functionalist 
ideal of African Ownership of the APSA; in practical terms, the African Union 
and its member states is only one of four major partners in the APSA. However, 
it is the most important one, acting as a framework within which external peace 
and security efforts can be coordinated and implemented.  
The APSA does not play the role of the African solution to African problems 
envisaged by the founders, early APSA scholars and pan-Africanists; but as a 
result of the APSA’s successes, the world takes Africa’s role in peace and 
security much more seriously in comparison with the cynicism directed towards 
the OAU. Literal African ownership is not part of the APSA’s interactionist role 
in a meaningful sense, however, the APSA is an increasingly important voice in 
African security; it can act, and by acting it can try to set the agenda. However, 
as AMIS and AMISOM have shown, large swathes of the international 
community are prepared to leave African PSO’s floundering and under-siege for 
years if they do not perceive them to be in their interests, and the APSA is 
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severely limited in what it can achieve without external support because of the 
capacity gaps discussed in chapter four.  
The interactionist role of the APSA will be, to a large extent, shaped by the 
governance structures of external partners for the foreseeable future—until 
APSA member states have developed economically to the extent that they can 
pay the hundreds of millions of dollars per year required to field PSOs and 
retain the expertise required at all levels to carry them out, or at least until the 
majority of external support is being paid into the AU Peace Fund without 
conditions, giving the PSC the freedom to allocate funds as it sees fit, without a 
shortage thereof. 
Personnel Capacity 
The APSA’s capacity to act is affected by personnel capacity issues at every 
level of staffing, from desk-workers at the AUC in Addis Ababa, to force 
commanders on the ground in Mogadishu. This constitutes another major 
influence on the functions that the APSA is able to perform, and understanding 
its net impact is key to understanding the interactionist role. 
Limiting Factors 
As chapter four showed, the APSA’s personnel capacity represents a serious 
limiting factor; the staff of administrative bodies like the PSC Secretariat and the 
PSOD have been, for most of the APSA’s history, performing several job 
descriptions and working long hours, frequently without the specialist training 
required. The APSA’s personnel systems have represented a severe 
bottleneck, especially in light of accounting practices for external aid; the APSA 
has several hundred individual sources of external aid, each with their own 
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accountability requirements. At times, this has limited the speed and extent to 
which the APSA can absorb external funding. As chapter four and chapter 
seven highlighted, limited expertise in core competency areas, especially weak 
capacity in terms of operational planning for the APSA’s PSOs, has had a 
constraining effect upon the interactionist role that the APAS is able to perform 
in the field.   
Enabling Factors 
The APSA’s lack of capacity in this area is bridged through significant external 
involvement in the day-to-day running of the APSA. Although the APSA’s treaty 
framework prohibits the organisation from hiring extra-continental staff, external 
partners frequently retain expert advisors on behalf of the APSA. Meanwhile, 
the APSA’s existing personnel capacity is continually being enhanced through 
training programmes run by external partners, as explained in chapter five. 
Conclusion 
External capacity enhancement in this area enables the APSA to continue to 
perform both day-to-day responsibilities and complex administrative tasks like 
troop rotations or the drafting of technical documents like CONOPS and Rules 
of Engagement, some of which would be outside of the APSA’s capacity 
without such support.  
Further, external personnel capacity enhancement, in the form of resident 
liaison officers, specialists, experts, advisors and mentors, also contributes to 
the intercontinental character of the APSA, which has become an increasingly 
important part of its role. In practical terms, the APSA’s personnel capacity 
problems are significantly less debilitating than they may appear, thanks to 
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external capacity enhancement in this area. While personnel capacity is still 
strained, and has a much more international character than the functionalist 
roles would suggest, chapter seven has demonstrated that, with external 
support, it is at a high enough level to conduct all the functions associated with 
the major PSOs, and is by no means the most significant problem limiting the 
APSA’s role in the field. 
Financial Capacity 
Money is the life-blood of any large institution like the APSA, and access to this 
resource is a transformative enabling factor for the interactionist role it plays. 
Deficiencies in this core area of capacity have threatened to break the missions 
in Sudan and Somalia, highlighting how capacity in this area has a defining 
effect on the boundaries of the APSA’s interactionist role. 
Limiting Factors 
As chapter three explained, the endemic functionalist role of the APSA 
suggests that the AU is responsible for ending conflict in Africa—a continent 
containing most of the world’s on-going conflicts—but set out to achieve this 
with a budget one tenth of the size of that of the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The APSA’s budget is tiny relative to its 
ambitions, a problem complicated by the fact that its internal financial capacity 
is very irregular; few African states pay their dues on time or in full. 
The capacity of the APSA to field PSOs has been crippled by this lack of 
budgetary resources. Only 2 per cent of the PSO budget is covered by African 
states, the rest comes from external partners, mostly the EU APF. However, 
funding from external partners is usually earmarked for specific projects and 
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capacity enhancement in specific areas, which has a knock on effect on 
medium and long-term planning, limiting capacity development to projects for 
which ad hoc external funding can be secured, leaving many areas of the APSA 
neglected, such as Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (Suifon 
2010).  
Enabling Factors 
As chapters five, six and seven highlighted, the APSA has been kept 
operational through transformative levels of financial support from its external 
partners, mostly on an ad hoc basis. Ad hoc external support to the APSA had 
been the only thing keeping AMIS and AMISOM operational at some points. 
Training programmes, equipment, logistics, intelligence, Command, Control and 
Communications (C3), heavy airlift, camp-building, food delivery and more have 
been provided by PMCs, which have in turn been paid for with earmarked funds 
provided by the United States or, in many cases, contracted directly by the 
United States on the APSA’s behalf. Several other major partners have 
provided similar assistance, especially the UK and France. 
The EU, however, has taken its support to the APSA beyond the ad hoc model, 
providing a lifeline for the APSA’s peace support operations by institutionalising 
an income stream from the development aid budget that is made available to 
the APSA with certain restrictions. These restrictions aside, a stable, regularly 
replenished, and most importantly, vast, source of funds like the APF is a major 
enabling factor, facilitating longer term projects as well as providing a standing 




A simple reading of the APSA’s financial capacity would conclude that the 
APSA could not have a role as a major peace and security actor. The reality is 
quite different; because of external support, the APSA has tremendous financial 
capacity available to it. The fact that it does not come from Africa does not 
make it any less integral to the APSA’s interactionist role. However, even with 
external support, the APSA’s financial capacity has struggled to support its 
workload at times, and has never been more than the bare minimum required to 
prevent mission failure, indicating that financial capacity, more than any other 
factor, is defining the ultimate extent of the APSA’s interactionist role. Yet, 
considering the scale of those missions, and their relative success, it is fair to 
say that the APSA’s net capacity in this area is formidable. 
Military Capacity and Force Generation 
Military capacity and effective force generation is vital for any organisation 
which intends to play a role in peace and security. Limiting and enabling factors 
in this area have been related to financial capacity, and the APSA has relied 
upon external partners to bridge the gap. It is the boundaries established by 
these limiting and enabling factors that really define the types of PSOs that the 
APSA can field and the tools available to it. 
Limiting Factors 
The APSA has no standing military capacity as the ASF is many years from full 
operationalisation. As a result, the APSA has had to rely upon traditional force 
generation techniques and the Burundi Model, which has been less successful 
at building balanced and well supported forces in Africa than elsewhere owing 
to the limited capacity and resources of African militaries. The APSA has 
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suffered from a severe lack of military capacity, especially a lack of key 
equipment, vehicles, airlift, air support, logistics capacity, strategic capacity and 
specialist expertise. The APSA has no standing depots and relies entirely on 
the sending countries and external partners to equip field missions. The APSA 
has not been able to pay wages to personnel deployed on its past field 
missions, or as in the case of Nigeria’s contingent to AMIS II, it has not even 
been able to transport available troops to the theatre.  
The Burundi Model, used extensively by the APSA to pay for deployments, 
requires that TCCs pay for the maintenance of their own contingents in the 
field. In light of the limited economic capacity of most African countries, and the 
considerable expense of deploying and maintaining a military force abroad, 
often hundreds of miles away, it is not surprising that there is little political will to 
contribute to APSA missions. 
Another potential limitation on force generation is the number of troops 
authorised in the mission mandate. In 2010, the APSA increased the mandated 
force strength of AMISOM to 20,000, but the UN, which had by then agreed to 
help to pay for the force, only authorised 12,000. This led to complaints from 
Uganda that they had several battalions waiting to deploy that were stuck in 
Uganda because they were not authorised. However, as chapter seven 
demonstrated, both AMIS and AMISOM spent most of their existence 
significantly below their mandated force strengths. 
Enabling Factors 
The United States, the UK, France and NATO have provided operational 
support in the form of camp building, strategic airlift and air support. Many 
external actors have also provided funding, training, equipment, expertise, 
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personnel and other forms of support to help bridge many of the capacity gaps 
in the militaries of key APSA member states. This type of support has gradually 
improved the quality of African contingents enabling the APSA to take on the 
role of a major peacekeeping agency, fielding UN-scale missions such as AMIS 
and AMISOM. The transition to UN leadership of the missions is also a major 
enabler for force generation, as TCCs know that they will be reimbursed by the 
UN; however, the impact of this enabling factor has been limited by the UN’s 
failure to deploy promptly, or even at all. 
Conclusion 
The APSA’s military capacity is growing as many of the externally-led training 
programmes come to fruition. However, chapter seven highlighted how long it 
has taken for its missions to get up to full strength; both AMIS and AMISOM 
took years to reach their mandated strengths, indicating that this is another 
defining factor of the APSA’s interactionist role; a solid boundary beyond which 
the APSA cannot act. External capacity enhancement in this area constitutes 
the bulk of the money spent on the APSA by external partners, paying 
hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain troops in the field, to provide the 
necessary equipment and to facilitate deployment. As a result of the 
transformative external investment in this area, the APSA has taken on a highly 
militaristic aspect, with military and force generation capacity becoming a 
defining feature of the APSA’s interactionist role. Even still, despite this huge 
effort to bridge the APSA’s capacity gaps in force generation and the military 
capacity of troop contingents, the pressures of various limiting factors, including 
the extremely challenging nature of the PSO operational environments 
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themselves, means that military capacity and force generation is still one of the 
APSA’s most pressing limiting factors in net terms. 
Where the APSA has no Capacity, or Negligible Capacity 
There are some areas of the APSA’s capacity that were prominent in its 
endemic functionalist role but have received little attention from external 
partners. Some of these key areas are listed below as areas of capacity that do 
not constitute a significant element of the APSA’s interactionist role. 
Sanctions 
Although the treaty framework lists coercive sanctions as part of its 
enforcement capacity, the APSA has never had the capacity to enforce 
sanctions effectively, and this capacity gap has never been bridged. However, 
the United Nations has imposed sanctions at the request of the APSA. For 
example, when Eritrea was found to be supporting the ARS in Somalia, the 
APSA requested that the UN impose sanctions on Eritrea, which it did in 
Resolution 1907 (2009) and subsequent resolutions. This indicates that 
implementing sanctions is not really part of the APSA’s role and that this 
responsibility remains with the UNSC. 
Conflict Prevention 
The Continental Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise have 
received some limited support from external partners, but compared to other 
areas of the APSA, they have effectively been abandoned. Rarely used, and 
rarely effective, the APSA’s conflict prevention capacity is still very low. 
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Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development  
The APSA’s role in post-conflict reconstruction and development has been 
negligible, and there has been almost no effort on the part of external partners 
to develop it (Suifon 2010). 
Conclusion 
These areas are not simply capacity gaps; they are capacity flat-lines. The 
realities of the APSA’s failure to develop capacity in these areas highlight the 
importance of understanding the interactionist role, and the weaknesses of the 
endemic functionalist role. Policy that is based on the latter could soon find that 
it is designed to support a capacity that does not exist. A clear idea of the 
APSA’s interactionist role highlights the extent of the work required to develop 
meaningful capacity in these areas. 
Outlining the Interactionist Role of the APSA 
This summary has provided a brief overview of the net effects of some of the 
most powerful limiting and enabling factors influencing the role played by 
APSA. However, to complete the implementation of Institutional Role Theory, it 
is necessary to synthesise the cumulative effects of these limiting and enabling 
factors and, in so doing, define the interactionist role of the APSA.  
Based upon the findings of the previous chapters, the APSA in fact plays 
multiple roles:  
1. Intercontinental framework for action on Africa 
2. Part of the United Nations system 
3. First Responder and Civilian Protection Force 
4. Regime Protector 
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5. Statement of African Political Will  
 
However, it does not play all these roles to the same extent, as will be 
described below. 
Intercontinental Framework for Action on Africa  
 
The APSA’s biggest role is as a partner for the UN, the EU, and the US, as well 
as key African Nation States like South Africa and Nigeria, in global peace and 
security. It is a framework for the consolidation of disparate peace and security 
efforts from various states and organisations inside and out of Africa. The 
preceding chapters have shown that the APSA is multi-continental to its core. 
The APSA’s decision-making structure is penetrated by external partners at 
almost every level; in particular, decisions made in Brussels or New York have 
very real effects upon the day-to-day running of the organisation. The APSA 
can only function at all because of the very close working relationships that it 
has with the UN, the EU, the USA and many other bilateral and multilateral 
partners. The APSA is governed, equipped, trained and funded, not solely, or 
even largely, by African states, but by its many international partners. In 
essence, the APSA is an intercontinental solution to African problems. 
However, as the Security Council recently reiterated that “the need for support 
does not amount to dependency. Instead, it must be viewed as a vital 
partnership in the global quest for maintaining international peace and security” 
(United Nations 2011a: 7). The problems that the organisation deals with are 
not just African problems, but global problems. Thus, the thesis confirms and 
extends one element of Klingebiel’s view of the role of the APSA: 
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“The African peace and security architecture (APSA) is not an isolated 
regime comprising only African actors: this evolving architecture forms part of 
an international context, and foreign actors are increasingly becoming 
involved in African peace and security matters” (Stephan Klingebiel et al. 
2008: 65-66). 
Part of the UN System 
Building on from the APSA’s role as a multi-continental framework is the fact 
that the APSA is fundamentally, and increasingly, integrated into the UN system 
and shares many of the World Organisation’s objectives, and this has become 
another core part of the APSA’s interactionist role. The interactionist role of the 
APSA in this regard is to create the conditions necessary for peace, to support 
the signing of a ceasefire agreement, and to provide the core of a 
peacekeeping force until the UN can take over. Its role is to support the United 
Nations’ work in Africa, not replace it. 
The APSA is a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The 
two organisations have been working to improve coherence between AU and 
UN integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian 
components, to facilitate the transition of missions and personnel between the 
APSA and the UN (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 45). We have seen this 
transition in action in Burundi and, belatedly, in Sudan. Indeed, the APSA’s 
experiences in Sudan highlighted the boundaries of the APSA’s interactionist 
role in this area, primarily its lack of control over the United Nations’ willingness 
to deploy. The United Nations, however, is beginning to understand the 
importance of co-opting the APSA. Vinay Kumar, India’s representative to the 
UNSC, explained recently that “it would add to the credibility of the Council’s 
action if serious consideration were given to the views of the African Union, in 
268 
 
particular when the AU can help in expeditiously and peacefully resolving a 
crisis” (United Nations 2011a: 13). 
Acting as part of the UN system, there are three main categories of inter-
organisational peacekeeping cooperation within which the APSA’s close 
relationship with the UN can take place; hybrids, co-deployments, and 
transitions (Derblom, Frisell and Schmidt 2008: 39). The APSA has participated 
in all three categories during its short existence, making all three important 
parts of its interactionalist role; however, it has focussed most of its attention on 
transitional cooperation, or ‘bridging’, with highly variable levels of success. 
AMIB is particularly important as a proof-of-concept for APSA peace support 
operations acting as bridgeheads for United Nations PKOs. The United Nations 
could not deploy to Burundi in 2003 because the operational environment did 
not meet the criteria required for a peacekeeping mission to be authorised 
under the Charter; in particular, there was no peace treaty to enforce and 
violence was on-going. However, upon the conclusion of AMIB’s mandate on 
31 May 2004, the UN was able to deploy the United Nations Operation in 
Burundi (ONUB) (Svensson 2008a: 14). This was made possible through the 
work of the APSA. AMIB’s deployment created a zone of stability and security 
in Burundi that allowed disparate interests to come together and negotiate, 
including leaders who had previously fled abroad. Although violence did 
continue in some parts of the country, these negotiations led to the 
establishment of a national government and the beginning of a peace process, 
thereby providing the United Nations with a “peace to keep” (Svensson 2008a: 
15). AMIB had facilitated the beginnings of the peace process, allowing the UN 
to take over the mission in 2004.  
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AMIB forces remaining in Burundi  were simply ‘re-hatted’ as ONUB forces; the 
1041 South African troops, 853 Ethiopian troops and 225 Mozambican troops 
provided ONUB with a backbone of experienced soldiers for the mission (UNSC 
2004: 14). Further support was provided by the AMIB ‘Lead-State’, South 
Africa, which agreed to maintain its maritime, special forces, military police, 
headquarters protection and engineering units until replacements were 
deployed (UNSC 2004: 8). South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique continued to 
play an important role in ONUB throughout its deployment (UNSC 2005a: 15-
17).  
It is interesting to note that the AU has re-established it presence in the wake of 
ONUB’s withdrawal to support the implementation of the 2006 comprehensive 
peace agreement. ONUB began drawing-down its military components near the 
end of 2006 (UNSC 2006a: 14), leading to the successful conclusion of the 
mandate on 31 December 2006, and the establishment of the United Nations 
Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) (UNSC 2007a: 1). However, the South 
African battalion remained in Burundi and on 29 December 2006, it was 
returned to African Union control, forming the core of the African Union Special 
Task Force for Burundi (UNSC 2007a: 1). The African Union Special Task 
Force comprises a headquarters, maintenance platoon, support elements, the 
South African infantry battalion in the role of a VIP Protection Unit and a Rapid 
Reaction Force (Ross 2009: 15). Although Burundi is the first AU peace support 
operation to reach this late stage in the process, the AU’s renewed 
responsibilities in Burundi might indicate a role for the APSA in consolidating 
peace after the UN missions have withdrawn. The AU’s decision to maintain an 
armed presence in Burundi turned out to be farsighted as hostilities broke out 
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between Palipehutu-FNL and the government security forces in May 2007 
(UNSC 2008: 1). 
The UN/AU relationship is interdependent; in the context of the UN’s ultimate 
responsibility for security in Africa, the APSA’s ‘bridging role’ seems like the 
APSA enhancing the capacity of the UN, lending their local expertise, 
experience, position in-theatre and their good offices to the UN in support of its 
objectives in Africa. Although it is not referred to as such, this is essentially 
what the United Nations is referring to when it talks about ‘synergy’ or 
‘comparative advantage’ (United Nations 2009c: 5).  
While the concept of the APSA as a ‘bridging’ organisation is quite widely 
recognised among scholars and practitioners alike, there are signs, however, 
that the APSA’s bridging role is in decline. The successful hand over in Burundi 
was followed by an extremely delayed handover in Sudan, where the APSA 
waited years before the UN could take over. In Somalia, the UN has 
consistently failed to deploy. The recent turn of events in the country, leading to 
the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab and the consolidation of TFG control were paid 
for and supported by the UN and other partners. However, these recent 
successes have been achieved through the framework of AMISOM, by APSA 
troops with the re-involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia, not through the 
framework of a United Nations mission. In Comoros, the APSA restored 
constitutional order without any expectation of support or even a mandate from 
the United Nations. Therefore, the APSA’s role as a bridging force might well be 
stagnating, if not actually in decline. 
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First Responder and Civilian Protection Force 
Another core element of the APSA’s interactionist role is as first responder. Ad 
hoc force generation through the Burundi Model may be inefficient and 
unsustainable in the long term, but, if there is sufficient interest from African 
regional powers, it can be a relatively swift modus operandi, especially because 
it does not require the lengthy process of collecting and authorising funds 
centrally. Further, the APSA has the legal capacity to intervene early on in a 
conflict situation, and can use its good offices and local expertise and 
knowledge to negotiate entry. In this regard, the APSA’s military capacity 
problems may be a bonus; the government of Sudan is not afraid that the APSA 
will flatten Khartoum in a bout of ‘humanitarian bombing’, because even if it 
wanted to, it lacks the capacity to do so.  
Once the APSA has secured early-phase deployment in-theatre, its primary 
interactionist role is to establish conditions on the ground conducive to peace, 
with the ultimate expectation of the UN assuming control of the mission as soon 
as possible. This has generally consisted of bolstering tentative ceasefires with 
military observers and peacekeepers. However, the APSA has also begun to 
develop responsibilities in the protection of civilians, especially IDPs. This 
interactionist role has developed as a result of the AMIS and AMISOM, which 
were both deployed for years longer than originally intended, resulting in a role 
which was originally intended to remain with the UN falling upon the shoulders 
of the APSA. 
The civilian protection role was a less important element of the APSA’s first 
mission, AMIB; although protection of combatants and their leaders during the 
peace negotiations and DDR was one of the main reasons for the mission—
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exemplified by the VIP protection force. AMIS was originally intended to provide 
protection only for MILOBS. The APSA was fully aware of its lack of capacity to 
protect civilians, but began developing its role in this area as it became clear 
that no other organisations were prepared to deploy to such a violent part of the 
world.  
In AMISOM, protection was the main focus of the mandate; however, the focus 
was on protecting VIPs and infrastructure rather than civilians. The violent 
mission environment prevented the APSA from playing an extensive role in 
protecting civilians as it only controlled small sections of the city. All the same, 
the fact that a disproportionately large proportion of the city population 
remained in APSA held territory – 80 per cent of the population of Mogadishu 
lived in the 33 per cent controlled by AMISOM in mid-2011 (African Union 
2011d: 3)—shows that AMISOM’s reputation as an effective protection force 
was starting to gain ground. 
There has been significant negative characterisation of the APSA’s protection 
record in the field. In particular, critics recommended a broader protection 
mandate for AMIS, possibly even including enforcement action without the 
consent of Khartoum. However, this would have been impossible as the APSA 
would not have had the military capacity to protect civilians and maintain itself 
in the field, as expanding the mandate would not have improved force 
generation. In fact, the mission would have been more volatile, possibly much 
more dangerous for civilians and certainly less appealing to potential TCCs had 
the Sudanese government opposed its presence. Even with AMIS’s extremely 
limited rules of engagement, the AU forces in Darfur came under attack on 
multiple occasions (Ekengard 2008: 25-29). In Somalia, by contrast, where the 
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support of the Transitional Federal Government for AMISOM is unwavering, the 
APSA force has been able to evolve into a much more proactive role, acting 
almost as a surrogate military for the TFG.  
Regime Protector 
Despite the fanfare for Article 4(h), it has never been a part of the interactionist 
role of the APSA. However, the unratified amendments to Article 4 that would 
allow intervention in the case of ‘unconstitutional changes of government’ have 
been exercised to a certain extent. The APSA has intervened to protect what it 
perceived to be constitutional legitimacy in Somalia and Comoros, establishing 
an interactionist role in what could be termed ‘regime protection’, or ‘the 
protection of constitutional order’.  
It was in this light that chapter seven emphasised AMISOM and Operation 
Democracy as marking a significant change in the role played by the APSA. 
While AMIB and AMIS were fairly traditional peacekeeping missions, made 
unusual by the early stage in the peace process at which they deployed, the 
missions in Comoros and Somalia were clear examples of the APSA taking the 
side of the government, protecting low-capacity regimes against 
unconstitutional changes of government by coming in and providing a surrogate 
military capacity. 
Operation Democracy and AMISOM (and in some instances AMIB and AMIS) 
are examples of the APSA playing the role of a surrogate state army, rather 
than a neutral peace keeping force. This is one way of countering some of the 
recent criticisms of peacekeeping as being toothless or too neutral, criticisms 
stemming from the UN’s perceived failure to respond effectively to the 
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Rwandan Genocide and Srebrenica. Such criticism has usually been focused 
around the idea that peacekeeping simply extends the duration of conflicts by 
allowing both sides time to replenish their strength, that the peace process is 
deliberately extended by the leaders of the conflict parties to take advantage of 
the UN’s hospitality, or that it prevents a clear winner from emerging and 
building a strong central government. The APSA’s actions have sometimes 
indicated a preference for stability over democratic ‘luxuries’, and the 
importance of ending conflict and establishing security in order to provide a 
stable environment for economic growth. One way to quickly end wars, and 
avoid the messy process of establishing consensus governments, giving into 
rebel demands or partitioning the country, is to pick winners; in the case of 
AMISOM and Operation Democracy, this has involved the APSA entering the 
conflict on the side of the incumbent regime.  
Of course, it is not part of the APSA’s endemic functionalist role to supplement 
national armies with multinational forces; however, it is part of the APSA’s 
endemic functionalist role to guarantee security on the continent, ensure 
stability, protect civilians and promote economic growth, all of which may be 
best served by a speedy, rather than neutral, intervention to end to the conflict. 
The increased security and stability that this could bring to African governments 
may facilitate economic growth, stronger centralised institutions and more 
effective security forces. 
Statement of African Political Will  
Finally, as explained earlier in the chapter, the APSA’s role as an ‘African 
solution to African problems’ is questionable because of its lack of capacity to 
play the lead role in funding, planning, supporting, equipping and managing its 
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own efforts in peace and security. However, one of the most basic elements of 
the APSA’s interactionist role is to generate and maintain African political will. 
This is not quite the strong pan-Africanist role envisaged by the founders and 
by pan-African academics, but as a result of the APSA’s successes, the world 
takes Africa’s role in peace and security much more seriously (compared with 
the OAU). 
If an African-owned regional security project is going to develop, it will certainly 
be through the APSA framework; the APSA is a safe environment for African 
projects as it has the training wheels of foreign support. Meanwhile, it is steadily 
developing the capacity to field missions on its own, in terms of expertise, 
experience logistics and military capacity (especially the ASF). Nonetheless, 
literal African ownership in financial terms has not improved, and the APSA will 
be dependent upon external funding, and will have to live with all the attendant 
effects upon its capacity to act until Africa’s economic development is much 
further along. 
Repercussions for the APSA’s Endemic Functionalist Role 
The APSA’s endemic functionalist role should not be interpreted as indicative of 
the role of the APSA. It could be seen, perhaps, more as a long-term objective, 
as an expression of will, or, on its most basic level, as an enabling factor; a 
description of what the African Heads of State and Government give the APSA 
permission to do, and not a description of what it does, or necessarily should 
do. 
However, the interactionist role of the APSA is not simply a deflated version of 
the endemic functionalist role; it has strengths in areas that were not envisioned 
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in the endemic functionalist role. In light of this, it is clear that the interactionist 
role explains more about the realities of the role played by the APSA than the 
endemic functionalist role can. 
Repercussions for the Projected Functionalist Role 
The interactionist role of the APSA has also proved quite different from the 
projected functionalist role, as the definition of the role of the APSA in this 
chapter does not match any one author’s definition; all authors have been right 
and wrong on some level. However, none of the authors had a fully accurate 
conception of the role played by the APSA. 
Bergholm states that “... international organisations are affected by failures, 
scandals and poor or uneven performance. That is ... why the outcome or 
quality of an organisation’s execution of its decisions warrants comprehensive 
analysis” (Bergholm 2009: 159). It also, however, means that such analyses 
should be as accurate and objective as possible, as they themselves impact 
upon the direction and scale of the APSA’s role. Unfortunately, Bergholm’s 
thesis, like the rest of the APSA discourse, relies on a preconceived projected 
functionalist role for the APSA which is not fully defended or explained. As 
Bergholm says herself, the mandate of AMIS “acted as a normative yardstick 
against which wider audiences now judged the AU’s performance”. Therefore, if 
that mandate has been misrepresented as a civilian protection mandate, 
without any evidence to back that up, when (as Bergholm herself accepts) its 
main focus is actually military observation, then expectations are not going to 
correspond to performance. AMIS’s endemic functionalist role was military 
observer. However, Bergholm’s projected functionalist role for AMIS was 
civilian protection (Bergholm 2009: 160); she finds AMIS correspondingly 
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unsuccessful as a result of its failure to perform a civilian protection role in 
Darfur. 
This is problematic for several reasons; despite western support for a civilian 
protection mandate, there was not a global consensus on the matter; as 
Bergholm (2009: 155-157) points out, China and Russia were not in favour of 
intervention. More importantly, the task set for the mission, in both the UN and 
PSC mandates, did not include civilian protection except for civilians in the 
immediate vicinity of AMIS forces, and only if they have the capacity to 
intervene successfully (the average MILOB protection force only consisted of a 
single section of about eight soldiers). They also explicitly state the Government 
of Sudan has responsibility for civilian protection. 
The fact that AMIS forces were able to bend the mandate to employ preventive 
deployments to the extent that they did indicates that the APSA was able to 
achieve a higher level of civilian protection than it was originally tasked with in 
Darfur. This indicates success, not failure. AMIS may not have lived up to 
Bergholm’s projected functionalist role, but that returns us to the original 
problem with the APSA scholarship: why is one projected functionalist role 
more valid than another? Authors tend not to address this head-on; Bergholm’s 
thesis takes the need for AMIS to perform a civilian protection role in Darfur as 
self-evident.  
This thesis has argued that, regardless of what observers would have liked the 
APSA to do in Darfur (protect every civilian, protect all aid workers, arrest all 
janjaweed etc.), the realities of the APSA’s limiting and enabling factors means 
that such an expanded role is not possible. It therefore makes little sense to 
judge the APSA to be unsuccessful for failing to achieve an objective which it 
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did not set itself, which the UN did not set for it, which the international 
community of states did not agree upon, and which was effectively impossible 
anyway. 
How Will this New Perception of Role Will Affect the Discourse 
Moving the Debate away from Pointless Criticism 
Creating a more evidence-based framework for analysing the role of 
organisations does not stifle useful debate. For example, by showing that 
widespread protection of civilians was outside of the role of the AMIS, 
Institutional Role Theory is simply moving the debate along, invalidating 
discourse that is devoted to criticising the mission for something that is outside 
its interactionist role and moving the debate towards more productive areas 
such as: Should we try to develop the role of the APSA as a protection force? 
How much capacity enhancement would be required for this? Will the APSA’s 
governance be willing to take on an expanded role in this area? Would this role 
be better performed outside the framework of the APSA, through nation states 
of other international organisations? Should the UN be pressured to deploy 
earlier in the peace process and support APSA missions sooner? 
For example, at the time Williams (2006) was writing, the APSA did not have a 
significant role in protection, somewhat invalidating his criticisms of the APSA 
for not doing so extensively. A more worthwhile approach may have been to 
explain the need for civilian protection and suggest who should provide such 
assistance. Williams did do this to a certain extent, but his suggestions were 
based upon a projected functionalist view of the role of NATO and the UN; 
Africa is out of NATO’s area. Likewise, the United Nations is a peacekeeping 
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organisation, and cannot deploy unless there is a peace process or at least a 
cease-fire. The fact that these did not exist in Darfur at the time meant that it 
was outside the role of the UN. Again, explaining why it should be part of the 
UN’s responsibilities and how to operationalise such a change to the legal 
framework and capacities of the UN could have been another focus for his 
efforts on the topic.  
Institutional role theory does not invalidate projected functionalist perspectives, 
however, which can certainly be useful as goals towards which an 
organisation’s interactionist role could be directed. However, it does encourage 
authors to explain and justify these perspectives more carefully; for example; 
Bergholm criticised the APSA because “when AMIS was endorsed, its troops 
were not screened, briefed, trained or equipped for the task [civilian protection] 
that was expected of them” (Bergholm 2009: 168). This criticism becomes less 
valid if AMIS was never designed nor intended to play a civilian protection role.  
New Framework for Debate over the Extent of Limiting and Enabling 
Factors 
Institutional Role Theory also creates a new framework for debate over the 
extent and nature of the limiting and enabling factors that have exerted 
pressure upon the organisation. Although this thesis provides an initial 
exploration of these factors, the debate over their effects and extents should 
continue in order to refine our understanding of the role. 
Updating the Framework 
The thesis has suggested a chronological context for the role of the APSA, and 
highlighted its trajectory; however, limiting and enabling factors continue to 
affect the APSAs role and in the future it will evolve. Documenting new limiting 
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and enabling factors, and monitoring existing ones, will be necessary to provide 
a clear and up-to-date view of the APSA’s interactionist role. 
Focusing on the Real Role as an Objective Basis for Policy 
The endemic functionalist and projected functionalist definitions of the role of 
the APSA have both been shown to be misleading. The interactionist definition 
of the role of the APSA presents an objective, evidence-based view of the role 
of the APSA, and where its strengths and weaknesses lie. This can then be 
used as a basis for policy, either as a reference for the prioritisation of capacity 
building, or as a basis for understanding the APSA’s place in Africa’s strategic 
environment. 
Functionalist roles also have a part to play in policy, but this thesis has shown 
that they cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of what the 
organisation is, only what they think that it ought to be. Deciding between 
various projected functionalist roles or the endemic functionalist role as the long 
term objective, or ideal outcome of capacity enhancement may be a key 
element of policy decisions; however, those same decisions need to have a 
clear foundation in an accurate understanding of the role that the organisation 
currently plays, allowing policy makers to make a more measured decision 
about which functionalist roles are realistic policy objectives, which are too 
ambitious and which aim to move the organisation in an unwanted direction. 
As this thesis has shown, the role of an organisation is determined by myriad 
influences; enabling factors would have to start pushing to expand the role 
played by the APSA in any one dimension, while corresponding limiting factors 
would have to reduce their pressure at the same time. Legality, capacity, 
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external support and governance all need to work together to push for an 
expansion. Moreover, there needs to be a requirement for this expansion in the 
regional security environment in which the APSA operates. 
Adapting Institutional Role Theory for other International Actors  
As this extended case study has demonstrated, Institutional Role Theory could 
help improve our understanding of the division of labour in international 
relations, and could also help to highlight widespread limiting factors and 
ineffective enabling factors. It could be possible to work out the interactionist 
role of multiple organisations working in the same field (e.g. the APSA, the AU 
and the EU as peacekeeping agencies in Africa) and compare them to explore 
relative success and failure, strengths and weaknesses. It is therefore hoped 
that it will be applied as an analytical framework in the study of other 
international actors. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has highlighted the need for academics to be much more careful 
about the use of terms such as success, failure, performance and especially 
role, when dealing with institutions like the APSA in international relations. It 
has reconceptualised what we mean by the word role, establishing a new 
version of Role Theory, which can be used in International Relations. It has 
provided technical definitions for three core uses of the word role and applied 
them to the APSA. In particular, this thesis has sought to define the APSA in 
interactionist terms as a way of establishing an objective, systematic and 
repeatable assessment of its role. 
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The thesis does not just describe what the role of the APSA is, it explains why 
and how the APSA plays that role through a careful analysis of the myriad 
limiting and enabling factors acting upon the APSA; twisting, shaping and 
moulding its role into something other than what was intended or what is 
expected. The thesis has thereby challenged pre-existing conceptualisations of 
the role of the APSA, especially criticising what the thesis has termed projected 
functionalist interpretations of the role of the APSA, which remain prominent in 
the literature. The definition of the role of the APSA presented in this chapter 
can be seen to have satisfied the objectives of the thesis, providing an all-
encompassing definition of the role of the APSA, arrived at systematically 
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